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Abstract 
 
 The interference between language and music has become a matter of study 
since the formulation of Patel’s hypothesis (2003), that is the Shared Syntactic Integration 
Resource Hypothesis (SSIRH). According to this framework, the processing of the 
syntax of both language and music requires the same neural resources, located in the 
frontal areas of the brain, whereas the representations associated to musical syntax 
are distinct from those associated to linguistic syntax, and involve distinct neural 
resources. In the last decades, both behavioral and neuroimaging works tested 
whether there is actually an interaction between language and music. From a purely 
syntactic perspective, some authors (Fedorenko et al. 2009, Slevc et al. 2009, Fiveash 
and Pammer, 2014, Hoch et al. 2011, Koelsch et al. 2005, Steinbeis and Koelsch, 
2008a) confirmed SSIRH’s predictions, while there is no general agreement on the 
results of the investigation of linguistic semantic processing interacting with 
simultaneously presented harmonic incongruities (see Besson et al. 1998, Bonnel et al. 
2001, Poulin-Charronat et al. 2005). Until now, as far as we know, the relationship 
between pragmatic knowledge in language and musical grammar has not been tested, 
yet. In this thesis, I take up the following questions: Does implicit musical processing 
interfere with the computation of scalar implicatures? Is there any difference between 
musicians and non-musicians regarding the music/pragmatics potential interference? 
In providing an answer to my research questions, I will also test the Relevance 
Theory predictions on the computation of scalar implicatures (implicatures are 
expected to be cognitively costly) by evaluating and assessing previous studies in the 
field of experimental pragmatics.  
 Study 1 is a statement evaluation task whose accuracy results show a worse 
performance of both groups (musicians and non-musicians) while processing scalar 
implicatures in the presence of music. Particularly, in RTs analysis, I found that non-
musicians are slower compared to musicians when computing infelicitous sentences. 
My study generally confirms that pragmatically infelicitous sentences are more 
difficult to be computed than pragmatically felicitous sentences, according to the 
predictions made by Relevance Theory. As for the interaction between language and 
music a significant interaction of music in the infelicitous context has been found. 
However, I deepen the analysis by adding more musical conditions in the following 
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study. Study 2, a sentence picture verification task, implements Study 1 because it 
tests the music/pragmatics interaction with respect to more musical conditions (no 
music condition, music in tune condition, out-of-key chord condition and loudness 
manipulation condition). Relevance Theory’s predictions, according to which 
pragmatically infelicitous sentences are more difficult to process than pragmatically 
felicitous sentences, are further confirmed. Moreover, though an interference 
between language and music has clearly emerged, the interference emerging in my 
study manifested itself independently of the nature of the relevant musical condition, 
and more specifically, independently of whether the interfering music was in tune or 
with a dissonant target chord, differently from what emerged from a variety of 
studies testing the interference with strictly syntactic processing. In these studies, 
manipulating the musical condition, i.e. making musical processing more difficult by 
means of a dissonant target chord, has the effect of subtracting resources to syntactic 
processing of linguistic stimuli. Thus, it is possible to claim that as far as scalar 
implicature computations are involved, language interferes with music only at a 
general cognitive level (i.e. at the level of the general cognitive burden presupposed 
by some complex dual task) and not because musical syntax and scalar implicature 
processing consume the very same neural resources in the brain. As for the 
differences between musicians and non-musicians, in Study 2 no differences have 
been found concerning the performance of the two groups with respect to the 
different musical conditions. Interestingly, however, non-musicians had a worse 
performance than musicians while processing the infelicitous sentences.  
 Overall, the results show that the computation of scalar implicatures is more 
difficult in the pragmatically infelicitous context than in the pragmatically felicitous 
context, as predicted by the Relevance Theory approach. Moreover, music interferes 
with pragmatic processing of linguistic stimuli. This happens only at a general 
cognitive level, in accordance with the relative complexity of a dual task involving 
both linguistic and musical stimuli, while the data do not support the hypothesis that 
the musical and the pragmatic computation revolve around the same network of 
neural resources in the brain. This can be straightforwardly interpreted as an 
important class of evidence for the SSIRH. Regarding the differences between 
musicians and non-musicians, I found that non-musicians have a worse performance 
both in terms of RT (Study 1) and of accuracy (Study 2), in the pragmatically 
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infelicitous condition, with respect to musicians. This can be due to an experimental 
artefact, but it might also be related to the cognitive benefits of musical training on 
the execution of the complex set of computations required by processing infelicitous 
sentences containing scalar terms.  
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 L’interferenza tra linguaggio e musica è diventata oggetto di studio a partire 
dalla formulazione dell’ipotesi di Patel (2003), la Shared Syntactic Integration Resource 
Hypothesis (SSIRH). Secondo questo quadro teorico, il processing della sintassi 
linguistica e musicale richiede le stesse risorse neurali, localizzate nelle aree frontali 
del cervello, mentre le rappresentazioni associate alla sintassi musicale sono distinte 
da quelle associate alla sintassi linguistica, e coinvolgono risorse neurali differenti. 
Nelle ultime decadi, studi comportamentali e di neuroimmagine hanno testato 
l’esistenza effettiva di un’interazione tra musica e linguaggio. Da una prospettiva 
puramente sintattica, alcuni autori (Fedorenko et al. 2009, Slevc et al. 2009, Fiveash 
and Pammer, 2014, Hoch et al. 2011, Koelsch et al. 2005, Steinbeis and Koelsch, 
2008a) hanno confermato le predizioni della SSIRH, mentre non c’è lo stesso 
accordo sui risultati di interazione nell’elaborazione della semantica presentata 
simultaneamente alle incongruità armoniche (vedi Besson et al. 1998, Bonnel et al. 
2001, Poulin-Charronat et al. 2005). Fino ad ora, per quanto ne sappiamo, la relazione 
tra la pragmatica linguistica e la grammatica musicale non è ancora stata testata. In 
questa tesi, mi occupo delle seguenti questioni: il processing musicale implicito 
interferisce con la computazione delle implicature scalari? Ci sono differenze tra 
musicisti e non-musicisti nella potenziale interferenza tra musica e pragmatica? Nel 
volgermi queste domande, testerò anche le predizioni della Relevance Theory sulla 
computazione delle implicature scalari (ci si aspetta che le implicature siano 
cognitivamente più costose) analizzando studi precedenti condotti nel campo della 
pragmatica sperimentale.  
 Lo Studio 1 è uno statement evaluation task i cui risultati mostrano una 
prestazione peggiore per entrambi i gruppi (musicisti e non musicisti) nel processing 
delle implicature scalari in presenza di musica. In particolare, dall’analisi dei tempi di 
reazione, ho trovato che i non musicisti sono più lenti se comparati con i musicisti 
nella computazione delle frasi infelici. Il mio studio, seguendo le predizioni della 
Relevance Theory, conferma che le frasi pragmaticamente infelici sono più difficili da 
computare delle frasi pragmaticamente felici. Per quanto riguarda l’interazione tra 
linguaggio e musica, ho riscontrato un’interazione significativa della musica nel 
contesto infelice. Tuttavia, ho approfondito l’analisi aggiungendo altre condizioni 
musicali nello studio successivo. Lo Studio 2, un sentence picture verification task, 
implementa lo Studio 1 poiché testa l’interazione tra musica e pragmatica con 
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l’aggiunta di più condizioni musicali (condizione senza musica, condizione con 
musica in tonalità, condizione con accordo fuori tonalità e condizione di 
manipolazione del volume). Le predizioni della Relevance Theory, secondo cui le 
frasi pragmaticamente infelici sono più difficili da computare delle frasi 
pragmaticamente felici, sono state nuovamente confermate. Inoltre, nonostante sia 
emersa chiaramente un’interferenza tra linguaggio e musica, l’interferenza che emerge 
nel mio studio si manifesta indipendentemente dalla natura della condizione 
musicale, e più specificamente, indipendentemente dalla natura della frase musicale, 
se in tonalità o con accordo target stonato. Ciò è diverso da quanto emerso da molti 
altri studi che testano l’interferenza con riferimento al solo aspetto sintattico. In 
questi studi, manipolare la condizione musicale, ossia rendere più difficile il processing 
musicale per mezzo dell’accordo target non in tonalità, ha l’effetto di sottrarre risorse 
cognitive al processing dello stimolo linguistico sintattico. Perciò, è possibile affermare 
che per quanto concerne le implicature scalari, il linguaggio interferisce con la musica 
solo a un livello generale (vale a dire a livello del carico generale cognitivo 
presupposto dal doppio task) e non perché la sintassi musicale e il processing delle 
implicature scalari richiedano le stesse risorse neurali nel cervello. Per quanto 
riguarda le differenze tra musicisti e non musicisti, nello Studio 2 non si riscontrano 
differenze se si guardano ai risultati dell’interazione nelle diverse condizioni musicali. 
È comunque interessante notare che i non musicisti hanno una prestazione peggiore 
dei musicisti nel processing delle frasi infelici. 
 Nel complesso, i risultati mostrano che la computazione delle implicature 
scalari è più difficile nel contesto pragmaticamente infelice rispetto al contesto 
pragmaticamente felice, così come predetto dalla Relevance Theory. Inoltre, la 
musica interferisce con il processing linguistico pragmatico ma solo ad un livello 
cognitivo generale. Ciò avviene in accordo con la relativa complessità del doppio task 
che comprende sia stimoli linguistici sia stimoli musicali, mentre non ci sono dati in 
supporto dell’ipotesi che la computazione musicale e pragmatica ruotino attorno agli 
stessi circuiti neurali nel cervello. Ciò si può considerare come una chiara evidenza 
per la SSIRH. In riferimento alle differenze tra musicisti e non musicisti, ho trovato 
che i non musicisti hanno una performance peggiore rispetto ai musicisti sia in 
termini di tempi di reazione (Studio 1) sia di accuratezza (Studio 2), nella condizione 
pragmaticamente infelice. Questo può esser dovuto ad un artefatto sperimentale, ma 
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potrebbe anche esser collegato ai benefici cognitivi del training musicale 
nell’esecuzione del set complesso di computazioni richieste nel processing delle frasi 
infelici che contengono il termine scalare. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 The relationship between language and music has been studied from many 
different perspectives. The first link between these two human capacities was made 
by Leonard Bernstein in 1973, when he delivered the Charles Eliot Norton Lectures 
at Harvard University. Bernstein supported the idea that, like language, also music 
has its own “musical grammar”. As a result of the lectures can be seen the first 
theory formulated in terms of rules of musical grammar, that is the Generative 
Theory of Tonal Music proposed by Jackendoff and Lerdahl in 1983. Since then, a 
growing interest has surrounded the relationship between these disciplines, spreading 
the domain of research, from pedagogical and theoretical purposes, to the supposed 
common origin of language and music, to neuroscience. 
 So, we can ask: what’s the actual interest of studying the relationship between 
language and music? According to some theorists (e.g. Mithen, 2008; Brown et al., 
1999) music and language are linked since the origins of the human species. This is 
probably due to the universality and uniqueness of language and music in our species, 
as they reflect the changes in the human brain that have taken place (Carroll, 2003). 
Another point of interest in exploring the relationship between language and music is 
a theoretical one. After Leonard Bernstein’s lectures, some scholars took inspiration 
from the Chomsky’s Generative Grammar (1957) and Langacker’s Cognitive 
Grammar (1991) and they hypothesized that there are analogies between the 
construction of the linguistic and the musical sentence (e.g. the GTTM by Jackendoff 
and Lerdahl, 1983, the Identity thesis for Language and Music by Katz and Pesetsky, 
2011). Language and music have also been studied in their relationship from a 
neuroscientific perspective. Of particular interest are the studies of the brain regions 
involved while processing both (e.g. pitch, syntax), the common cognitive processes 
underlying both and around the question whether music can shape the cerebral 
anatomy of the human brain. Specifically, exploring what are the differences and the 
similarities can deepen the understanding of the mechanisms that underlie our 
communicative abilities. In fact, this relationship has been explored also for a 
pedagogical and therapeutic purpose. Music can help to acquire and to recover non-
musical abilities (e.g. Yoo, 2009; Wilson et al., 2009), and understanding how music 
and language are related has implications for how language disorders can be treated, 
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as in the case of rehabilitation programs, like the Melodic Intonation Therapy (MIT) 
described in Zumbansen, Peretz and Hébert (2014), that is one of the most 
formalized treatments used for patients with Broca’s aphasia.  
 Although all these approaches are worth analyzing, this thesis focuses on the 
relationship between language and music in the neurobiological framework, and, in 
particular, based on Patel’s specific hypothesis, known as the Shared Syntactic Integration 
Resource Hypothesis.  
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1.1  Dissertation outline 
 
 From a neuroscientific perspective, language and music as cognitive 
capacities are based on a multiple dimension of cognitive processes and of 
knowledge manipulation. This led to a transdisciplinary work that cuts across 
different disciplines, such as linguistics, the study of musical harmony, psychology 
and cognitive neuroscience.  
 The present thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 explores the relationship 
between language and music in the neurobiological framework. I start by introducing 
some of the neuropsychological works (section 2.2) that led to the evidence for 
domain-specificity. On the one hand, in fact, there are well known cases of aphasia (a 
language disorder on the comprehension of formulation of language) without amusia 
(a neurodevelopmental disorder mainly characterized by a defect in pitch processing), 
on the other hand there are cases of people with amusia but without any linguistic 
disruption. In contrast to this evidence, I am going to explore the literature about 
neuroimaging studies (section 2.3) that probe the relationship of language and music 
using different techniques, like fMRI, EEG, MEG and PET. These works uniformly 
suggest that since recently the relationship between language and music has not been 
appropriately investigated because neuropsychological data, as observed above, 
convincingly supported the claim that language and music are domain-specific. On 
the contrary, works based on neuroimaging techniques question the domain-
specificity assumption. In section 2.4 I will present the Shared Syntactic Integration 
Resource Hypothesis (SSIRH), a theoretical framework proposed by Patel in 2003 that 
tries to reconcile neuropsychological with neuroimaging data and, in the following 
section (2.5), I will present some works that tested the predictions of the SSIRH. 
Concluding the review of this debate, in section 2.6 I present more recent studies on 
neuropsychology that converge to Patel’s hypothesis. Last section (2.7) discusses the 
literature on the differences between musicians and non-musicians.   
 Chapter 3 is dedicated to experimental pragmatics. After a brief introduction 
into the topic (3.1), in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 I present the experimental works on 
the computation of Scalar Implicatures in both children and adults that tested the 
theoretical predictions.  
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 In chapter 4 I will present the experimental protocols that tested the 
computation of scalar implicatures in adult musicians and non-musicians, in an 
experimental setting in which they were listening to a musical background vs. a 
setting with no music (Experiment 1), as well as in a setting involving loudness 
manipulation vs. out-of-key target chord (Experiment 2). The aim of these 
experiments was to test language-related processing in the pragmatic context giving 
rise to scalar implicatures (while at the same time evaluating the consequences for the 
SSIRH). Following the presentation of both experiments, I present the results and 
the discussion for each.  
 As a conclusion, in chapter 5 I will discuss all the data I gathered, as well as 
their implications. In a nutshell, my results provide substantial evidence for the 
Relevance Theory regarding the computation of Scalar Implicatures, as proved by the 
higher error rate for pragmatically infelicitous sentences than for pragmatically 
felicitous sentences. Moreover, in both experiments I found a significant interaction 
between language and music limited to the most difficult linguistic condition 
indicating that the presence of music in the background affects the way in which a 
sentence, requiring the computation of an implicature, and thus involving higher 
computational resources, is processed.  
 As importantly, concerning the SSIRH, I can claim that pragmatic 
computation interferes with music but not with musical grammar. More specifically, 
whereas I already have important evidence to the effect that linguistic syntax 
interferes with music processing, as predicted by the SSIRH, my data show that these 
interference effects do not extend to pragmatics in the same way. Finally, I did not 
find any difference between musicians and non-musicians in the interaction between 
language and music. However, non-musicians had a worse performance in the 
computation of scalar implicatures in general. I will discuss whether this is an artefact 
of my experimental protocol or whether it can provide further indications on the 
interaction between language and music. 
 15 
2.  Language and music. Literature review 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, I am going to review the literature about the interaction 
between language and music in a cognitive framework.  
 Neuropsychological studies have often been taken as evidence for domain-
specificity, because many authors reported cognitive deficits that are selective for 
language but not for music (e.g. aphasia) or for music but not for language (e.g. 
amusia). What shifted the ground in the works between the language-music relation 
were the neuroimaging results. In these works, I witness an interesting challenge to 
domain-specificity, because similarities in language and music processing in the 
elicitation of the P600 and other ERP components have been found, and, through 
fMRI and PET methods, there emerged an overlap of brain regions involved in 
processing linguistic and musical structure, including (but not limited to) Broca’s 
area.  
 In 2003, Patel proposed a theoretical framework aimed to reconcile the 
contradictory evidence on the interaction between language and music by focusing 
on syntactic processing. This theoretical framework was called the Shared Syntactic 
Integration Resource Hypothesis (Patel, 2003, 2008). Basically, Patel observed that though 
there are aspects of language and music that are different in their structural 
organization, these two cognitive capacities show, in terms of cognitive processing, a 
number of deep connections.  
 After the presentation of Patel’s proposal, I will discuss some of the works 
that tested the interaction between language and music in the theoretical framework 
of the Shared Syntactic Integration Resource Hypothesis with neural and behavioural 
methods. To conclude this chapter, I report recent evidence in neuropsychology that 
provide further support to Patel’s proposal.  
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2.2  Evidence for domain-specificity in language and music. 
Neuropsychological studies. 
 
 Aphasia is a language disorder caused by damage to one or more of the 
language areas of the brain and it can be due to a stroke, head injury, cerebral 
tumour, or degenerative dementias such as Alzheimer’s disease (Damasio, 1992). 
Patients who suffer from this sort of brain lesion experience a disturbance of the 
comprehension and production of language. It occurs not only in languages based on 
auditory signals but also in those based on visual-motor signs (sign languages). It may 
compromise the written code of any type of language, as it compromises multiple 
aspects of language, such as syntax, the lexicon and word composition. It is worth 
noting that aphasia is a “disorder of linguistic processing, a disruption of the 
mechanisms for translating thought to language. Aphasia is not a disorder of 
perception” as in the case of deaf people (Damasio, 1992: 531). There are two broad 
categories of aphasia: fluent and non-fluent, and there are several subtypes of these 
groups. However, what is relevant for our discussion here is the dissociation reported 
for linguistic and musical processing in people who suffers from aphasia.   
 Since more than a century it is well known that in patients who experience 
aphasia, musical and singing abilities are preserved (Jackson, 1871). However, there 
are also many cases of disturbance of musical function concurrent with aphasic 
disorders (Benton, 1977; Brust, 1980; Geschwind et al. 1968). Marin (1982) reported 
12 cases of aphasia without amusia, 19 cases of amusia without aphasia, 33 cases of 
amusia and aphasia, and 9 cases of verbal and music alexia. Studying amusia, Brust 
(1980) has noted that the several types of amusia are not predicted by the presence or 
absence of aphasia. 
 In 1985, Basso and Capitani reported the case of patient NS, which is of 
particular interest because, contrary to many other cases of aphasia with spared 
musical function where patients were less severely impaired in language, NS had a 
persistent global aphasia and ideomotor apraxia with spared musical function. NS 
was an orchestral conductor with a degree in violin. At the age of 67, in a concert 
tour in the US, he developed slight right hemiparesis, right homonymous hemianopia 
and global aphasia. His diagnosis was an infarct in the territory of the middle cerebral 
artery. Since then, NS was tested several times both on linguistic abilities (oral and 
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written) and on musical abilities (written, oral, while playing and while conducting), 
and he also underwent language rehabilitation. Considering his linguistic abilities, 
speech was confined to some formulaic expressions, picture naming was nil, 
spontaneous writing and writing to dictation were severely affected. Repetition and 
reading aloud were impossible; moreover, there was severe apraxia. When he was 
tested on his musical capacity, it was observed that whenever a request required 
language production or comprehension, NS failed, while he reproduced musical 
rhythm fairly well, even if not naming the notes. Moreover, he was still able to play 
the piano with both hands, though the right hand was slightly paretic. While language 
rehabilitation never produced significant improvement, musical execution always 
improved with practice. On a test of music incongruity detection, NS never failed. 
He was also observed while conducting. NS was perfectly able to point out mistakes 
in execution and when he conducted some orchestral performances, such as Verdi’s 
Nabucco and Casella’s Serenata per archi, which are very difficult (because of the size of 
the orchestra and the number of singers in Verdi and because of the continuous 
changes of time and measures values in Casella), he was applauded by the critics’ 
judgments. In conclusion, NS was functionally performant when conducting; he also 
could play the piano, but as Basso and Capitano (1985: 411) pointed out “even more 
striking was the dissociation between NS’ verbal and musical performances”. 
 A strong dissociation between music and language has also been observed by 
Polk and Kertesz (1993). They reported the case of patient CW, a 58-year-old male 
guitar teacher. At the age 56 he presented a generalized decrease in cognitive 
function. CT and MRI scans showed enlarged ventricles and diffuse cerebral atrophy 
with greater left involvement. He was diagnosed with a progressive aphasia or 
possible Alzheimer’s disease. During the following years he repeated 
neuropsychological tests that reported significant decline in all cognitive functions. 
Polk and Kertesz (1993: 110) tested him on linguistic and musical abilities and they 
found “non-fluent, unintelligible and scanty verbal output” that “contrasts directly 
with ratings of his music performance”.  
 Another case of a professional musician and composer who presented a 
progressive aphasia with a severe anomia has been reported by Tzortis et al. (2000). 
MM was severely impaired in naming of non-musical stimuli, but he normally named 
musical instruments’ sounds. Another often cited case is the one of the composer 
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Vissarion Shebalin (1902-1963) reported by Luria et al. (1965). Shebalin suffered two 
strokes in his left hemisphere, affecting the temporal and parietal regions. His 
language disorder manifested itself after the second stroke, but, in those years, he was 
a fruitful composer and composed in fact also a symphony that was commented by 
Shostakovich as a “brilliant creative work” (Luria et al., 1965: 292). Other cases of 
aphasia without musical disruption are reported by Assal (1973) in a professional 
pianist and conductor, by Assal and Buttet (1983) in a piano professor and organist, 
Judd et al. (1983) in a composer, conductor and professor of music, Signoret et al. 
(1987) in a composer and regular organist. However, research on neural plasticity has 
revealed significant differences between the brains of professional musicians and 
those of non-musicians in a variety of ways, among them, the increased gray matter 
density in specific regions of the frontal cortex and increased corpus callosum size 
(Patel, 2008; Schlaug et al., 1995; Gaser and Schlaug, 2003). As pointed out by Patel 
(2008), given the substantial differences between professional musicians and non-
musicians and given that professional musicians are not representative of the 
ordinary population, we should avoid inferring domain-specificity based on the 
dissociations found for cases of aphasia without amusia. Peretz et al. (2004) have 
argued that such cases exist, but in a closer examination, the cases she reported are of 
“pure word deafness”, something sometimes referred to as a form of aphasia, but in 
fact a form of auditory agnosia. Pure word deafness is qualitatively different from 
pure aphasia, because an individual with pure word deafness can no longer 
understand spoken material but can produce language in other modalities, such as 
writing. In contrast, in the case of pure aphasia language is damaged across 
modalities (Caplan, 1992). What should be noticed here, is that, according to Patel 
(2008), all these cases of aphasia without amusia are not convincing because they 
consider only professional musicians and there are no reported cases of ordinary 
individuals with brain damage. Moreover, as reported above, there are also cases of 
the coexistence of aphasia with amusia as in the cases reported by Souques and 
Baruk (1926) in a piano professor, Alajouanine (1948), who reported on the case of 
the composer Maurice Ravel, Jellinek (1956) reporting the situation of a professional 
singer who accompanied himself while playing guitar, Wertheim and Botez (1961) in 
a professional violinist, Brust (1980) reporting the case of a music student and also 
the case of a professional jazz double-bassist, Mavlov (1980) in the case of a 
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professional violin player and professor of music, Hofman et al. (1993) in the case of 
an amateur violinist, among many others. 
 Another claim for the domain-specificity for the two domains is given by the 
cases of amusia without any linguistic disorder. Amusia is a neurodevelopmental 
disorder mainly characterized by a defect in pitch processing. It can be acquired, 
occurring as a result of brain damage, or congenital, thus, a lifelong disorder of music 
processing present since birth. It occurs despite normal hearing and other cognitive 
functions as well as normal exposure to music. Amusia can be present both in 
comorbidity with aphasia or without any other disorder. Cases of pure amusia, as 
cases of pure aphasia, have been considered significant because they imply that brain 
networks are specialized for specific functions (Ayotte et al. 2002; Justus, Bharucha, 
2002; Nune-Silva, Geraldi Haase, 2013; Peretz, 1992; Peretz, Belleville, 1997; Peretz, 
Coltheart, 2003; Peretz, Zatorre, 2003; Piccirilli et al. 2000). For example, Peretz 
(1993) and Peretz et al. (1994) reported the case of GL, a patient who presented 
auditory atonalia as a consequence of brain damage due to an aneurysm on the right 
middle cerebral artery. A year later, in a control evaluation, a mirror aneurysm on the 
left side was also found. GL’s capacity for music was preserved for the 
discrimination between single pitches and he was also sensitive to differences in 
melodic contour in short melodies. However, he lacked sensitivity to musical key. In 
an experiment on tonal closure, GL and control participants were asked to listen to a 
musical context followed by a probe tone that scans all the chromatic pitches. 
Participants had to judge on a Likert’s scale of five points the goodness of the probe 
tone in the completion of the context. Diatonic tones should be preferred over non-
diatonic tones, and triad tones should be preferred over non-triad. Among the triad 
chords, the tonic, being the highly referential note in a musical key, should receive 
the highest rating. Expectancies were confirmed by control participants. In contrast, 
GL judged on the basis of his preserved melodic contour between the penultimate 
and final tone. Thus, he “failed to exploit tonal cues but relied on nontonal ones for 
judging the adequacy of melodic endings” (Peretz, 1993: 47). In a test on Tonal 
Preference, GL refuses to perform the task, therefore the authors tested GL in a 
Discrimination Task, in a “same-different” classification, where half of the trials 
contained pairs of tonal melodies, and half pairs of nontonal melodies. GL’s 
performance was far below that of controls, failing again to show evidence of using 
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the tonal scale as a way to organise and retain melodic information. It is important to 
notice that while tests on music revealed some deficits, GL scored in the normal 
range on standardized aphasia tests. Thus, he is a case of “amusia without aphasia”. 
 In order to classify amusia as a learning disability that affects music abilities, 
Ayotte, Peretz and Hyde (2002) studied the behavioural manifestations of congenital 
amusia. Their results show that congenital amusia is related to failure in processing 
pitch variations and the deficit extends to impairments in music memory and 
recognition, in singing and in the ability to tap in time to music. As noted in the case 
of GL, it seems that amusia is a highly specific musical deficit. Amusics retain the 
ability to process and recognize speech, including speech prosody, and they also 
recognize environmental sounds (such as animal cries and ringing sounds) and 
human voices not differently from controls.  
 
2.3  Challenges to domain-specificity. Neuroimaging studies  
 
 Based on the conspicuous data coming from neuropsychology we should 
conclude that music is a modular system that is not related to language. What 
challenges this view are the neuroimaging studies involving different types of 
techniques, such as EEG (electroencephalography), MEG 
(magnetoencephalography) and fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging).  
 The first work that compared and found similarities in linguistic and musical 
processing in normal individuals is the one of Patel, Gibson, Ratner, Besson, 
Holcomb (1998a). In the first experiment, the authors manipulated the linguistic 
structural context before a fixed target phrase, in order to have a different difficulty 
when integrating the latter with the prior context. The ERP (event-related potential) 
waveform was found to have a larger positivity (a P600 effect) when the sentence 
was ungrammatical than in the grammatically complex sentence type, which was in 
turn more positive than the grammatically simple sentence type. Thus, if sentences 
were grammatically complex or ungrammatical, target phrases had a positive-going 
ERP component, while if sentences had a simple syntactic context before the 
context, the P600 effect was not observed. The P600, or “syntactic positive shift” 
brain potential (Osterhout, Holcomb, 1992, 1993; Hagoort, Brown, Groothusen, 
1993) is a positive-going component of the ERP that is elicited by words that are 
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structurally difficult to integrate into meaningful sentences. Basically, we can say that 
the P600 component is related to syntactic difficulties in processing. Patel et al. 
(1998a), in a second experiment, manipulated the target chord in a musical phrase, 
thus manipulating musical grammar. The target chord was either within the tonality 
of the musical phrase or it was an out-of-key chord, that could be from a nearby key 
or a distant key. It is important to notice that it was deviant only in the harmonic 
sense, given the structural norms of Western European tonal music. Participants had 
to judge musical phrases as acceptable in all three conditions. Results show that 
“musical sequences with out-of-key target chords elicited a positive ERP component 
with a maximum around 600 msec post-target onset” (Patel et al. 1998a: 10). The 
authors also noted that the waveform was different for the three types of target 
chords. After testing syntactic incongruity in language and in music, the authors 
statistically compared the amplitude and the scalp distribution, and they found that 
the P600 latency range was indistinguishable for the two cognitive systems. On this 
basis, they suggested that the P600 reflects processes of structural integration which 
are shared by language and music.   
 Further evidence for the overlap of music and language processing has been 
provided by Maess, Koelsch, Gunter and Friederici (2001). The aim of their work 
was to establish where the neural substrate of syntactic musical processing is 
localized. Electrically, a syntactically incongruous chord elicits an early right-anterior 
negativity (ERAN). Using MEG, the authors found that the mERAN (the magnetic 
equivalent of ERAN) was generated “in each hemisphere within the inferior part of 
BA44 (inferior part of the pars opercularis) in the left hemisphere”, known as Broca’s 
area (Maess et al. 2001: 542). Their results indicate that Broca’s area and its right-
hemisphere homologue might be involved in the processing of musical syntax, and 
this suggests that these regions of the brain are less domain-specific than what 
previously believed (cf. Koelsch, Siebel, 2005). Later research using fMRI and PET 
(positron emission tomography) converged with the electrophysiological measures. 
Koelsch et al. (2002) tested ten non-musicians in an fMRI study. Stimuli were chord-
sequences containing unexpected musical events. Participants were asked to detect 
clusters and deviant instruments. In the fMRI analysis it was found that the 
processing of musical sequences required the activation of a cortical network that 
comprised numerous brain structures. Several of these structures are known to be 
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involved in the processing of music, such as the right, the posterior and the anterior 
STG, BA 44, left BA 44/6, that are respectively related to the processing of pitch, 
pitch perception, the processing of tonal and melodic processing as well as melodic 
representations, working memory for pitch and for the processing of sequential 
sounds (Liegeois-Chauvel et al., 1998; Peretz et al., 1994; Platel et al., 1997; Samson 
and Zatorre, 1988; Zatorre, 1985; Zatorre et al. 1994; Zatorre and Samson, 1991). 
However, it is important to notice that all these structures are also well known to be 
involved in language processing with both auditory (Zatorre et al., 1992; Mummery et 
al., 1999; Meyer et al., 2000; Pöppel, 1996; Friederici et al., 2000; Binder et al., 1994; 
Schlosser et al., 1998; Bellin et al., 2000; Friederici, 1998) and visual stimuli (Just et al., 
1996; Shaywitz et al., 1995; Mazoyer et al., 1993). This is particularly the case of 
Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas as demonstrated by lesion- and imaging studies. In this 
respect, Koelsch et al. (2002) claim that these findings do not support the strict 
dichotomy between auditory language and music processing, but rather suggest 
considerable overlap. Moreover, they confirm that music, like language, has a 
syntactic dimension.  
 Using positron emission tomography (PET), Brown et al. (2006) tested 
amateur musicians while improvising melodic or linguistic phrases in response to 
unfamiliar, auditorily presented melodies or phrases. Results show that core areas for 
generating musical phrases are in left BA 45, right BA 44, bilateral temporal planum 
polare, lateral BA 6, and pre-SMA. Core areas for generating sentences appeared to 
be in bilateral posterior superior and middle temporal cortex (BA 22, 21), left BA 39, 
bilateral superior frontal (BA 8, 9), left inferior frontal (BA 44, 45), anterior 
cingulated, and pre-SMA. Directly comparing the areas activated by the two tasks, 
the authors claim that the activated areas are nearly identical, including the primary 
motor cortex, supplementary motor area, Broca’s area, anterior insula, primary and 
secondary auditory cortices, temporal pole, basal ganglia, ventral thalamus, and 
posterior cerebellum. Even if Brown et al. (2006) found that differences between 
melodic and sentential generation were in lateralization tendencies, with language 
favouring the left hemisphere, “many of the activations for each modality were 
bilateral, and so there was a significant overlap” (Brown et al. 2006: 2791).  
 Levitin, Menon (2003, 2005), in a fMRI study, investigated the 
neuroanatomical correlates of musical structure. Participants were asked to listen to 
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classical music and scrambled versions of that same musical pieces and the authors 
compared the brain responses to that stimuli. Scrambled music was used to break 
temporal coherence; however, it was balanced for low-level factors, that are 
psychoacoustic features such as pitch, loudness and timbre. Given that there was no 
differential activation in auditory cortex between the two conditions, experimenters 
confirmed that they were well matched for low-level acoustical features. Levitin and 
Menon (2003, 2005) found that classical music activated Broadmann Area 47, a 
region that has been associated with the processing of linguistic structure in spoken 
and sign language, and its right hemisphere homologue. As a result, Levitin and 
Menon (2003: 2149) believe that “Broadmann Area 47 and the adjoining anterior 
insula constitute a modality-independent brain area that organizes structural units in 
the perceptual stream to create larger, meaningful representations. That is, it may be 
part of a neural network for perceptual organization”. Considering all these data, and 
data from other works such as Vuust et al (2006, 2011b) on the involvement of BA 
47 in the processing of temporal coherence that subserves both language and music, 
and Sammler et al. (2011: 659) who claim that “ the left IFG, known to be crucial for 
syntax processing in language, plays also a functional role in the processing of 
musical syntax”, it is possible to say that according to neuroimaging studies, there is 
an overlap in brain areas while processing syntax in language and music. I would like 
to emphasize that the overlap occurs only with respect to syntax. In the discussion, 
Sammler et al. (2011: 659) state that their results “are consistent with the notion that 
Broca’s area supports the processing of syntax in a rather domain-general way”. The 
idea that it is syntax at the core of the overlap is widely agreed. Among the studies 
already reported, also Fadiga et al. (2009), in a review, focused on the inferior frontal 
gyrus and the ventral premotor cortex because of the claims regarding these areas as 
not only related to language production. Based on the data gathered in his work, 
Fadiga et al. (2009: 448) state that “language, action, and music share a common 
syntactic-like structure”. 
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2.4  Reconciling the paradox: The “Shared Syntactic Integration Resource 
Hypothesis” 
 
 As reported in the previous sections, neuropsychological data yield rather 
different perspectives from neuroimaging data on the relation between language and 
music in the brain. In order to disentangle this paradox, Patel (2003, 2008) proposed 
the Shared Syntactic Integration Resource Hypothesis (SSIRH). His starting point is the 
proposal of a conceptual distinction between syntactic representation and syntactic 
processing, that is on the one hand the distinction between long-term structural 
knowledge in a domain (in this case, the associative networks that store knowledge 
for words in language and for chords in music), and on the other hand operations 
conducted on that sort of specific knowledge for the purpose of building coherent 
percepts. A basic principle is that language and music involve domain-specific 
representations. For example, knowledge of words and their syntactic properties 
involve a different set of representations than the one of chords and their harmonic 
relations. The SSIRH posits that the syntactic representations stored in long-term 
memory are different for language and for music. This explains why, according to 
Patel (2003, 2008, 2012), these representations can be selectively damaged leading to 
the neuropsychological evidence discussed above. The second part of the SSIRH is 
the idea that when similar cognitive operations are engaged on these domain-specific 
representations, the brain shares neural resources between the two domains. Thus, it 
is the case that these operations share neural resources and this explains 
neuroimaging data. As reported by Patel (2008), such “dual system” approaches have 
already been proposed by researches who studied the neurolinguistics of syntax. For 
example, Caplan and Waters (1999) proposed that the working memory system for 
linguistic syntactic operations is supported by frontal areas of the brain, and Ullman 
(2001) considers that a symbol-manipulation system for linguistic syntax reside in 
frontal areas. Patel’s approach (2003, 2008) is actually a dual system approach, but he 
does not consider that music and language share a specific memory system or symbol 
manipulation system. Instead, he proposes that what is shared by musical and 
linguistic syntactic processing emerges from a comparison of cognitive theories of 
syntactic processing in both language and music. The reason why Patel (2003, 2008) 
 25 
chose these theories is because of their strong empirical basis and because they 
converge remarkably.  
 For the processing of language, Patel (2003, 2008) reported the Dependency 
Locality Theory (DLT) and the Expectancy Theory (ET). The DLT has been developed 
by Gibson (1998, 2000) aiming to account for the perceived complexity differences 
of grammatical sentences and for what guides preferences in the interpretation of 
syntactically ambiguous sentences. According to the DLT, when comprehending 
linguistic sentences, two distinct components are involved and both of them 
consume neural resources. The first component is the structural storage, which keeps 
track of the perceived syntactic categories (e.g. after a noun a verb is predicted). The 
second component is the structural integration which connects one word to another 
in the sentence structural context. The basic idea of this theory is that locality 
influences the cost of integration. More the element and the site of integration are 
distant, and more the cost increases. In the DLT, distance has to deal with a linear 
measurement rather than a hierarchical one. That is, it is measured by computing 
new “discourse referents” since the site of integration, rather than by counting nodes 
in the syntactic tree. Reading time experiments confirm the predictions of the DLT, 
because longer reaction time reflects the cost of processing. As pointed out by Patel 
(2008), the main idea here is that when distant elements have to be mentally 
connected, they require more cognitive resources.  
 The ET is a different theoretical perspective for the processing of language 
which suggests that a preceding perceived word creates a syntactic expectation. Each 
expectation reflects concurrent structural analysis of the sentence. In the case a word 
does not match the expectations, resources must be reallocated in order to change 
the preferred structural interpretation. Psycholinguistic studies have confirmed this 
idea and what is noteworthy in our discussion is that ET integrates the DLT 
approach.  
 In the case of music processing, Patel (2003, 2008) reports the Tonal Pitch 
Space Theory (TPST) presented by Lerdahl (2001). Empirical findings (cf. Patel 2008) 
show that music has perceived relations between scale tones, chords and keys. These 
relations have a psychological distance, and TPST actually provides a method for 
deriving tree structures which effectively show the distances between harmonic 
relations. The basic idea here is that harmonic tension increases with tonal distance 
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between chords. The TPST has been supported by empirical evidence, as in Lerdahl 
& Krumhansl’s (2007) work. The authors suggest that music is actually perceived in a 
hierarchical sequential manner. What is relevant here is that chord relations are 
perceived in terms of distances in a cognitive space that is structured for pitch 
classes, chords and keys.  
 The main point of the linguistic and musical syntactic theories is the notion 
that structural integration is a key part of syntactic processing. Moreover, all the 
theories predict resource consuming for the structural interpretation of a (musical or 
linguistic) sentence. Given the distance and the expectancy cost in resource 
processing, Patel (2003: 678) proposes that “overlap in the syntactic processing of 
language and music can thus be conceived of as overlap in the neural areas and 
operations which provide the resources for syntactic integration”. This is what Patel 
calls the Shared Syntactic Integration Resource Hypothesis. According to the SSIRH, there is 
a dedicated area of the brain that provides the resources for syntactic integration. 
This area rapidly selects low-activation items from the “storage” area, that is the 
“representation networks” and it activates the selected items in order to integrate the 
linguistic and musical stimuli. Even if there is not yet a firm answer regarding the 
neural location of this brain area, Patel (2003, 2008, 2012), capitalizing on current 
research on language processing, hypothesised that it is located “in frontal brain 
regions that do not themselves contain syntactic representations but that provide 
resources for computations in posterior regions where syntactic representations 
reside” (Patel, 2008: 283).  
 
 
1. Schematic diagram (from Patel, 2008: 283) of the functional relationship between linguistic 
and musical processing. L, language; M, music. In this diagram it is possible to see on the 
right the stored representations for language and music, that are separated in distinct brain 
areas, whereas on the left it is represented the neural overlap of the networks which provides 
neural resources for integrating the stored representations. Arrows indicate functional 
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connections between networks. Patel (2008: 283) wants to note that “the circles do not 
necessarily imply highly focal brain areas. For example, linguistic and musical representation 
networks could extend across a number of brain regions or exist as functionally segregated 
networks within the same brain regions”.  
 
 
Patel (2003, 2008, 2012) notes that in order to test the neural localization hypothesis, 
tests with localization techniques such as fMRI, based on within-subjects analysis 
while subjects are processing linguistic and musical syntax, still have to be done.  
 The strong point to be made about the SSIRH is that it can reconcile 
neuropsychological evidence and neuroimaging data. For example, the ERP 
component P600, elicited for both language and music processing in Patel et al. 
(1998a), “reflects syntactic integration processes that take place in posterior/temporal 
brain regions” (Patel, 2008: 284). A further confirmation comes from localization 
studies, such as Koelsch et al. (2002), because these studies find that frontal language 
areas are activated in musical harmonic processing. As for neuropsychological 
evidence, regarding acquired amusia Patel (2008) claims that it is due to a damage to 
brain areas specifically involved in processing musical syntax rather than in syntactic 
integration processes. This idea is confirmed by cases involving damaged superior 
temporal gyri (Peretz, 1993; Peretz et al. 1994; Patel, Peretz, et al., 1998b; Ayotte et al., 
2000), which are related to long-term representation of harmonic knowledge. 
Concerning congenital amusia, Patel (2008) claims that it consists in a developmental 
failure to process musical pitch. As reported by Peretz and Hyde (2003) and Foxton 
et al. (2004), subjects who suffer from congenital amusia have basic psychophysical 
deficits in pitch discrimination, besides deficits in judging the direction of pitch 
changes. As observed by Patel (2008), this problem is associated with a failure in 
cognitively representing musical scale, chord, and key structure. Thus, amusics 
cannot process musical syntactic structure. So, the traditional observation according 
to which amusia (also called “tone deafness”) can exist without any linguistic 
disorder, is derived in Patel (2008: 284) by proposing that, since amusics are not able 
to process musical syntactic structure, amusia “is largely irrelevant to the study of 
music-language syntactic relations”. 
 As pointed out in the previous section on neuropsychological studies, cases 
of patients with aphasia without amusia reported in the literature were of 
professional musicians with a high musical expertise. Patel (2008) does not consider 
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these cases as correctly describing the larger population. Furthermore, most of the 
reported cases are out of date, thus Patel (2008) suggests that more work should be 
done here before reaching firm conclusions. 
 In presenting the SSIRH, Patel (2003, 2008) formulated some predictions 
that could guide future research on the relationship between linguistic and musical 
syntactic processing. The first prediction concerns the simultaneous syntactic 
integration in music and language. In this case, given that linguistic and musical 
syntactic integration rely on common neural resources, and because resources are 
limited (Gibson, 2000), the result should be an interference between the two. This 
prediction can be tested through interference paradigms, in which musical and 
linguistic sentences are presented together and the focus is on how musical 
processing interferes with language processing. The second prediction of the SSIRH 
is about aphasia. According to Kolk, Friederici (1985), Haarmann, Kolk (1991), 
Swaab, Brown, Hagoort (1998) and Kaan, Swaab (2002), deficits of Broca’s aphasics 
in syntactic comprehension processing can be due not to a damage in the syntactic 
representations, but to a disruption of the processes that activate and integrate 
linguistic representations in posterior language areas. In this case, the SSIRH predicts 
that comprehension deficits in linguistic syntax are related to harmonic processing 
deficits in music.   
 
2.5  Testing the predictions of the Shared Syntactic Integration Resource 
Hypothesis with neural and behavioural methods. 
 
 Previous works on the relationship between language and music found 
dissociations between the two or reported an interaction supposedly to be due to 
non-specific factors. The reason why these works could not provide support for the 
SSIRH was related to the type of stimuli. Regarding music, stimuli were of harmonic 
manipulations, but, as for linguistic stimuli, only linguistic semantic processing was 
tested.   
  In 1998, Besson et al. tested 16 professional musicians on incongruity 
detection in language and in music. Participants were asked to carefully listen 200 
opera excerpts (sung by a professional musician and without instrumental 
accompaniment) and to stay focus on both language and music in order to detect 
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semantic and harmonic incongruities. The authors found that linguistic semantic 
incongruities elicited the N400, the ERP component with a negative-going deflection 
with its peak at around 400 msec post-stimulus onset, “typically considered an ERP 
index of semantic processing or contextual integration because its amplitude is 
modulated by its relation and fit to the ongoing context, be it a single word, a 
sentence, or a multisentence discourse” (Hillyard, Kutas, 2002: 435). In contrast, out-
of-key notes gave rise to P300 components. Thus, Besson et al. (1998: 497) claim that 
“harmonic processing is not affected by the semantics of the sentence” and this 
result supports the idea that “semantic and harmonic violations are processed 
independently”.  
 In a behavioural work, Bonnel et al. (2001) using the same material of Besson 
et al. (1998), asked participants to carefully listen the sung sentences. Participants 
were asked to detect either the semantic or the melodic incongruity (single task) or to 
judge the incongruity of both (dual task). The authors found that the dual task was 
not more difficult than the single task, thus confirming the results of Besson et al. 
(1998). Hence, these works supported the idea that language processing is 
independent from musical processing.  
 In contrast, Poulin-Charronat et al. (2005) found an interaction between 
musical syntactic processing and linguistic semantic processing. Their material was 
composed of eight-chord sung sentences, with the last word being either semantically 
related, as in “La giraffe a un très grand cou” (The giraffe has a very long neck), or 
unrelated to the previous linguistic context, as in “La giraffe a un très grand pied” 
(The giraffe has a very long foot). Another half of the sentences were identical, with 
the exception that target words were non-words. The harmonic function of the target 
word was manipulated, being either the most hierarchically relevant tonic chord, or 
the less stable subdominant chord. Participants were asked to listen each sequence 
and to decide quickly and accurately whether the last word was real or a non-sense. 
The authors were interested in reaction times to real words and they found that the 
RT difference between semantically expected and semantically unexpected word was 
diminished when the final chord functioned as a subdominant chord. Moreover, 
testing both musicians and non-musicians, they found that the two groups behaved 
very similarly, indicating that this process is independent of an explicit musical 
knowledge. Thus, Poulin-Charronat et al. (2005) showed that linguistic semantic 
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processing can interact with syntactic processing in music. However, when discussing 
the data, the authors claim that the interaction is probably due to a general attentional 
mechanism rather than by shared processing resources in language and music. Patel 
(2008) considers that this work is of particular interest because it can direct future 
works to investigating the indirect effects of music on language based on general 
attentional mechanisms, such as loudness manipulation or timbre manipulation. 
 After Patel’s (2003) proposal, many scholars started studying the relationship 
between linguistic and musical processing with respect to syntax in the framework of 
the SSIRH. A neuroscientific work is the one of Koelsch, Gunter, Wittfoth and 
Sammler (2005), who investigated through EEG the simultaneous processing of 
linguistic written sentences and auditorily presented chord sequences. In Experiment 
1 musical sequences were presented that ended with the expected tonic chord, or 
with the unexpected Neapolitan chord. Linguistic material comprised syntactically 
correct sentences with a high cloze probability such as “Er trinkt das kühle Bier” (He 
drinks the (neuter) cool (neuter) beer (neuter)), syntactically correct sentences with 
low cloze probability such as “Er sieht das kühle Bier” (He sees the (neuter) cool 
(neuter) beer (neuter)) and syntactically incorrect sentences with a high cloze 
probability, such as “Er trinkt den kühlen Bier” (He drinks the (masc) cool (masc) 
beer (neuter)). Music material was auditorily presented while words were visually 
presented. Each word appeared synchronously with each chord. Participants were 
asked to focus only on the linguistic sentence and they had to judge whether the last 
sentence was correct or incorrect. The left anterior negativity (LAN) is an ERP 
component that is associated to linguistic stimuli that violate syntactic structure, 
while the early right anterior negativity (ERAN) is associated to violation of music-
syntactic information (Friederici, 2002; Koelsch, Friederici, 2003). Koelsch et al. 
(2005) found that when sentences were completely grammatical, but they were 
accompanied by a syntactically out-of-key chord, the predicted ERAN was produced. 
Vice versa, when music was as expected, without deviant chord, but the linguistic 
sentence ended ungrammatically, a normal LAN was produced. In the case where 
participants had to listen to simultaneous syntactic incongruities in language and in 
music, results show that the brain responses were not simply additive, but that there 
was actually an interaction. The LAN, which was elicited by syntactically incorrect 
words, was clearly reduced when incorrect words were presented simultaneously to 
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syntactically irregular musical chords. In contrast, the semantic aspect of language, 
investigated by high/low semantic probability, and indexed by the N400, was not 
affected by the processing of music-syntactic violations (indexed by the ERAN).  In 
order to be sure that it is not a deviance-related negativity that has an effect on 
linguistic syntax processing, the authors carried out a second ERP experiment which 
was identical to Experiment 1, except that single tones were presented instead of 
chords, and the last tone was either a standard one, or a physically deviant tone, 
which usually elicits a mismatch negativity (MMN) (Schröger, 1998; Näätänen, 1992). 
Results from Experiment 2 confirm that there is actually an interaction in processing 
linguistic and musical syntax. In the second experiment, in fact, the LAN was not 
affected when words were presented on physically deviant tones. Koelsch et al. (2005: 
1574) claim that “it is possible that the neural resources for syntactic processing were 
at least partly consumed by the (quite automatic) processing of the music-syntactic 
irregularities, resulting in a decrease of resources involved in the generation of the 
LAN. This finding is surprising, given that the attentional focus of participants was 
directed on the linguistic information”. These results have also been confirmed by a 
work of Steinbeis and Koelsch (2008a: 1169) who found that “the ERAN was 
reduced only when presented concurrently with a syntactic language violation and 
not with a semantic language violation”.  
 Behavioural works that are noteworthy in testing the SSIRH, are Fedorenko 
et al. (2009), Slevc et al. (2009), Hoch et al. (2011) and Fiveash and Pammer (2014). 
 The work of Fedorenko et al. (2009) investigated how syntax in language and 
in music is simultaneously processed by using sung materials. Linguistic complexity 
was manipulated via the distance between dependent words, specifically, they used 
subject-extracted relative clauses, such as “The boy that helped the girl got an “A” on 
the test”, and object-extracted relative clauses, such as “The boy that the girl helped 
got an “A” on the test”. Instead, musical complexity was manipulated by the 
presence of an out-of-key note vs. an in-key note on the last word of the relative 
clause, that is “girl” on the subject-relative clause reported above, or “helped” in the 
object-relative clause. In order to test whether it is actually the structural integration 
that it is difficult and not a general attentional mechanism as proposed by Poulin-
Charronat et al. (2005), Fedorenko et al. (2009) added a loudness manipulation 
condition, that is a 10 dB increase in volume on the target word. After each sentence, 
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participants were asked a comprehension question, and accuracy was assumed to 
reflect processing difficulty. The authors observed that comprehension accuracy was 
lower in the object-extracted relative clauses vs. the subject-extracted relative clauses, 
but crucially, in the presence of the out-of-key note this difference was larger. This 
shows an interactive pattern between linguistic and musical syntactic processing. In 
contrast, the auditory-anomaly condition did not produce this effect, which proves 
that it is actually the syntax of language that interacts with music. Moreover, the 
interaction is not due to a perceptual salience effect in the musical conditions. It is in 
fact interesting to note that the accuracies in the auditory-anomaly condition are 
quite similar to the in-key conditions. These results are consistent with the SSIRH, 
because they prove that some aspect of structural integration in language and music 
relies on shared processing resources.  
 Further support for the SSIRH has been provided also by Slevc et al. (2009) 
by manipulating syntactic processing demands presented simultaneously in language 
and music. Additionally, the expectation related to linguistic semantic processing was 
tested to determine whether the interaction is actually specific to syntax. The test was 
a self-paced reading task on garden-path sentences, and it included either a full or a 
reduced sentence complement, such as “After the trial, the attorney advised (that) the 
defendant was likely to commit more crimes”. In the conditions where “that” is 
omitted, a garden path sentence is created with localized processing difficulty on 
“was”, due to a syntactic expectancy violation. In the semantic manipulation, words 
were added with either high or low cloze probability, such as “The boss warned the 
mailman to watch for angry (dogs / pigs) when delivering the mail”, thereby making 
the semantic interpretation expected or unexpected at the critical word. As for the 
music material, Slevc et al. (2009) presented, simultaneously to linguistic sentences, 
musical sequences in Bach-style chord progression. They created two versions of the 
same musical excerpt. One version with all chords respecting the C major tonality, 
and another identical version except for one chord concomitant to the target word, 
which was replaced with a chord from a distant key, that is an out-of-key chord. 
Because out-of-key chords are harmonically unexpected, the authors crossed 
syntactic and semantic expectancy in language with harmonic expectancy in music. 
Results were drawn from reading times for the critical word. Slevc et al. (2009) found 
a three-way interaction between the type of linguistic manipulation (syntactic or 
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semantic), linguistic and musical expectancy. They found that when participants 
encountered an unexpected word, be either syntactically or semantically unexpected, 
they read them more slowly than the expected counterparts. In the case sentences 
were read while processing a harmonically unexpected chord concomitant to the 
critical word, an interference was found. Interestingly, the interference was found 
only when the out-of-key chord was presented simultaneously to the syntactic 
unexpected word and not when presented together with the semantic unexpected 
word. In a second experiment, Slevc et al. (2009) added a further condition 
manipulating the timbre of the critical chord, which either had the expected piano 
timbre, or a pipe-organ timbre. It was found that manipulations of musical timbre 
did not interact with syntactic or semantic expectancy in language. Once again, these 
results confirm that linguistic and musical syntactic processing share neural resources.  
 In 2011, Hoch, Poulin-Charronat and Tillmann tested again the SSIRH by 
using a cross-modal paradigm on syntactic and semantic linguistic processing 
overlapping with listening musical sequences. The authors asked participants to read 
sentences and to perform a lexical decision task on the last word, which was 
syntactically expected or unexpected (Experiment 1) or semantically expected or 
unexpected (Experiment 2). Simultaneously to the presentation of written sentences, 
participants listened to musical sequences that ended on either the expected tonic 
chord (I), the most hierarchically relevant chord of the musical scale, or the less-
expected subdominant chord (IV). Linguistic manipulation in Experiment 1 
consisted of a morphosyntactic violation through gender disagreement, such as “Le 
méchant chien dort dans la(fem.) niche (fem.)” (The nasty dog is sleeping in the(fem.) 
kennel(fem.)) vs. “Le méchant chien dort dans le(masc.) niche(fem.)” (The nasty dog is 
sleeping in the(masc.) kennel(fem.)). In Experiment 2, semantically expected sentences 
were the syntactically expected sentences used in Experiment 1, while sentences with 
the semantically unexpected word were for example “Le méchant chien dort dans la 
tente” (The nasty dog is sleeping in the tent). Results from Experiment 1 showed that 
expected words were processed faster and more accurately than syntactically 
unexpected words. It reflects the influence of morphosyntactic expectancies. This 
effect was modulated by the tonal function of the simultaneously presented musical 
chord. When the target word was presented together with the less-expected 
subdominant chord the effect was reduced compared to an expected tonic chord. As 
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regard to music interaction, there was an effect of musical expectancy only for the 
expected words, but not for the syntactically unexpected words. The expected words 
showed a tonic facilitation, in contrast, syntactically unexpected words did not show 
the same facilitation. Hoch et al. (2011: 4) suggest that “musical structure and 
linguistic syntax processing tap into the same processing resources, thus hindering 
the otherwise observed tonic benefit”. Compared to the results of Slevc et al. (2009) 
and Fedorenko et al. (2009), Experiment 1 reports a different type of interactive 
pattern between the processing of syntax in music and language. In Slevc et al. (2009) 
the effect of the syntactic garden-path sentences compared to the simple sentences 
was greater when they were presented with an unexpected out-of-key chord than 
with an expected in-key chord. According to Hoch et al. (2011) the different 
interactive patterns with music-syntactic processing might be due to the type of 
linguistic-syntactic manipulation. However, overall findings suggest an interactive 
influence between simultaneous music-syntactic and linguistic-syntactic processing 
further supporting the SSIRH. In Experiment 2, with semantically expected vs. 
unexpected words, it was confirmed that expected words are processed faster and 
more accurately than unexpected words (see McNamara, 2005 for a review); 
moreover, a main effect of tonal function was found with faster and more accurate 
results for words concomitant to the expected tonic chord than those concomitant to 
the less-expected subdominant chord. What is relevant here is that “the semantic 
priming effect did not modulate the musical expectancy effect nor was it modulated 
by the musical expectancy effect” (Hoch et al. 2011: 6). It is thus the case that music-
syntactic processing and linguistic-semantic processing do not share cognitive 
resources. All in all, Hoch et al. (2011) provide more evidence to support the SSIRH.  
 The final study described here, by Fiveash and Pammer (2014), combines the 
SSIRH and the syntactic working memory (SWM) theory by Kljajevic (2010). The 
SWM proposes the presence of a short-term memory mechanism specialized for 
syntax, where syntactic information reside while the rest of the musical or linguistic 
sentence is processed via working memory. By hypothesis, this is where the overlap 
in resource networks occurs in the processing of linguistic and musical syntax 
(Kljajevic, 2010). The existence of a working memory system that is specific to syntax 
processing was early supported by Caplan and Waters (1999), who suggest that there 
is a subset of verbal working memory that specifically deals with syntactic 
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information used in sentence interpretation. With respect to the working memory 
model proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974), and later extended by Baddeley 
(2000), Kljajevic’s proposal is that SWM is separate but related to the working 
memory model. Baddeley and Hitch (1974) and Baddeley (2000)’s working memory 
model include both a phonological loop, which is thought to consist of two parts: a 
phonological store and an articulatory rehearsal process, and a visuospatial 
sketchpad, besides a central executive and an episodic buffer. Even if Baddeley 
(2000) further integrated the working memory model, he does not specifically 
mention how syntax is processed, and this is where Kljavevic locates his SWM 
theory.  
 Turning to Fiveash and Pammer’s (2014) experiment, the authors wanted to 
investigate whether musical syntax and linguistic-syntax draw on SWM by looking at 
the interaction of music with a syntactic violation paired with both word lists and 
complex sentences. Fiveash and Pammer (2014) determined their prediction basing 
themselves on the SSIRH. Language stimuli were word lists of five monosyllabic 
items, such as “sand, bat, light, pear, mole”, complex sentences were object-extracted 
relative clauses vs. subject-extracted relative clauses from Fedorenko’s work (2009). 
Music material comprehended an in-key/control condition, a musical syntactic 
manipulation with an out-of-key chord and a control condition with instrument 
manipulation (with a flute instead of an acoustic guitar). Participants were presented 
with either a word list or a sentence on the screen while music simultaneously 
started. They were then asked to verbally recall as much as they could about the word 
list or the sentence. Aiming to study the SWM, the authors assumed that word lists 
would go only with the phonological loop, while complex sentences were assumed to 
make use of both the phonological loop and of access to SWM. Consistently with the 
SSIRH, “the results support the hypothesis with memory for complex sentences 
decreasing significantly when paired with the music syntactic condition compared to 
the music normal condition. The same pattern was not found in word lists, showing 
that the syntactic music manipulation had different effects on word lists and 
sentences” (Fiveash, Pammer, 2014: 200-201). Also in this case, the instrument 
manipulation control condition, inserted to exclude a possible explanation in terms 
of a general attentional mechanism, was not significantly different from the in-key 
music condition, whereas it was if compared with the out-of-key musical condition. 
 36 
 Taken together, the results of the studies reviewed above point to shared 
neural resources between music and linguistic syntactic processing, thus confirming 
the predictions of the SSIRH. 
 
2.6  Reconciling neuroimaging and neuropsychological data. 
 
 As reported in section 2.4, the cases of congenital and acquired amusia are 
not relevant in the study of the relationship between language and music. Briefly 
summing up, the reason for that is that for acquired amusia the brain damage is 
located in brain areas that are specific to syntactic processing in music rather than 
syntactic integration processes, while congenital amusia is considered a 
developmental failure to process musical pitch. Congenital amusics, in fact, fail in 
cognitively representing musical scale, chord, and key structure. Thus, it is the case 
that amusics are not able to process musical syntactic structure.  
 Cases of aphasia without amusia reported in section 2.2 should be carefully 
considered because these cases are of professional musicians and not of ordinary 
people and they are mainly out of date. Indeed, new evidence from aphasia in non-
musicians points to an association between linguistic and musical syntactic disorders. 
Patel, Iversen, Wassenaar, and Hagoort (2008) examined linguistic and musical 
syntactic processing and linguistic semantic processing in individuals with Broca’s 
aphasia and agrammatic comprehension. Patients with Broca’s aphasia have a marked 
difficulty with sentence production, though speech comprehension is quite often 
spared. However, when they were carefully tested, a linguistic syntactic 
comprehension deficit clearly emerged. Patel et al. (2008) tested in two different 
experiments Broca’s aphasics on their sensitivity to grammatical and semantic 
relations in sentences, and on their sensitivity to musical syntactic relations in chord 
sequences. In Experiment 1 they used an explicit task, that is, an acceptability 
judgment of novel sequences, whereas in Experiment 2 the task was implicit and 
investigated musical syntactic processing through harmonic paradigm. A language 
pre-test was administered to both groups of Broca’s aphasics (those of experiments 1 
and 2). It was a “sentence-picture matching task” with sentences varying across five 
levels of syntactic complexity, from active semantically irreversible sentences, to an 
intermediate level of complexity was the passive structure, where the most complex 
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linguistic complexity was represented by sentences with an embedded subject relative 
clause in the passive voice. Correct matching was possible only on the basis of 
syntactic information. Participants had to determine who did what to whom in these 
sentences. Broca’s aphasics, compared to controls, performed significantly worse on 
this test. This result confirms that they did indeed have a syntactic comprehension 
deficit in language. Participants were also administered a music pre-test to check for 
possible basic pitch perception or memory problems. Except from two aphasic and 
one control participants that performed at chance level and thus were excluded, the 
remaining participants did not significantly differ on basic pitch discrimination or 
memory skills. To test the interaction of music and language, Patel et al. (2008) asked 
participants to perform acceptability judgments on musical and linguistic sequences. 
Linguistic material was composed of sentences with a syntactic error, such as “De 
matrozen roepen de kapitein en eist een lekkere fles rum” (The sailors call for the 
captain and demands a fine bottle of rum) thus with a syntactic agreement error, and 
of sentences with a semantic error, such as “Anne kraste haar naam met haar tomaat 
in de houten deur”(Anne scratched her name with her tomato on the wooden door), 
where the word “tomaat” (tomato) is semantically anomalous. The authors tested 
both syntactic and semantic comprehension to determine whether musical syntactic 
abilities were specifically related to linguistic syntax. For the musical task, participants 
listened to 60 chord sequences (from Patel et al. 1998) and they had to judge whether 
the musical sequence was acceptable or not. Half of the sequences were in-key, while 
in the other half an out-of-key chord occurred within the phrase, thus creating a 
syntactic incongruity. Participants had always to firstly complete the music test and 
then the language test. The results show that aphasics had a significantly worse 
performance than controls on detecting anomalies in chord sequences. This indicates 
that there is actually a deficit for this group while processing musical tonality. They 
also showed significant deficits on the linguistic syntactic task. Looking at the 
correlation between performance on the music task and the language syntax task, for 
the aphasics, the simple correlation was not significant. Surprisingly, when the 
controls were included in the correlation, performance on the music syntax task 
became a predictor of performance on the language syntactic task. It is also 
noteworthy that when the same analysis was run by adding the semantic anomalous 
condition, performance on the music task did not predict linguistic performance. 
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Hence there seems to be a shared process that links music syntax to language syntax 
also in patients with Broca’s aphasia. 
 In Experiment 2, Patel et al. (2008) probed harmonic priming in a second 
group of Broca’s aphasics. The same linguistic pre-test of Experiment 1 was 
administered to the experimental group in order to establish a linguistic syntactic 
comprehension deficit. The authors also administered two short musical pre-tests to 
the participants. The first tested the ability to discriminate tuned vs. mistuned chords, 
while the second tested auditory short-term memory. In these tests, except from two 
aphasics that were then excluded from further analysis, the other Broca’s aphasics 
performed as well as controls. The main experiment consisted of two-chord musical 
sequences used to test harmonic priming. In this task the first encountered chord 
primes the processing of the second target chord (Bharucha, Stoecking, 1986; 
Bharucha, 1987). The priming effect is reflected in shorter reaction times and higher 
accuracy when the target chord is harmonically close to the tonal centre created by 
the context. This advantage is not only due to psychoacoustic similarity of context 
and target, but to the harmonic distance in the cognitive space of chords and keys. 
Thus, the harmonic priming effect is an index of implicit knowledge of syntactic 
conventions in tonal music. Participants were asked to judge whether the target 
chord was tuned or mistuned according to the preceding chord. However, Patel et al. 
(2008) were interested in the RT, because faster RT to harmonically close vs. distant 
chords is evidence of harmonic priming. Results show a normal harmonic priming 
for controls, with faster RT to close vs. distant well-tuned targets. In contrast, 
aphasics did not show a priming effect and they were even faster on distant targets, 
even if not significantly. This suggests that their responses were driven by 
psychoacoustic similarity rather than by harmonic structure.  
 Experiment 1 and 2 are thus the first to prove that aphasics that have 
syntactic comprehension problems in language also have problems in activating the 
implicit knowledge of harmonic relations that Western non-musicians normally 
exhibit. Patel et al. (2008: 788) claim that results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 
2 are “consistent with the SSIRH, and with the idea that these aphasic individuals 
have diminished processing resources for structural integration in both domains”. 
 Further evidence from neuropsychological studies has been provided by 
Jentschke (2007) and Jentschke et al. (2005, 2008). The aim of these works was to 
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probe the ERP components that are related to music-syntactic processing in children 
with language difficulties. Specifically, they studied the processing of the ERAN and 
of the N5 in children with specific language impairment (SLI), which is a primary 
linguistic disorder in the absence of non-linguistic causes. A main characteristic of 
SLI children is that they show severe difficulties with grammar (van der Lely, 2005). 
Their performance on syntactic comprehension is significantly worse than the 
performance of typically developing children. It seems that lexical and pragmatic 
skills are quite intact, phonology and argument structure abilities are slightly worse, 
while morphosyntactic skills, and in particular the processing of grammatical 
morphemes, are the most impaired (Jentschke et al. 2008). The authors find it 
interesting to study music perception in children with a linguistic disorder, especially 
considering that this language disorder is commonly related to syntax. EEG data 
were recorded while children listened to chord sequences. Musical sentences were 
five chords long and the final chord function was a harmonically regular tonic (I), or 
a slightly irregular supertonic (II). During the experiment, participants sat in front of 
a monitor while watching a silent movie of an aquarium. The authors found that 
neither ERAN nor N5 were elicited in children with SLI, whereas both were evoked 
in age-matched control children. This means that typically developing children from 
4 to 5 years of age already possess cognitive representations of the syntactic 
regularities of Western tonal music; in contrast, children with SLI, even if they did 
not differ from typically developing children in their processing of acoustic features, 
did not evoke the ERAN and the N5 components. According to Jentschke et al. 
(2008: 1948) “this provides further evidence that musical and linguistic syntax are 
processed in shared neural systems”.  
 Interestingly, all these recent data coming from neuroimaging, 
neuropsychology and behavioural works that tested the SSIRH found significant 
evidence for the overlap of neural resources between linguistic and musical 
processing at the level of syntax. As for semantic processing Besson et al. (1998), 
Bonnel et al. (2001), Koelsch et al. (2005), Slevc et al. (2009) and Hoch et al. (2011) did 
not find any interaction between linguistic semantic and harmonic processing. 
Moreover, even if Poulin-Charronat et al. (2005) argue for a general attentional 
mechanism, they found an interaction in semantic processing in language and 
harmonic processing in music. What is relevant in this work is that, by now, it has 
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not yet been studied whether there exists an interaction between linguistic pragmatic 
computations and harmonic processing in music. 
 
2.7  Musicians and non-musicians. Are they different? 
 
 The debate on whether musicians are “different” if compared to the ordinary 
population has been pursued both in behavioural and neuroimaging studies. One of 
the reasons that led to this research question is that perceptual and cognitive skills 
can be shaped and enhanced through our experience in the world (see for example, 
Goldstone, 1999; Palmeri & Gauthier, 2004), and expert musicians are an ideal 
population to be studied. Professional musicians are in fact dedicated to music 
training since very early in life and they follow rigid practice regimens totalling 
approximately 10.000+h of lifetime practice by early adulthood (e.g. Ericsson, 
Krampe & Tesch-Romer, 1993; Krampe & Ericsson, 1996). During their training, 
instrumentalists have to deal with clear perceptual and cognitive demands. They 
continuously perceive and control their instrument’s acoustic signal, sustain attention 
to their output, reproduce complex and variable sound sequences, and also when 
playing in orchestras or with other instrumentalists they must carefully analyse the 
output of other musicians. Moreover, there are differences across the types of the 
instrument or musical-genre played. For instance, musicians that perform classical 
music, if compared to rock or jazz musicians, can better discriminate differences in 
frequency (Kishon-Rabin et al., 2001; Vuust, Brattico, Seppänen, Näätänen, & 
Tervaniemi, 2012). Percussionists are more stable when reproducing temporal 
intervals with respect to string musicians and non-musicians (Cicchini et al., 2012); 
string musicians match frequency differences less variably than percussionists 
(Hoffman, Mürbe, Kuhlisch, & Pabst, 1997); and trained vocalists can sustain pitch 
better than instrumentalists (Nikjeh et al., 2009). Also data from EEG and MEG 
show differences in the timbre response of the specific musical instrument played, 
both in adults (Pantev, Roberts, Schulz, Engelien, & Ross, 2001; Shahin, Bosnyak, 
Trainor, & Roberts, 2003) and in children (Shahin, Roberts, Chau, Tranor, & Miller, 
2008; Shahin, Roberts, & Trainor, 2004; Trainor, Shahin, & Roberts, 2003). 
Moreover, differences have been found between string and woodwind players 
compared to piano players. String and woodwind players, who continuously must 
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attend to and adjust intonation during performance, can discriminate frequency 
differences more finely (Micheyl et al., 2006; Spiegel & Watson, 1984). However, in 
an attempt to probe whether there are any differences between violinists and pianists 
in fine-grained auditory perceptual threshold associated with long-term training on 
specific instruments, Carey et al. (2015) found that basic acoustic features are 
manipulated differently by violinists and pianists, but they do not differ in their 
perceptual sensitivity to these features. 
 Turning back to the comparison between musicians and non-musicians, it has 
been widely proved that musicians tend to outperform non-musicians in perceiving 
fine differences in a number of basic auditory properties, which includes frequency 
and/or pitch (Amir, Amir, & Kishon-Rabin, 2003; Kishon, Rabin, Amir, Vexler, & 
Zaltz, 2001; Koelsch, Schröger, & Tervaniemi, 1999; Micheyl, Delhommeau, Perrot, 
& Oxenham, 2006; Nikjeh, Lister, & Frisch, 2009; Parbery-Clark, Skoe, Lam et al. 
2009; Spiegel & Watson, 1984), tone interval size (Siegel & Siegel, 1977; Zarate, 
Ritson, & Poeppel, 2012, 2013), temporal interval size (Cicchini, Arrighi, Cecchetti, 
Giusti, & Burr, 2012; Ehrlé & Samson, 2005; Rammsayer & Altenmüller, 2006), and 
timbre (Pitt, 1994).  
 Evidence on sustained attentional abilities in musicians showed that 
musicians outperform non-musicians on auditory but not visually sustained attention 
measures (Strait et al., 2010); however, Rodrigues, Loureiro, & Caramelli (2013) also 
showed an advantage for musicians on visual attention metrics. It is interesting to 
note that Conway et al. (2010) found that deaf children with cochlear implants are 
impaired in visual sequence learning, suggesting that a period of auditory deprivation 
may have a major impact on cognitive processes that are not specific to the auditory 
modality.  
 As for the ERP components, musicians have larger amplitude and/or shorter 
latencies compared to non-musicians with respect to many ERP components, such 
as the N1, P2, MMN, P300, reflecting enhanced cortical attentive and pre-attentive 
processing of linguistic (e.g. Chobert et al., 2011) and musical features (e.g. Vuust et 
al., 2011a; Pantev, et al., 1998; François & Schön, 2011; Koelsch et al., 1999; Shahin et 
al., 2003; Van Zuijen et al., 2005). According to Baumann et al. (2008) the increased 
auditory evoked potentials in musicians (N1-P2) reflects an enlarged neural 
representation for specific sound features rather than selective attention biases. 
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Kraus and Chandrasekaran (2010) found that at the sub-cortical level, musicians have 
more robust encoding of linguistic and musical features. This is shown by earlier and 
larger brainstem responses. Fujioka et al. (2004) found that, compared to non-
musicians, musicians show larger MMNs to deviants in contour and in interval 
structure inserted in 5-notes melodies. 
 On auditory scene analysis, Zendel and Alain (2009, 2013) found that 
musicians segregate harmonic complexes better than non-musicians and more often 
report hearing a harmonic as a separate auditory object.  
 François and Schön (2011) and François et al. (2012) (but see also Shook et al., 
2013) assessed the effects of musical expertise in adults and active musical training in 
children on speech segmentation abilities. Adult musicians outperformed non-
musicians with a larger amplitude on the N1 component. Additionally, the amplitude 
of a later N400-like fronto-central negative component was more sensitive to the 
transitional probabilities in musicians compared to non-musicians. Thus, musicians 
have a robust representation of musical and linguistic structures. It was also found 
that musicians showed both a larger P2 and MMN to low transitional probability 
melodies than to high transitional probability melodies while non-musicians did not 
show these effects. François and Schön (2011) and François et al. (2012) suggest that 
musicians learned the musical structure better than non-musicians. Longitudinal tests 
on children also confirm that the group of children who undertook music lessons 
showed a significant increase in speech segmentation abilities after one and two years 
of training. After two years, this behavioural benefit was proved also by greater 
sensitivity to the fronto-central N400-like component to transitional probabilities. 
Thus, it is the case that music training enhances sensitivity to statistical regularities in 
speech. 
 Other differences between musicians and non-musicians are shown by the 
electrophysiological indices of auditory perception (e.g. Seppänen, Pesonen, & 
Tervaniemi, 2012; Tervaniemi, Just, Koelsch, Widmann, & Schröger, 2005; 
Tervaniemi et al., 2009; Marie, Magne, & Besson, 2011). Tervaniemi et al. (2009) 
compared the N2b component amplitude in musicians and non-musicians and found 
that musicians show an increased N2b for attended intensity, frequency and duration 
deviances in speech and musical sounds. Seppänen et al. (2012) also found significant 
reduction in P3b amplitudes when attending to subtle pitch deviances. Thus, there 
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are differences in attention between musicians and non-musicians in the detection of 
potentially less salient acoustic cues (Fujioka, Ross, Kakigi, Pantev, & Trainor, 2006; 
Strait & Kraus, 2011; Strait et al., 2010). 
 Some researchers also show that there are morphological differences between 
musicians and non-musicians. For instance, Bermudez and Zatorre (2005) show that 
musicians have a larger gray matter concentration in the auditory cortex, Sluming et 
al. (2002) an increased gray matter density and volume in the left inferior frontal 
gyrus, Broca’s area, and other authors (Schlaug et al., 1995; Chan et al., 1998; Keenan 
et al., 2001; and Luders et al., 2004) also add that musicians have a larger planum 
temporale than non-musicians. However, it is not really surprising that sound 
features are better perceived by musicians. This is due to the quantity of time spent 
focusing on sounds and the way they are generated, paying close attention to pitch, 
timber, duration, and timing. These acquired skills transfer to non-musical abilities. 
For example, musicians, both children and adults, perform better if asked to detect 
fine contour modifications in the prosody of an utterance (Schön et al., 2004; Magne 
et al., 2006). At the end of an utterance, adult musicians have better performances 
and larger ERP components to metric incongruities (Marie et al., 2011). Anvari et al. 
(2002) and Milovanov et al. (2008, 2009) found evidence for a possible correlation 
between musical and linguistic aptitudes in children; and this is true also for adults 
(Foxton et al., 2003; Slevc, Miyake, 2006). Some authors also argued for a positive 
influence of musical training on linguistic skills (Butzlaff, 2000; Overy, 2003; Gaab et 
al., 2005; Tallal and Gaab, 2006; Forgeard et al., 2008; Moreno et al., 2009; Parbery-
Clark et al., 2009).  
 However, it is not the case that all the literature that investigates the 
behaviour of musicians and non-musicians on musical and on linguistic tasks found 
differences. This is the case of Poulin-Charronat’s et al. (2005) study on semantic 
priming in vocal music. The authors probed how musical grammar may interfere 
with the processing of semantically related or unrelated sentences in sung sequences. 
Participants, half non-musicians and half professional musicians, were asked to 
perform a lexical decision task, thus, the musical task was implicit. Poulin-Charronat 
et al. (2005) found that both groups behaved very similarly, thus they claim that, as in 
this case, not all the musical processes require an explicit knowledge of music. This is 
also what is found in Slevc et al. (2009), having both groups performing equally in the 
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garden-path test; this is consistent with a large set of data showing that harmonic 
priming occurs at an implicit level and results from the implicit learning of Western 
tonal regularities (Tillmann, Bharucha & Bigand, 2000) as with other data showing 
that the auditory cortex of non-musicians can process musical relations automatically 
(Brattico, Näätänen, & Tervaniermi, 2002; Koelsch et al., 2000; Koelsch, Schröger, & 
Gunter, 2002; Trainor, McDonald, & Alain, 2002). Moreover, it is noteworthy that 
when differences have been found in behavioural studies the task asks for explicit 
attention. In fact, Loui, Wessel (2007: 1091) found that when the demand for 
selective attention was removed, the performance of musicians and non-musicians 
was similarly affected by harmonic expectation. According to the authors, the 
differences between musicians and non-musicians that vary in relation to the 
explicit/implicit task “are consistent with a model of attention in which musical 
training selectively facilitates responses to harmonically expected chord progressions, 
so that musicians form automatic expectations for prototypical chord progressions 
and are unable to ignore these harmonic expectations”. Additionally, the automatic 
expectation model is confirmed by electrophysiological data, as in Loui, Grent-‘t-
Jong, Torpey, & Woldorff’s (2005) work, which shows that the violation of harmonic 
expectation is heavily modulated by attention in non-musicians. Thus, Loui and 
Wessel (2007) account for the whole set of data reported by suggesting that the 
formation of harmonic expectations is affected by both attention and musical 
training. When experimenters asked for a selective attention to the music, musicians 
recruited their musical skills to focus on harmony, but when they did not choose for 
selective attention, musicians became sensitive to harmonic expectations as non-
musicians did. 
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3.  Experimental pragmatics: the case of scalar implicatures 
 
 
 Pragmatics is a branch of linguistics which deals with the study of how the 
properties of language interact with the contextual factors in the interpretation of 
utterances.  
 In linguistics, it is possible to distinguish between sentence and utterance. 
While a sentence is an abstract object, with properties that are phonological, syntactic 
and semantic and that are assigned by the grammar of the language; an utterance is a 
concrete object because it has a definite location in time and space. Once an 
utterance is realized, also a sentence is, but not vice versa. An utterance is, in fact, a 
realization of a sentence that has all linguistic properties of a sentence, but it also has 
further properties. These added properties are linked to the situation in which 
sentences are realized, crucially involving the contextual parameters introduced by 
the presence of a speaker/hearer.  
 Pragmatic theories are concerned with the interaction of both linguistic and 
non-linguistic properties at play.  
 The philosopher Paul Grice (1989) defended two main ideas that are widely 
accepted by linguists. The first idea is the existence of a speaker’s meaning and of a 
sentence meaning. The speaker’s meaning is the communicative content that is 
shared by the interlocutors, while the sentence meaning is the subpart of the process 
that corresponds to the decoding of the sentence uttered. The recognition of the 
speaker’s meaning is a process that is realized without any distinct awareness of the 
sentence meaning, that is, of the semantic properties that the grammar assigned to 
the sentence. In a conversation, it is presupposed that the hearer will (finally) 
recognize the intended meaning of the utterance as produced by the speaker. 
Consider, for instance, the answer in the following exchange: 
 
 (1) Bill: Do you like Mozart sonatas? 
  Anne: Some of them. 
 
The answer of Anne “some of them” is interpreted as conveying Anne’s intention to 
induce in Bill the belief that Anne likes some of Mozart sonatas, but not all of them. 
The speaker’s meaning of the relevant proposition is thus Anne likes some of Mozart 
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sonatas, but not all of them. The actual meaning of the sentence is thus much richer than 
the meaning that was literally expressed by the speaker, which is clearly related to the 
standard logical interpretation of some (Anne like some and possibly all Mozart’s 
sonatas).  
 The second idea that Grice defended is the cooperative nature of 
conversational exchanges in communication. Grice argues that when we speak, the 
conversation should meet some specific standards that are related to the fact that it is 
a cooperative activity. Grice labels these standards as Cooperative Principle and he 
defines it by claiming that participants to a conversation, fulfilling the cooperative 
principle, are required to “make [their] conversational contribution such as is 
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
talk exchange in which [the interlocutors] are engaged” (Grice, 1975: 45). In order to 
give this principle a specific content, Grice (1975: 45-46) proposes four maxims that 
have to be respected in order for the principle to be obeyed. These are: 
 
 Maxims of Quantity 
 1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current  
 purpose of the exchange) 
 2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required  
 
 Maxims of Quality 
 Supermaxim. Try to make your contribution one that is true. 
 1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
 2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
 
 Maxim of Relation 
 Be relevant. 
 
 Maxims of Manner 
 Supermaxim. Be perspicuous. 
 1. Avoid obscurity expressions. 
 2. Avoid ambiguity. 
 3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
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 4. Be orderly. 
 
Once a sentence is uttered by the speaker, the hearer chooses the interpretation of 
the sentence that is the most consistent with the assumption that the speaker has 
complied with the maxims outlined above. In (1), for instance, Anne’s answer leads 
the speaker to compute some inferences. As we have seen, this sentence should be 
seen as elliptical for “I like some but not all Mozart sonatas”. The reason is that if the 
speaker had intended to convey the information according to which she likes all 
Mozart’s sonatas, she would have used, to that purpose, the more informative 
sentence “I like all of them”, and the hearer is fully aware of that. More exactly, in 
Grice’s model of communication, the hearer is aware of the fact that not using the 
more informative variant would bring about a violation of the first submaxim of 
quantity: “make your contribution as informative as is required”. The hearer 
concludes thus that the speaker’s communicative intention involves excluding the 
possibility that she likes all of Mozart’s sonatas. The final result is the speaker’s 
meaning (the so-called pragmatic reading of the sentence), that is, “I like some but 
not all of Mozart’s sonatas”, which is clearly distinct from the original meaning 
conveyed by the sentence (the so-called logical or semantic meaning): “I like some 
and possibly all Mozart’s sonatas”. 
 It is in 1975 that Grice introduced the notion of implicature to account for 
information that go beyond the literal meaning of the utterance. According to Grice, 
implicatures can be Particularized Conversational Implicatures (PCIs) or Generalized 
Conversational Implicatures (GCIs). PCIs are strongly dependent on the context, 
while GCIs are default inferences, which are not strictly bound to the context, but 
they are related to an appropriate trigger, that is a word. Scalar implicatures are the 
paramount example of GCIs, illustrated by cases such as (2a), which is said to 
implicate (2c): 
 
 (2)  (a) She played some Mozart sonatas 
  (b) She played all Mozart sonatas 
  (c) She played not all Mozart sonatas 
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The proposition in (2b) entails the proposition in (2a) because it is more informative. 
In order to obey Grice’s first Maxim of Quantity (“make your contribution as 
informative as is required”), and make thus an optimal contribution to the common 
purpose of the conversation, the speaker should utter the most informative 
proposition (2b) if what he intends is (2b). Hence, according to the Gricean account, 
when listening a proposition like (2a), (2a) is typically understood as implicating the 
proposition in (2c), which crucially involves the negation of the proposition in (2b). 
 This sort of implicature is standardly called scalar and traditionally related to 
the neo-Gricean account found in Horn (1972). Scalar implicatures are more or less 
conventionalized scales of lexical items organized by order of informativeness. 
Levinson (1983: 134) provides the examples in (3): 
 
 (3)  < all, most, many, some, few > 
  < and, or > 
  < n, …, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1> 
  < excellent, good > 
  < hot, warm > 
  < always, often, sometimes > 
  < succeed, V ing, try to V, want to V > 
  < necessarily p, p, possibly p > 
  < certain that p, probable that p, possible that p > 
  < must, should, may > 
  < cold, cool > 
  < love, like > 
  < none, not all > 
 
Other lexical scales are, for instance: 
 
 (4) < first, second, third, fourth, fifth, … > 
  < definite, indefinite >  
  < lover, friend > 
  < need, want > 
  < old, middle-aged, young > 
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  < general, colonel, major, captain, … > 
 
The informativeness of scales, as those in (3) and (4), is characterized by the presence 
of a one-way semantic relation. However, as noted by Hirschberg (1985: 114), scalar 
implicatures are extremely varied because “the orderings that permit speakers to 
license scalar implicatures (…) range from those relatively domain-independent 
“canonical” orderings inspired by the logical quantifiers and connectives to domain-
dependent entity rankings – and from linear orderings to hierarchical orderings”; she 
also claims that “the relations that support scalar implicature (…) turn out to be just 
the class of partially ordered sets, or posets” (Hirschberg, 1985: 125).  This view is 
shared by Carston (1990, 1997) and Horn (1992), who do not consider scalar 
ordering as a homogeneous class, even within the range of entailment scales. 
According to them, numerals have a peculiar behaviour with respect to other scalar 
terms. Consider, for instance, a sentence like “Christmas is coming in 286 days”. 
Here, it is possible to use numerals with an “at most” reading, though this reading is 
not possible with other scalar terms, as in some. Numerals are usually interpreted with 
an exact interpretation, thus, they do “not have an “at least” semantics which is 
upper-bounded by a scalar implicature; rather they might be best analysed as 
underspecified among the “at least”, “exact” and “at most” readings. (…) Scalar 
inferences associated with numerals would no longer be considered conversational 
implicatures but would come out as different ways of pragmatically enriching the 
underspecified semantic content of the numerals” (Papafragou, Musolino, 2003: 
259).  
 From a standard Gricean point of view, scalar implicatures (SIs, henceforth) 
are firstly computed by the semantic module which assigns the original truth 
conditions to a sentence; after that, the pragmatic module intervenes, by enriching 
these truth-conditions. This idea has been challenged by Chierchia (2004) because SIs  
fail to arise as a global effect in specific linguistic contexts, whereas there are 
embedded SIs that must be computed before the end of the semantic computation, 
as it applies to the sentence as a whole. Consider the sentence in (5a): 
 
 (5a) Anne is either drinking a coffee or eating some biscuits. 
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 (5b) Anne is either drinking a coffee or eating some biscuits, but she is not 
  eating all the biscuits. 
 (5c) Anne is either drinking a coffee or eating every biscuit. 
 (5d) Anne is either drinking a coffee or eating some biscuits and it is not  
  the case that (Anne is drinking a coffee or eating every biscuit). 
 (5e) Anne is not drinking a coffee. 
 
If we interpret (5a) globally, the alternative relative to the second disjunct, where the 
implicature is triggered, is (5c), which is more informative than (5a). Under the 
pragmatic interpretation of (5a), all its stronger alternatives are then denied, most 
crucially (5c). The new interpretation is thus (5d), which negates the alternative in 
(5b). But, from this alleged pragmatic interpretation in (5d), we may infer that (5d) 
obtains (5e); and this is certainly not a correct characterization of the speaker’s 
meaning of (5a). It seems thus that the correct pragmatic interpretation of (5a), that is 
(5b), should be calculated locally, at the level of the second disjunct, that is, while the 
semantic processing of the whole sentence is still going on. 
 The other issue concerning SIs concerns the so-called downward entailing 
contexts. In a context of this type, inferences are licensed from sets to their subsets. 
For instance, negation is a downward entailing context (DE), since (6a) entails (6b): 
 
 (6a) John did not buy a car. 
 (6b) John did not buy a red car. 
 
DE contexts can be realized also in sentences containing scalar terms, as in (7a) and 
(7b): 
 
 (7a) Anne invited Mary or Paul. 
 (7b) Anne did not invite Mary or Paul. 
 
The difference in these sentences is the reading of the disjunct or. In (7a) it is 
interpreted exclusively, because the correct reading is that Anne invited either Mary 
or Paul, but not both (pragmatic reading); while in (7b) the disjunct is interpreted 
inclusively, meaning that Anne invited neither Mary nor Paul. In (7b), thus, the SI is 
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not calculated and the interpretation that is assigned is the default semantic 
interpretation, to the exclusion of the pragmatic interpretation. This means that in 
DE contexts, the SIs that should arise because of the presence of a scalar term tend 
not to arise, to the effect that the scalar term is interpreted semantically (for instance, 
or is interpreted inclusively, as in propositional logic).  
 However, there are also cases in which, although the structural context at 
stake is DE, the SIs arises, as in (8) (Chierchia et al, 2004: 287): 
 
 (8) It was a two-course meal. But everyone who had skipped the first or 
  the second course enjoyed it more. 
 
In uttering this sentence, it is crucially not meant that a person who had skipped both 
the first and the second course enjoyed it more, that is, we do not interpret the 
disjunct or inclusively. The right interpretation of (8) is rather that a person who has 
eaten only the first course or only the second course enjoyed it more.  In this case, 
even if the context is DE, the implicature is calculated, because not doing so would 
give rise to an unintelligible reading. Thus, in DE contexts, SIs do not arise, unless 
something forces them to be calculated.  
 In DE contexts, SIs do not arise because in these contexts the scale of 
informativeness is generally reversed. If we consider a non-DE context, also called 
upward entailing context, the inference is licensed from sets to supersets. Consider (9): 
  
 (9) Mary invited Anne and John. 
 
In this case, this statement is true only if both Anne and John are invited by Mary 
(the sentence is true in one and only one scenario). By contrast, a statement with the 
disjunction or, as in (10a), is true in three situations, exemplified in (10b), (10c), (10d): 
 
 (10a) Mary invited Anne or John. 
 (10b) Mary invited Anne and John. 
 (10c) Mary invited Anne. 
 (10d) Mary invited John. 
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In fact, (10b) logically entails (10a). Hence, we conclude that (10b) is more 
informative than (10a). On the contrary, in DE contexts, a statement that includes 
the disjunction or as in (7b), here repeated as (11), is more informative than (12), 
which involves a conjunction. Thus, (12) is true in three situations as illustrated in 
(12a), (12b), and (12c): 
 
 (11) Anne did not invite Mary or Paul. 
 
 (12) Anne did not invite Mary and Paul. 
 (12a) Anne invited neither Mary nor Paul. 
 (12b) Anne invited Mary. 
 (12c) Anne invited Paul.  
 
In upward entailing contexts (UE contexts) a statement which includes and is more 
informative than a statement which includes or; on the contrary, in DE contexts, a 
statement which includes or is as informative as and, given that the implicature does 
not arise. In DE contexts, we cannot then proceed to calculate the implicature 
potentially triggered by or by negating the corresponding sentence with and, since the 
latter is arguably less informative than the former, to the effect that the maxim of 
Quantity does not dictate the use of the conjunction.  
 The issues regarding implicatures have been addressed by many scholars, who 
formulated different accounts. These pragmatic theories are based on Grice’s idea 
that there is a set of expectations that allow the interlocutors to infer the meaning of 
the sentences involved in a conversational exchange based on the original meaning of 
the utterance and on the contribution of the context. The main theories can be 
subdivided in two groups: the so-called Neo-Gricean account (Gazdar, 1979; Horn, 
1973, 1984, 1989, 1992, 2004; Levinson, 1983, 2000; Chierchia, 2004), that is 
relatively close to Grice’s formulation; and the Post-Gricean account, whose most 
important formulation is undoubtedly Relevance Theory (Bezuidenhout, 1997; 
Blakemore, 1987, 2002; Blass, 1990; Carston, 2002; Carston and Uchida, 1997; Gutt, 
1991; Ifantidou, 2001; Matsui, 2000; Moeschler, 1989; Noh, 2000; Papafragou, 2000; 
Pilkington, 2000; Reboul, 1992; Rouchota and Jucker, 1998; Sperber and Wilson, 
1986/1995; Yus, 1997).  
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 Neo-Griceans consider scalar implicatures to be conversational implicatures, 
and they also propose that some conversational implicatures are strongly dependent 
on the context, while others, as scalar implicatures, are not. According to Horn 
(1972), as already mentioned, scalar implicatures depend on the existence of lexical 
scales. Horn’s idea is that, in computing scalar implicatures, the alternatives to be 
compared are determined by the lexical scale where the scalar terms belong. For 
instance, if a scalar term like “some” is used in a sentence, the hearer/reader 
automatically compares the term with the stronger terms that are present in the scale, 
in this case “all”.  
 Relatively close to Grice’s original formulation is the definition of Levinson 
(2000) of three more general principles stemming from Grice’s maxims: 
 
 Q-Principle 
 Speaker’s maxim. Do not provide a statement that is informationally weaker 
 than your knowledge of the world allows, unless providing an informationally 
 stronger statement would contravene the I-Principle. Specifically, select the 
 informationally strongest paradigmatic alternate that is consistent with the 
 facts. 
 
 Recipient corollary. Take it that the speaker made the strongest statement 
 consistent with what he knows. 
 
 I-Principle. 
 Speaker’s maxim. Produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to 
 achieve your communicational ends. 
 
 Recipient corollary: The Enrichment Rule. Amplify the informational content 
 of the speaker’s utterance, by finding the most specific interpretation, up to 
 what you judge to be the speaker’s m-intended point. 
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 M-Principle 
 Speaker’s maxim. Indicate an abnormal, non-stereotypical situation by using 
 marked expressions that contrast with those you would use to describe the 
 corresponding normal, stereotypical situations. 
 
 Recipient corollary. What is said in an abnormal way indicates an abnormal 
 situation, or marked messages indicate marked situations. 
 
These principles allow us to interpret sentences as in (1), here repeated in (13): 
 
 (13) Bill: Do you like Mozart sonatas? 
  Anne: Some of them. 
 
In the elliptical answer of Anne, Bill interprets her answer as complying with the I-
Principle, by producing the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve her 
communicative purpose. In (13), Bill also assumes that Mary is obeying the Gricean 
Maxim of Relation. This justifies the way he analyzes the answer, that is, by enriching 
the content of her utterance. Moreover, according to the Q-Principle, Bill 
understands that Mary made the strongest possible statement consistent with her 
knowledge.  
 In the interpretation of scalar implicatures, Levinson (2000) further proposed 
that the scalar term, in its pragmatic interpretation, is lexicalized as its default 
interpretation. He considers that in the pragmatic interpretation, the scalar term is 
encoded as a defeasible part of its meaning, that is, “some” also means “not all”. The 
semantic interpretation, where “some” is interpreted as “at least one”, is accessible 
only if the pragmatic interpretation is explicitly negated. 
 Relevance Theory (Post-Gricean account) is still based on Grice’s two 
foundational ideas, but the differences from the standard account are mostly related 
to the expectations that guide the comprehension process. In the case of Griceans 
and neo-Griceans, these expectations come from principles and maxims, because 
they expect speakers to obey or occasionally violate rules of communication. These 
violations may be unavoidable because of a clash between two different maxims, or 
they may be committed on purpose as a dedicated instrument in order communicate 
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to the hearer some implicit meaning: the speaker knows that the hearer will calculate 
an implicature as the result of the detected maxim violation. For Relevance Theory, 
the speaker, in the very act of communicating, raises in his interlocutors precise and 
predictable expectations of relevance, which guide the hearer to the speaker’s 
meaning. Even if Grice proposed the Maxim of Relation, invoking relevance, he did 
not define it in a fine-grained way; Relevance Theory, on the contrary, starts from a 
detailed account of relevance and its role on cognition. Relevance is defined as a 
property of inputs, that include external stimuli and mental representations, with 
respect to cognitive processes. These inputs are relevant when they connect to 
background knowledge to yield new cognitive effects, which amount to changes in 
the assumptions of a cognitive subject. The changes result from the processing of an 
input in a context of previously held assumptions. The processing of the input may 
lead to three possible different cognitive effects, that are, the derivation of new 
assumptions, the modification of previously held assumptions, or the deletion of 
previously held assumptions. Relevance is the possibility to achieve such cognitive 
effects; it is, thus, what makes an input worth processing. Inputs may differ on the 
cognitive costs and on how much they are relevant and more worth processing. For 
instance, when a doctor utters a sentence like “you caught a flu”, this utterance 
carries more cognitive effects, and is thus more relevant, than a sentence like “you 
are ill”. Some mental effort is required when processing this sort of inputs. An 
example of input that is relevant and with a smaller processing effort is a sentence 
like “you caught a flu” when compared to “you have a disease spelled with the sixth, 
the twelfth and the twenty-first letter of the alphabet” (Noveck, Sperber, 2004). 
Relevance, thus, deals with the degree assigned to these two factors: direct 
proportionality with cognitive effect, and inverse proportionality with processing 
effort.  
 In Relevance Theory, there are two principles about the role of relevance in 
cognition and communication (Noveck, Sperber, 2004: 6): 
 
 Cognitive principle of relevance. Human cognition tends to be geared to the 
 maximization of relevance. 
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 Communicative principle of relevance. Every act of communication conveys a 
 presumption of its own optimal relevance. 
 
Unlike Gricean and neo-Gricean maxims and principles, these two principles are not 
intended as normative but as purely descriptive. The Cognitive Principle of 
Relevance predicts that the human perceptual mechanisms pick out spontaneously 
potentially relevant stimuli, the human retrieval mechanisms activate spontaneously 
relevant assumptions, and the human inferential mechanisms process them 
spontaneously in the most productive way. To do so, however, the speaker needs an 
audience that is focused on the relevant communicative purpose. In order to obtain a 
successful conversation, the speaker wants his utterance to be seen as relevant by the 
audience: this is in fact what the Communicative Principle of Relevance states. 
 In the Relevance Theory the presumption of optimal relevance (Noveck, 
Sperber, 2004: 6) conveyed by every utterance grounds a specific comprehension 
heuristic: 
 
 Presumption of optimal relevance 
 (a) the utterance is relevant enough to be worth processing. 
 (b) it is the most relevant one compatible with communicator’s abilities  
  and preferences. 
 
 Relevance-guided comprehension heuristic 
 (a) follow a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation of the  
  utterance (and in particular in resolving ambiguities and referential  
  indeterminacies, in going beyond linguistic meaning, in computing  
  implicatures, etc.). 
 (b) stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied. 
 
For instance, in (1), in evaluating Anne’s answer “some of them”, the listener follows 
a path of least effort and perceives “them” related to Mozart sonatas, and the whole 
sentence to be elliptical for “I like some of them”. The attention of the listener is 
plausibly gained by the fact that Anne is answering his question. However, the 
expectations of relevance are not yet satisfied. Anne was in fact able, but chose not 
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to do so, to answer that she liked all Mozart sonatas. Giving not the all-answer (“I 
like all of them”), the listener is entitled to interpret that she likes only some of them. 
Now, the expectations of relevance are satisfied. 
 Concerning scalar implicatures, Relevance Theory considers them to be 
explicatures rather than conversational implicatures, as neo-Griceans do. According 
to Relevance Theory, scalar implicatures are the result of a pragmatic enrichment of 
the logical form of a sentence. This enrichment process is the same as for other sorts 
of utterances, such as metaphors, loose talk, etc. If, for instance, someone says “It’s 
freezing outside”, this sentence is usually interpreted “It is very cold outside”. The 
interpretation of the sentence comes through a process that is driven by the context 
because the concept is constructed locally on the meaning of “freezing”. This 
construction is a contextually driven non-linguistic, conceptual process (de Carvalho 
et al. 2016). This is one point of crucial difference from the neo-Gricean approaches. 
In Relevance Theory, in fact, scalar implicatures are interpreted through a process 
that is identical to the one mentioned, that is one of ad hoc concept construction. 
Moreover, this process is cognitively costly, meaning that differently from what 
suggested by neo-Griceans, scalar implicatures are costly and they are accessed only if 
the context makes them relevant. Summing up, regarding scalar implicatures, the 
main point for the post-Gricean account is the central role assigned to the context. It 
is through contextual processes that it is possible to calculate scalar implicatures, and 
lexical scales are not assigned any specific role.  
 Neo-Gricean and post-Gricean accounts differ not only theoretically, but also 
for the different experimental predictions they make.   
 For neo-Griceans, the semantic interpretation is costlier than the pragmatic 
interpretation. On the post-Gricean account, the opposite is true, that is, semantic 
interpretation is less costly than the pragmatic interpretation. This means that if there 
is a costly interpretation, this would be acquired later in cognitive development, and, 
regarding reaction times, it should take more time to be processed. Thus, for neo-
Griceans the semantic interpretation should come later and take more time to be 
processed, while for post-Griceans, it is the pragmatic interpretation that is acquired 
later and takes more time to be processed. Several works that contrasted the 
predictions of the neo-Gricean and post-Gricean accounts have provided robust 
evidence in favour of the post-Gricean account, because it has been proved that 
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children acquire later the pragmatic interpretation (see section 3.1.1) and reaction 
time measures in adults show that the pragmatic interpretations of scalar terms takes 
more time to be processed than semantic interpretations (see section 3.1.2). 
Moreover, the amount of pragmatic answers given by adults was strongly context-
dependent (see Hartshorne et al. 2015 and Dupuy et al. 2016) and this is contradiction 
with Levinson’s default account. In his account, Levinson implies that all 
underinformative sentences with scalar terms should be given pragmatic 
interpretations and that the implicature is explicitly negated when the sentence is 
semantically interpreted. Thus, since now, all the experimental results favour for the 
post-Gricean account contradicting the predictions of the neo-Gricean accounts.  
 Based on experimental work that we are going to explore in the next section, 
Chierchia (2013) has proposed a new version of the neo-Gricean account. In his 
theory, he considers scalars, free-choice implicatures, polarity items, upward and 
downward entailing contexts. For what concerns scalar implicatures, Chierchia 
considers them to be the “result from a covert exhaustification operator (roughly 
equivalent in meaning to only) that operates on a set of alternatives determined by the 
scale the scalar term belongs to” (de Carvalho & Reboul et al. 2016: 3). The problem 
with this idea is that the set of alternatives is only available to the exhaustification 
process if the context makes it mandatory to derive the implicature. Consider for 
instance the conversational exchange below: 
 
 (14a) Bill: Did you play all Mozart sonatas? 
 (14b) Anne: I played some Mozart sonatas. 
 (14c) Anne: I played most of Mozart sonatas. 
 (14d) Anne: I played all Mozart sonatas. 
 
 (15)  Bill: Did you play Mozart sonatas? 
 
In (14a) the question leads to a set of possible alternatives, including most and all, as 
illustrated in (14b), (14c) and (14d); in (15) the alternative set would not be available 
because of the absence of the covert exhaustification operator in (15). As noted by 
Chierchia (2013), the central contextual factor in the derivation of scalar inferences is 
the relevance to conversational goals.  
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 In the recent version of Chierchia, some differences between the neo-
Gricean approaches and the post-Gricean approach disappear, even if Chierchia does 
not take any explicit position regarding processing costs of implicatures. In his new 
approach, he considers context to play a central role. However, the alternatives that 
play a role in scalar implicatures are entirely discharged on Horn scales, which are 
lexically determined.  
 The theories discussed above, Grice’s original theory, the neo-Gricean theory 
and Relevance Theory, are not the only theoretical approaches to pragmatics. As 
reported in Noveck, Sperber (2004: 7), important contributors to pragmatic 
theorizing with original points of view include Anscombre and Ducrot (1995); Bach 
(1987, 1994); Bach and Harnish (1979); Blutner and Zeevat (2003); Dascal (1981); 
Ducrot (1984); Fauconnier (1975, 1985); Harnish (1976, 1994); Kasher (1976, 1984, 
1998); Katz (1977); Lewis (1979); Neale (1990, 1992, forthcoming); Recanati (1979, 
1988, 1993, 2000); Searle (1969, 1979); Stalnaker (1999); Sweetser (1990); Travis 
(1995); Van der Auwera, J. (1981, 1985, 1997); Vanderveken (1990-91); see also 
Davis (1991), Moeschler and Reboul (1994). 
 
3.1  Experimental works on the computation of Scalar Implicatures 
  
 Experimental works on linguistic-pragmatic issues are relatively recent. 
However, there are some classical reasoning studies (Braine, Rumain, 1981; Evans, 
Newstead, 1980; Paris, 1973; Smith, 1980; Sternberg, 1979) that give us interesting 
results. When adults are presented sentences in a pragmatically infelicitous context, 
they are often equivocal in answering. For example, in Evans and Newstead’s (1980: 
382) second experiment, the authors presented the participants “a series of 
sentences, followed by a letter and a number. The task (was) to say whether the 
sentence is true or false with respect to the letter and number presented”. The 
participants saw, for example, a sentence like “either there is a P or a 4” in some 
possible situations: when there is a P with a 4, a P with a 9, or a Q with a 4, etc. 
When the sentence contained the conjunction and (presented as “P 4”), the authors 
reported that this type of sentence was considered true for the 57 per cent of the 
participants, while it was considered false for the 43 per cent of the participants. The 
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same pattern of results has been reported in Paris (1973). Here, the group of adults 
responded true in weak contexts in 67.5 per cent of the cases.  
 Other interesting results come from developmental studies. Children are 
more likely than adults to provide logically correct responses. In Paris (1973), 90 per 
cent of the 8-year-old participants accepted as true cases where both disjuncts were 
true. This developmental result has been confirmed by many other studies, such as 
Braine, Rumain, 1981, Sternberg, 1979 (on propositional connectives) and Smith, 
1980 (on quantifiers). 
 Sternberg (1979: 492), after confirming Paris’ results, claims that “the data 
show an interesting interaction between age and interpretation of or … children at 
the lowest grade level use the inclusive interpretation of or in preference to the 
exclusive interpretation … At the higher-grade levels, children show a strong 
tendency to use the exclusive interpretation in preference to the inclusive 
interpretation”. As noted by Noveck (2004: 305), what fails to be observed is the 
explanation of this effect. According to him, weak terms, such as or, some and might, 
have a linguistically encoded meaning that is compatible with minimal interpretations 
of underinformative items, while pragmatic inferences increase with age. The 
minimal interpretation corresponds to the logical one, while pragmatic enrichment 
seems to be quite exclusively a prerogative of adults. 
 In the next sections we are going to deepen the analysis of the experimental 
works on scalar implicatures, both on children and on adults. 
 
3.1.1  The computation of Scalar Implicatures: developmental studies 
 
 The studies of Paris (1973), Braine and Rumain (1981), Sternberg (1979) and 
Smith (1980) opened a new field of investigation. Many scholars are in fact studying 
the developmental-pragmatic effect. Noveck (2001) started investigating children’s 
responses to weak scalar utterances through two different experiments. In 
Experiment 1 he studied how children reason in a modal-context, while in 
Experiment 3 how do they behave in a context with quantifiers.  
 In Experiment 1, Noveck (2001) proposes a reasoning scenario which 
involves three boxes, the first two (Box A and B) opened, the last (Box C) closed. In 
Box A there is a parrot and a toy bear, in Box B there is only a parrot. Seven-year-old 
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participants are told that in Box C there is the same content as either in Box A or in 
Box B. A puppet presents eight statements and the participants are asked to say 
whether the puppet’s claim is right or not. The target sentence is There might be a parrot 
in the box, a clearly underinformative sentence with respect to the statement There must 
be a parrot in the box. 80 per cent of the answers of seven-year-olds participants is 
consistent with the logical interpretation, whereas adults tend to draw out the 
pragmatic potential of the sentence. According to Noveck (2001: 174), it is the case 
that “logical interpretation of Might remains the default and they (the children) give 
way to pragmatic interpretation”.  
 In Experiment 3, the original paradigm of Smith (1980) was employed with 
little variations. Noveck (2001) tested children at the age of 8 and of 10 and he 
compared their answers to adults’. In this experiment there were six kinds of 
statements based on the existential quantifiers some and all, and three kinds of 
relations: absurd (e.g. Some chairs tell time/All crows have radios), appropriate (e.g. 
Some houses have bricks/All elephants have trunks) and inappropriate (e.g. Some 
giraffes have long necks/All dogs have spots). Target sentences are those in the 
inappropriate condition with the quantifier some. The results showed that 85 per cent 
of children’s answers were compatible with underinformative statements, and thus, 
they are consistent with Smith’s results.  
 Similar findings have also been found in other experiments such as 
Papafragou, Musolino (2003); Chierchia, Guasti, Gualmini, Meroni, Crain and 
Foppolo (2004); Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini and Meroni (2005). 
 Papafragou and Musolino (2003) were interested in whether young children 
compute scalar implicatures as adults do. They tested children at the age of 5 in two 
experiments on scalar implicatures using different types of scales. The scales 
employed in the experiments involve quantificational expressions, i.e. <all, some>; 
number terms, i.e. <three, two>; and inchoative/completion predicates, i.e. <finish, 
start>.  In the first experiment, participants were presented, among others, sentences 
as “Some of the horses jumped over the fence”, in a context where the truth 
condition is satisfied, but it is pragmatically infelicitous. The results show a different 
pattern of results between adults and children. As in previous studies, in fact, while 
adults tend to reject underinformative statements, children almost never did so. What 
is more interesting, in Papafragou and Musolino (2003), is Experiment 2. Differences 
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from the first study are a pre-test training and more and specific instructions. The 
authors wanted children to be strongly aware of the pragmatic infelicity, rather than 
judge truth. Specifically, children were told that a puppet would say “silly things” and 
their role in the game was to help the puppet to say it better. In the case children did 
not correct the puppet, the experimenter did. Another difference is a modification on 
the stories represented, in order to support the implicatures in a much stronger way, 
focusing on the protagonist’s performance. The results show that children’s 
sensitivity to scalar implicatures is strongly improved if they are firstly presented the 
goals of the task and if they are provided a context that more readily invite pragmatic 
inferences.  
 After this study, Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini and Meroni 
(2005), wanted to investigate whether training has a long-lasting effect. In the first 
experiment they replicated Noveck’s (2001) finding, with children providing a high 
percentage of “logical” answers. In Experiment 2, Guasti et al. (2005) tested seven-
year-old children who, prior to the experiment, participated in a training session as in 
Papafragou, Musolino (2003). During the training, children were made aware of the 
pragmatic in-/felicity of the sentences by indicating which of the two ways that 
described the picture constituted the better option. At the end of the training session, 
the experimenter reminded every child of the differences in describing sentences and, 
during the experiment, if the child did not agree, she would occasionally be invited to 
explain why. Looking at the results, children who participated in the training session 
gave a higher number of rejection to statements like Some giraffes have long necks, in 
comparison to children who did not attend the training session. The rejection rate 
was 12 per cent for children without training, while for those who have been trained, 
the percentage rose to 52 per cent. More interestingly, Guasti et al. (2005), in 
Experiment 3, investigated whether the enhancement of performance achieved 
through training is permanent. One week after Experiment 2, children were re-tested, 
without replicating the training session. “The main finding is that children who 
rejected the critical some statements after training (Experiment 2) failed to do so when 
retested without additional training … On average, therefore, the effect of training 
did not persist” (Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini and Meroni, 2005: 
683).  
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 As noted in the theoretical section, there are contexts in which scalar 
implicatures do not arise, as in Downward Entailing contexts. Chierchia, Crain, 
Guasti, Gualmini, Meroni (2001) and Gualmini, Meroni, Crain (2003) explore what 
happens when children deal with these contexts with respect to scalar implicatures. 
Chierchia et al. (2001), using a Truth Value Judgment Task (Crain, McKee, 1985; 
Crain, Thornton, 1998) tested 4-year-old English children with sentences with the 
logical connective or in the first or in the second argument of every. The target 
sentence for a DE context is, for instance, (16a), while (16b) is the target sentence for 
a non-DE context (Chierchia et al. 2001:164-165): 
 
 (16a) Every dwarf who chose a banana or a strawberry received a jewel. 
 (16b) Every boy chose a skate-board or a bike. 
 
The authors expected children to consistently access the inclusive-or reading of the 
disjunction operator. For a sentence like (16a), the experimenter performed a story 
about Snow White and four dwarves at a picnic. Snow White invites every dwarf to 
choose healthy food, reminding them that banana and strawberry are healthy food. If 
the dwarves will choose healthy food, she promises to reward them with a jewel, 
otherwise she will not. Three of the dwarves want to receive a jewel so they choose 
healthy food, but, being very hungry, they choose both the banana and the 
strawberry. One of the dwarves is not interested in the jewel, so he chooses potato 
chips. Snow White, as promised, rewards only the dwarves who have chosen a 
banana and a strawberry. At the end, a puppet produces the utterance in (16a). As 
noted by Chierchia et al. (2001: 164-165), “it is important to observe that the target 
sentence is true only if the disjunction operator or is interpreted under the inclusive 
or-reading. Therefore, if children (or adults), compute scalar implicatures, and then 
interpret the target sentence under the (derived) exclusive-or reading of disjunction, 
they should reject the puppet’s assertion”. A story for the sentence in (16b) featured 
four boys who are choosing a toy to play with. They can choose among skate-boards, 
bicycles, a boat and a truck. After considering the possibilities, the four boys choose 
to pick up a skate-board and a bike. At this point, the puppet utters (16b).  
 Results show that in the first type of sentences, those exemplifying a DE 
context, children and adults have similar results. Children accepted target sentences 
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for 91.6 per cent of time; the control group of adults, accepted them as true for 95.5 
per cent of time. They both, thus, “access the inclusive-or reading of disjunction 
when this occurred in the restrictor of the universal quantifier every, a downward 
entailment environment” (Chierchia et al. 2001: 165).  Different results emerge when 
a non-DE context is presented. In this case, children acceptance was 50 per cent, 
while for adults it was 0 per cent.  
 These results are interesting in showing how the behaviour of children differs 
according to the context. If, in fact, children are presented with a DE context, their 
answers are adult-like. It is thus the case that these results are consistent with the 
view according to which the computation of implicatures comes at a cost. In DE 
contexts, instead, children reach adult performance since implicatures do not arise. 
 The same pattern of results is confirmed by Gualmini, Meroni and Crain 
(2003). In a Truth Value Judgment Task, they tested five-year-old children on the 
disjunction operator or with the scheme of downward entailment. Children and the 
control group of adults were presented with short stories and what emerged is that 
“children, like adults, interpret the disjunction operator or in the internal argument of 
the universal quantifier every in accordance with the interference scheme typical of 
downward entailing operators. (…) the findings reveal a striking asymmetry between 
children’s interpretation of the disjunction operator or in the two arguments of the 
universal quantifier” (Gualmini, Meroni, Crain, 2003: 145).  
 Another point of interest in the literature on the computation of scalar 
implicatures from the developmental point of view concerns the observation made 
by Papafragou, Musolino (2003: 276), according to which “children are more likely to 
infer an enriched interpretation in an adult-like manner when the context makes this 
enrichment highly relevant”.  
 This claim has been proved by some other scholars. Feeney, Scrafton, 
Duckworth, Handley (2004), in Experiment 2, investigate whether the sensitivity of 
children to scalar implicatures using the quantifier some is increased when the context 
is pragmatically enriched. In this experiment, some storyboards are presented to 
twenty-eight English children in a range of age between seven-year-old and eight-year 
old. In each of these storyboards, there is a girl performing an action with some or all 
of the objects in the scene. In each situation, the experimenter read a statement made 
by the girl that describes the action. She, according to the experimental condition, 
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claims to have interacted with some or all the objects. Children are asked to indicate 
whether the statement is true or false. To make the story more “real”, the statement 
made by the girl is always an answer to her mother and the behaviour preceding it 
was likely to have been proscribed. Thus, the context motivates the girl to conceal 
the truth from her mother. When given the appropriate contexts, in fact, children 
draw the standard scalar implicature associated with some.  
 The same claim has been made by Papafragou, Tantalou (2004). They tested 
thirty Greek-speaking children at the age of five. The context consisted in the 
presentation of a set of animals and the children were told that they would play a 
game. Children had to reward the animal who performed a specific task previously 
assigned. In this experiment different scale types were employed: quantificational (all, 
some), encyclopaedic (which included a set of orderings licensed by world knowledge, 
and supported by the context), or ad hoc (which introduced a range of 
circumstantial, context-specific orderings). Papafragou, Tantalou (2004: 75-76) 
specifies that “the experimental scenarios resemble naturalistic communicative 
circumstances in which implicatures are actually computed”. Results show that 
children correctly withheld to reward the animals 77.5 per cent of the time in the 
quantificational cases, 70 per cent in the encyclopaedic cases and 90 per cent in the 
ad hoc cases. After providing their responses, children were asked to justify them. It 
is interesting to note that when children refuse to give the prize to the animal, they 
justify their choice by claiming that a “weaker” scalar term was used, instead of a 
stronger one. Thus, the authors claim that “in contexts that approximate naturalistic 
conversations, children are capable of assessing informativeness expectations built 
during a talk exchange and of deriving SIs when these expectations are not met by 
the speaker’s conversational contribution” (Papafragou, Tantalou, 2004: 77-78).  
 Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini and Meroni (2005) also tested 
children in a more natural context. The authors wanted to control the situation and, 
thereby, to establish the conditions that are a prerequisite for the computation of 
scalar implicatures. In order to do so, they opt for a Truth Value Judgment Task 
(Crain, Thornton, 1998). Fifteen Italian-speaking children, mean age 7;2 participated 
in the study and they were asked to judge five statements with the quantifier some that 
were logically true, but underinformative. The main finding is that the performance 
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of children nearly resembles that of the adults. Children, in fact, had a rejection rate 
of 75 per cent, while adults 83 per cent. This difference is not significant.  
 The experiments just mentioned (Feeney, Scrafton, Duckworth, Handley 
(2004), Papafragou, Tantalou (2004), Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini 
and Meroni (2005)), show that employing different materials and procedures has a 
strong effect in developmental studies on scalar implicatures. Thus, it is the case that 
children are very sensitive to training and task manipulation. 
 Foppolo, Guasti and Chierchia (2012) ran six experiments trying to assess the 
boundaries of age in deriving scalar implicatures. In a Truth Value Judgement Task 
(Experiment 1), the authors showed that children from age 6 have an excellent 
pragmatic performance. This is not the case for younger children at age 4 and 5 
because they reject only occasionally underinformative statements. This performance 
is interesting, given that in pragmatic tasks, such as the Conversational Violations 
Test and the Felicity Judgment Task (respectively, Experiment 4 and 5), they perform 
very well. Foppolo et al. (2012), in fact, highlight that in the Statement Evaluation 
Task in Guasti et al. (2005), seven-year-old children’s behaviour show a bimodal 
distribution, and, the fact that in Foppolo et al. (2012) children are split into two 
groups, in the processing of SIs, might suggest that the process of maturation is not 
completed yet for all the children at the age of 5.  
 To test the performance rate, Foppolo et al. (2012) manipulate the 
experimental design by adding the partitive alcuni dei (some of) in Experiment 2; in 
Experiment 3, they prime the scale <some, all> by showing children, prior to the 
critical underinformative statement with some, a correct statement with all; in 
Experiment 6 the authors stressed the ambiguity of some in order to make children 
more aware of it.  
 With respect to Experiments 2 and 3, there was no improvement on 
children’s behaviour in the derivation of SIs. As claimed by Foppolo et al. (2012: 390) 
“the absence of such an improvement, (…), might suggest that children’s difficulties 
are not to be found at the level of pure lexicon or lexical access”.  
 On the contrary in Experiment 6, after enhancing awareness in children in 
the informativeness of the statements, the authors found a significant improvement. 
The rate of rejection of underinformative statements with the quantifier some was 
72.5 per cent, which has never been attested in the literature for five-year-old 
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children in a Truth Value Judgment Task. Foppolo et al. (2012: 391) suggest that 
“children’s failure in deriving the SI related to some might be linked to other 
“cognitive” difficulties manifested by children in other tasks”.  Considering the 
results globally, the authors suggest that there are three factors that might play a role 
when children process sentences with underinformative some. The first is the 
maturation of the lexicon because, in the case of scalar items, two layers of 
representation are involved: the lexical entry in its basic meaning and the scale. The 
process that link these two must be firstly acquired and then automatized. The 
second factor is the ability to shift one’s strategy and perspective. As shown by tests 
of executive functions (Bialystok, Martin, 2004; Bialystok, Senman, 2004), this ability 
is not mature yet at the age 5, even if it can be improved by specific tasks and with 
explicit/implicit instructions that enhance children’s awareness of the ambiguity, as 
shown by Gopnik, Rosati (2001). The last factor is the influence of the task, the 
materials used for the experimental protocol and design used for the test. As seen 
from the results mentioned above of Evans, Newstead (1980), Paris (1973), 
Sternberg (1979), Braine, Rumain (1981), Noveck (2001), Papafragou, Musolino 
(2003), Chierchia, Guasti, Gualmini, Meroni, Crain and Foppolo (2004), and Guasti, 
Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini and Meroni (2005, Experiment 1), if children 
are presented with a Truth Value Judgment Task, they are more likely to give logical 
answers; in DE contexts, in Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, Gualmini, Meroni (2001) and in 
Gualmini, Meroni, Crain (2003) they have an adult-like behaviour; while, when given 
the appropriate context, as in Feeney, Scrafton, Duckworth, Handley (2004), 
Papafragou, Tantalou (2004) and Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini, 
Meroni (2005, Experiment 4), children are capable to draw scalar implicatures. As 
claimed by Foppolo et al. (2012: 392) “in any case, the large variability observed 
across different studies that employ a similar methodology reaffirms once again that 
children are very sensitive to subtle changes in the way the task is conceived and 
administered and extremely vulnerable to flaws in the experimental design”. 
Differently from what stated in Guasti et al. (2005), children are not, according to 
Foppolo et al. (2012), more logical than adults. Moreover, Katsos and Bishop’s 
proposal (2011) of “pragmatic tolerance” of children, which explains why they over-
accept underinformative statements, does not take under consideration that if 
children are given best chances to be pragmatic, they do so without failing.  
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 According to the approaches presented in the previous section, the neo-
Gricean approach and Relevance Theory, all in all the results are more compatible 
with Relevance Theory. The predictions made by these accounts are, in fact, quite 
different. While neo-Griceans consider semantic interpretation to be more costly to 
process than the pragmatic interpretation, and, thus, to occur later in the 
development, for post-Griceans the opposite is true. When given the appropriate 
context, children can derive the implicature. On the contrary, in Truth Value 
Judgment Task, when children are asked to compute sentences like Some elephants have 
trunks, they tend to respond logically. The pattern of answers changes over time, 
resulting in a more adult-like behaviour. Interestingly, however, when children are 
presented a DE context, they do not manifest any problem in the interpretation of 
scalar terms.  
 All these data are compatible with Relevance Theory’s predictions, since 
pragmatic answers tend to occur later across developmental stages.   
  
3.1.2  The computation of Scalar Implicatures: adult studies 
 
 It can be argued that children’s data are different from adults’ only because 
children are not reliable subjects to be tested, as far as it concerns implicatures 
computation, since their processing resources are still developing. In order to obtain 
other classes of data that could support one or the other theoretical approach on the 
computation of scalar implicatures, different studies on adults have been carried out. 
To provide evidence in favour of the default inference view on the neo-Gricean 
account, results should show that pragmatic interpretations are simpler than semantic 
interpretation (which involve circumventing the default reading) and trigger lower 
reaction times. On the contrary, if the Relevance Theory is supported by adults’ data, 
it should turn out that the semantic interpretations are simpler, triggering lower 
reaction times, and that the pragmatic enrichment occurs later. 
 Noveck and Posada (2003) ran an interesting experiment on scalar 
implicatures on adults. In this study, the authors collected time of responses and 
ERP data on a set of sentences that were patently true, patently false and 
underinformative. In the latter case, sentences can be true or false according to 
whether the subject chooses the semantic or the pragmatic interpretation. 
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Underinformative sentences were formed only with the quantifier some, as in Some 
dogs have ears (Noveck, Posada, 2003). Reaction-time data are interesting because the 
authors found that there was a difference between the participants who responded 
true to underinformative sentences and those who judged the sentence as false. 
When participants chose false, they took nearly twice as long as when they chose true 
(655ms was the mean time for those who gave semantic answers and 1203ms for 
those who gave pragmatic answers). Moreover, participants who answered ‘yes’ to 
underinformative statements were faster also in responding correctly to the other 
conditions, the patently true and patently false sentences. The authors suggest that 
this behaviour reflects two sorts of strategies: those who accept underinformative 
statements tend to interpret literally scalar items, and thus they perform quicker; 
whereas participants who consider these statements false have in fact opted for a 
non-literal interpretation, which requires more time, which shows that they are 
engaged in a more complex reasoning.   
 The ERP data are interesting too, because they show that underinformative 
items generally led to a flat N400, which indicates that there is little semantic 
integration. For control conditions, that are patently true and patently false, the N400 
was even flatter. The evoked potential N400 was elicited in a comparable way both 
for participants who responded True to underinformative items and for those who 
responded False. According to Noveck (2004: 318), “the scalar inference, which 
requires more effort and prompts participants to respond False, is part of a late-
arriving, effort-demanding decision process”.  
 Another interesting study was carried by Bott and Noveck (2004), who ran 
four experiments investigating the time course of underinformative sentences like 
Some elephants have trunks. The starting point of Bott and Noveck (2004) was a study 
conducted by Rips (1975), which was one of the earliest psychological studies to 
investigate the conflicting interpretations of underinformative sentences like Some 
congressmen are politicians. He asked participants to make category judgments and 
examined the effect of the interpretation of the quantifier through two experiments. 
In one of these experiments he asked participants to interpret some as some and possibly 
all, whereas in the second experiment he asked them to interpret some as some but not 
all. When results were compared, Rips (1975) noted that participants who received 
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the some but not all instructions were slower than those who received the some and 
possibly all instructions.  
 The experimental design of Bott and Noveck (2004) was drawn from Smith 
(1980) and Noveck (2001), and it was based on Rip’s findings. In their experiments, 
the authors included six kinds of sentences on the form [Quantifier] A are B with the 
<some, all> quantifiers. The set of relationships between A and B was A as a subset 
of B (as in Some/All monkeys are mammals), B as subset of A (as in Some/All mammals 
are monkeys) and another condition where A and B formed two disjoint sets (as in 
Some/All monkeys are fish). Experiment 1 was a replication of Rips (1975, Experiments 
2 and 3) and was split into two sessions. In one experimental session, participants 
were instructed to interpret the quantifier some as some and possibly all, while in the 
other experimental session the same quantifier had to be interpreted as some but not 
all. We thus refer to the first case as the Logic condition, and to the other as the 
Pragmatic condition. The results show that when participants were in the Pragmatic 
condition, and were thus instructed to draw the implicature, they needed more time 
to evaluate Underinformative sentences; on the contrary, in the Logic condition, they 
were faster. The data also show that it was more difficult to answer correctly when 
they were instructed to derive the implicature. Participants were, in fact, accurate on 
85 per cent of the underinformative sentences under Logic instructions and accurate 
on about 60 per cent on the underinformative items under Pragmatic instructions.  
 Interesting data also come from Experiment 3 in Bott and Noveck (2004). In 
this experiment, the authors used the same paradigm as in Experiment 1 but neither 
instructions nor feedback were given to participants. It was expected to have two 
groups. One group of participants would spontaneously draw the implicature (the 
Pragmatic group), the other would not (the Logic group). In this case, Bott and 
Noveck (2004) could compare the answers of the groups as did in previous 
experiments. The authors’ main finding is that pragmatic answers have a longer mean 
reaction time than the logic answers. We conclude that also in this experiment the 
findings of the previous experiments are confirmed. 
 In Experiment 4, Bott and Noveck (2004) combined the procedure of 
Experiments 1 and 3. Sentences were presented one word at a time and no 
instructions nor feedback was given to the participants. The aim of this experiment 
was to confirm or disconfirm the predictions from Relevance Theory concerning the 
 71 
processing of scalar implicatures. One of the dependent variables in this experiment 
was the time available for the response. In one condition (Long Condition) a long 
time to respond was made available to the participants (3000msecs), while in the 
other condition (Short Condition), participants were given a short time to respond 
(900msecs). By manipulating the time available, the authors attempted at limiting the 
cognitive resources available to the participants in order for them to provide the 
appropriate answer. According to Relevance Theory, participants should answer with 
a quick “True” in the short condition; on the contrary, when participants have more 
time to answer, they should give more “False” responses. The results, interestingly, 
show that for experimental conditions in the short conditions there were significantly 
more logical responses to underinformative sentences. This trend supports the 
predictions made by Relevance Theory.  
 Similar findings have been reported by Katsos, Breheny, Williams’ (2005), in 
Experiments 2, and 3. In Experiment 2, the authors ran an on-line reading time 
experiment, recorded in a segment by segment self-paced reading paradigm. Material 
for the experiment was made of sentences in two conditions: upper-bound (UB), as 
in (17) and lower-bound (LB) context (18): 
 
 (17) UB: The manager asked: Who has the report on last year’s profits?  
  Her secretary replied: Jones or Barnes from the department of  
  Finance has. Would you like to see the report? 
 (18) LB: The manager asked: Who has a report on last year’s profits to  
  show me? Her secretary replied: Jones or Barnes from the   
  department of Finance has. Would you like to see the report? 
 
Katsos et al. (2005: 1111) found that “the critical segment, “Jones or Barnes”, was 
read in 819ms in the upper-bound and in 775ms in the lower bound condition” 
suggesting that the computation of scalar implicatures is actually costly. 
 In Experiment 3 the authors replicated the findings that drawing scalar 
implicatures is a time-consuming process, by using ad hoc scales that are introduced 
by the discourse context, as <roof, house>, <father, parents>.   
 In another study, Bott, Bailey and Grodner (2012) investigated the costs for 
deriving implicatures. In Experiment 1, the authors tested participants on the 
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comprehension of UB sentences and LB sentences when they could not trade off 
speed for accuracy. In agreement with Bott, Noveck’s findings (2004), they found 
that correct UB sentences take longer response time in comparison to LB sentences. 
In Experiments 2 and 3, Bott, Bailey and Grodner (2012) wanted to rule out 
semantic complexity differences, and compared thus the quantifier some in its 
pragmatic and logical meaning to its explicit equivalents, that are only some in 
Experiment 2, and at least some in Experiment 3. The main finding is that pragmatic-
some, relative to the explicit control, is delayed in the interpretation more than in its 
interpretation of logical-some. All these results are “the first to provide evidence of 
the costs associated with deriving implicatures per se” (Bott, Bailey, Grodner, 2012: 
123).  
 In confirmation of this claim, the time-enriched pragmatic effect has been 
studied also in disjunctions. The sentential connective or can be, in fact, interpreted 
either inclusively (A or B or both) or exclusively (A or B, but not both). Chevallier, 
Noveck, Nazir, Bott, Lanzetti and Sperber (2008), following Bott and Noveck 
(2004), Noveck (2001) and Noveck and Posada (2003) wanted to investigate whether 
extra effort is applied to disjunctive statements. Chevallier et al. (2008) ran three 
experiments. In Experiment 1, the one we are interested in, participants saw a five-
letter word and they were required to respond with a Yes/No answer to statements 
such as There is an A or a B. The authors manipulated the time available for the 
response. While in the control condition, the letter string remained visible, in one 
experimental condition the five-letter string was removed before the descriptive 
sentence appeared (short time condition), while in the other experimental condition 
the minimal amount of time necessary for answering was extended, in order to 
trigger further processing. The authors wanted participants to apply more cognitive 
resources when interpreting the disjunction. To attract their attention, they increased 
the saliency of the word, writing it capitalized and underlined. Findings show that 
when participants are encouraged to respond within a second, participants give a 
high number of Logical responses (84 per cent). On the contrary, when participants 
can answer whenever they want, giving them an unlimited amount of time to decide, 
their rates of Logical answers drop to around 55 per cent. According to Chevallier et 
al. (2008: 1751) “this implies that they (the participants) were more likely to derive 
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the enriched interpretation when they were encouraged to spend more time 
processing the sentence than when they were not encouraged to do so”.  
 All the results of the studies reviewed above are interpretable in the relevance 
theoretic framework because minimal interpretations serve as the basis for quick 
judgments, while Pragmatic responses arrive subsequently. We conclude that the 
cognitive chronometry studies on adults strongly confirm Relevance Theory’s 
predictions, and closely match the results obtained in the developmental studies 
reviewed in an earlier section. 
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4.  Experimental Protocols 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
 In this chapter I will present the experimental protocol that I developed to 
test the predictions of the SSIRH with respect to pragmatic computations, reporting 
the description of the participants (section 4.2.1), the procedures adopted in 
Experiment 1 (section 4.3.2) and in Experiment 2 (section 4.4.4), the research 
questions and predictions for Experiment 1 (section 4.3.3) and for Experiment 2 
(section 4.4.5), and the results and the discussions of the experiments (respectively 
sections 4.3.5 and 4.3.6 for Experiment 1 and sections 4.4.7 and 4.4.8 for Experiment 
2). 
 In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 I tested, with adults, the 
computation of scalar implicatures with a musical background in order to verify 
whether the presence of music affects the cognitive/linguistic process of implicature 
calculation. From previous studies, as discussed above, we know that there seems to 
be an interaction in the processing of linguistic and musical syntax (see chapter 1). 
 As far as I know, there are no experimental results, to the contrary, 
concerning a possible interaction of language and music in the wider cognitive 
perspective made available by experimental pragmatics. This provides the main 
motivation for these experimental protocols. The purpose of this study is to explore 
whether language and music interact at the level of pragmatic processing that 
corresponds to implicature computation, and, if they do, to verify whether the results 
vary according to the participants’ musical expertise. 
  
4.2  Methods 
 
4.2.1  Participants 
 
 Participants were the same for both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. I 
recruited them at the University of Verona and at the Conservatorium of Verona. 
Unless participants wished otherwise, all were paid 10€ for participation. The 
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payment was possible thanks to the “Scuola di Dottorato in Scienze Umanistiche” of 
the University of Verona. 
 42 participants were tested, and I divided them into 2 groups: 20 musicians 
(henceforth, M) and 22 non-musicians (NM). Among the M, 5 were males, 15 
females; among the NM 8 were males, 14 females. As in Morrison et al. (2003: 379) I 
defined NM those who had “fewer than 2 years of participation in an instrumental or 
choral ensemble and less than 1 year of private performance instruction”. Basic 
instruction given at ordinary schools was not considered. All NM reported they had 
not studied music outside ordinary lessons at school. As in Patel et al. (1998), M had 
significant musical experience (M= 9 years, SD= 5.3) and played one or more 
musical instruments. In the group of musicians 6 play the piano, 1 piano and harp, 1 
piano and flute, 1 piano, guitar and bass, 1 piano and organ, 1 piano, organ, 
harpsichord and violin, 2 violin, 1 clarinet, 1 viola, 1 guitar, 1 guitar and piano, 1 
guitar and violin, 2 western concert flute. 
 The age range for both groups is 19-32, with M (M= 23.2 years, SD= 3.9) 
and NM (M= 23.2, SD= 3.4). A one-way ANOVA with Group (M and NM) as an 
independent variable confirmed that there were no significant age differences 
between the groups, F(1,40)= .001, p = .976. All participants were Italian native 
speakers. No bilinguals were tested, even if all participants reported they had studied 
one or more foreign language at school. Moreover, all participants reported no 
linguistic, auditory, psychiatric or neurological disorder. Their vision was normal or 
corrected to normal. Prior to the experiment, participants were asked to answer the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Answers were analyzed thanks to 
http://www.brainmapping.org/shared/Edinburgh.php and the result considered was 
the Laterality Index for each respondent. Main lateralization quotient was 60 for M 
and 53.6 for NM. A one-way ANOVA with Group (M and NM) as an independent 
variable shows that there were no significant differences in lateralization between 
both groups, F(1,40)= 1.285, p = .264. Thus, participants in each group were right-
handed.  
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4.3  Experiment 1 – Statement Evaluation Task 
 
 The first experiment is a statement evaluation task with linguistic manipulated 
difficulty (computation of scalar implicatures, that is pragmatically felicitous vs. 
pragmatically infelicitous sentences) and the presence/ absence of musical 
background. In particular, participants were presented with a written sentence on a 
screen, which appeared at fixed time one word at time. Concomitantly to the 
sentence presentation, the participants heard a chord played by a synthesized piano. 
Participants, divided in two groups, musicians and non-musicians, were asked to 
answer whether they agreed or disagreed with the sentence, based on their 
encyclopaedic knowledge. I measured accuracy and RT. The task included four 
experimental conditions: pragmatically felicitous and infelicitous sentences without 
music stimuli and pragmatically felicitous and infelicitous sentences with music in 
tune in the background. Additionally, I added six different types of filler: sentences 
with the universal quantifier in true and false context (with and without musical 
background) and true and false declarative sentences (with and without musical 
background).  
 
4.3.1  Design and materials 
 
 Experiment 1 has a 2×2 within-subjects and within-items design, 
manipulating linguistic complexity (felicitous vs. infelicitous sentences) and the 
absence or presence of musical stimuli.  
 The language materials consisted of 10 felicitous sentences, 10 infelicitous 
sentences (both sets involving the quantifier some), 10 fillers with the quantifier all in 
true context, 10 fillers with the quantifier all in false context, 20 fillers consisting of 
declarative sentences without quantifier in a true context and 20 fillers consisting in 
declarative sentences without quantifier in a false context. Each of these groups were 
a half without any musical stimuli and a half with musical background. The length of 
linguistic stimuli was 11 words for each sentence in each condition. An example of 
felicitous sentence is given in (1), of infelicitous sentence in (2), of sentence with all 
true in (3) and of all false in (4), of a declarative sentence without quantifier in a true 
context in (5) and in a false context in (6). All stimuli can be found in Appendix A. 
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1. La signora Elena Zacchi dice che alcuni quadrupedi sono dei cavalli. 
 Ms. Elena Zacchi says that some quadrupeds are horses. 
2. La signora Giada Vinco dice che alcuni incisivi sono dei denti. 
 Ms. Giada Vinco says that some incisors are teeth. 
3. La signora Noemi Pasci dice che tutti i molluschi sono invertebrati. 
 Ms. Noemi Pasci says that all the molluscs are invertebrates. 
4. Il signor Alfio Costa dice che tutti gli alberi sono betulle. 
 Mr. Alfio Costa says that all the trees are birches. 
5. Il signor Muzio Pasco dice che la luna è un satellite. 
 Mr. Muzio Pasco says that the moon is a satellite.  
6. La signora Irina Tozzo dice che il sole è un pianeta. 
 Ms. Irina Tozzo says that the sun is a planet. 
 
 Musical stimuli included 40 items, all in the tonality of C major. All musical 
stimuli were mainly between the second and the fifth register (octave) of the piano. 
Pitches ranged from B1 to A5 and they were played at 80bpm, a rate of presentation 
that, according to Akiva-Kabiri, Vecchi, Granot, Basso and Schön (2009) is a rate of 
presentation of musical stimuli in between slow and fast. All sequences were played 
by the piano in the midi version of Finale notepad2008 and, in order to ensure no 
familiarity with the music, they have been specifically composed with Finale 
notepad2008 for this experiment. The melodies were 12 s in length. 
 Musical sequences were in a tempo of ¾ and were composed of 5 bars, each 
of them included three crotchet chords, except for the last one which had a chord 
with a duration of ¾. The total amount of chords in each musical sequence was 13 
chords.  
 Stimuli were presented in a one-word-one-chord fashion and, in order to 
ensure the establishment of musical tonality, all linguistic sentences started in a very 
similar way, such as “Mr. So-and-so says that…” (see examples from 1 to 6 above). 
The quantifiers some and all occurred always in the seventh position, which always 
coincided with the tonic chord, that is the tonal center in the musical scale and which 
establishes the hierarchical reference for all other chords. The position was also 
rhythmically relevant because it coincided with the strongest beat of the bar in which 
 78 
it occurred. Other fillers had the same musical characteristics, having the same tempo 
and the same tonality, but the tonic chord did not necessarily occur in the seventh 
position. Below I report one musical sequence for the linguistic condition with some 
(7) and one for a filler declarative sentence (8). In Appendix A the reader can find all 
musical stimuli.  
 
7.  
 
 
8.  
 
 
All musical stimuli were composed with Finale notepad2008, then exported from 
midi to wav version with Cubase5 (DAW software) by Steinberg. Items containing 
both linguistic and musical information were created in a video format through 
Windows Live Movie Maker.  
 
4.3.2  Procedure 
 
 The experiment took place on an individual basis in a quiet experimental 
room. Before the experimental session, participants were asked to fill the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), and to sign a written informed consent 
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form. After that they were presented with instructions, here reported (Italian and 
English versions) and were then invited to sit in front of a computer screen. 
 
Questo è il primo test della durata di 15 minuti. Non appena premerai la barra 
spaziatrice, comparirà sul monitor una frase del tipo “Il signor Tal dei Tali dice che il 
tonno è un pesce” oppure “La signora Pinco Pallo dice che Tokyo si trova in 
Austria”. Tu dovrai rispondere se sei d’accordo o in disaccordo con quanto 
affermato dai personaggi. Dovrai premere il tasto n se sei in disaccordo, il tasto b se 
sei d’accordo. Ti chiedo di usare la sola mano destra per rispondere. 
Al termine di ogni tua risposta, comparirà la scritta “Premere la barra spaziatrice”. Se 
sei stanco, quindi, puoi fare una pausa, se invece premi la barra proseguirai con il test.  
Mentre leggerai le frasi, noterai che ogni tanto ci sarà della musica di sottofondo. Ti 
chiedo di non prestarci attenzione e di rispondere alla frase (linguistica) 
indipendentemente dalla musica di sottofondo. 
Ti chiedo inoltre di rispondere il più velocemente ed accuratamente possibile. 
 
(This is the first test and it lasts 15 minutes. As soon as you press the space bar, it 
will appear on the screen a sentence like “Mr. So-and-so says that tuna is a fish” or 
“Ms. So-and-so says that Tokyo is in Austria”. You have to say whether you agree or 
disagree with what asserted by the characters. Press button n if you disagree, press 
button b if you agree. I ask you to use only the right hand to answer. 
After giving your answer, it will appear the sentence “Press the space bar”. If you are 
tired, you can have a pause, otherwise press the space bar and the test will carry on. 
While reading the sentences, you will notice that sometimes there will be music in the 
background. I ask you not to take care of it and to answer to the (linguistic) sentence 
regardless the music.  
I also ask you to answer as fast and as accurate as possible.) 
 
The sentence remained on the screen until participant’s response, however 
participants were asked to perform as rapidly and as accurately as possible. 
Dependent variables were RTs and error rates. When participant responded, the 
target disappeared from the screen and the sentence “Press the space bar” appeared 
instead, thus participants could make a pause at the end of every item. There was no 
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training before the Experiment, and items were randomized. The programme used 
for the Experiment was E-prime 2.0, which presented the stimuli and recorded the 
answers (both RT and accuracy). Participants used headphones to listen to the 
musical stimuli. The usage of E-prime 2.0, the headphones and of the quiet 
experimental room was possible thanks to Prof. Silvia Savazzi and the Department of 
Neurosciences, Biomedicine and Movement Sciences of the University of Verona. 
 
4.3.3  Research questions and predictions  
 
 The main interest of Experiment 1 is related to the simultaneous processing 
of linguistic sentences and musical sequences. I wanted to evaluate whether the 
presence of music interferes with linguistic processing, and if it does, whether the 
interference is modulated by the complexity of the linguistic condition, that is, 
pragmatically felicitous vs. infelicitous sentences. More particularly, I wanted to test 
the prediction according to which the presence of music affects linguistic processing 
in the most difficult linguistic condition, that is the pragmatically infelicitous 
condition.  
 Independently of the issue raised by music/language interaction, I also tested 
the difficulty of computing scalar implicatures. Here, I predict that, in accordance 
with the experimental results reviewed above, supporting Relevance Theory, 
pragmatically infelicitous sentences should be more difficult to compute, both in 
terms of RTs and in terms of accuracy.  
 My last research question concerns the possible differences between 
musicians and non-musicians. As in Poulin-Charronat et al. (2005) and Slevc et al. 
(2009), this is an implicit task because I do not require explicit attention to the 
musical stimuli. According to the literature, when no explicit attention is required, no 
differences between the groups are found, thus I do not expect substantial 
differences.  
 
4.3.4  Data analytic plan 
 
 I conducted the analysis through a mixed-design ANOVA (2×2×2) both for 
accuracy and for reaction time. In both cases the within-subject factors were 
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Language (some felicitous and some infelicitous) and Music (without music and with 
music in tune in the background); Group (musicians and non-musicians) was the 
between-subjects factor. In the analysis of accuracy, Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated for both Language, Music and the 
Language × Music interaction (χ2(0) = .000), therefore degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .62). In order to 
understand the interaction between Language and Music, I ran two paired-samples t-
tests. When underinformative sentences (i.e. pragmatically infelicitous ones) were 
interpreted pragmatically they were judged “false”; as a consequence, “true” answers 
in this condition were considered as errors (i.e. they were considered equivalent to 
interpreting the sentence logically, and not pragmatically). 
 In the analysis of reaction time, 15.72% of total answers has been discarded 
because they were errors, and another 2.86% of answers was discarded because they 
were outliers. I have considered as outliers those answers with less than 120msec or 
more than 5000msec of reaction time. RTs below 120ms reflect anticipatory 
responses prior to proper stimulus processing, while I assumed that responses after 
5000ms reflect distraction. For the remaining trials, I checked RTs outside of the 
interval defined by the intra-subject average ±2.5 standard deviation, in order to 
minimize the impact of outliers on mean RT. However, nobody was outside this 
range. I then calculated the average for each participant in each of the different 
conditions prior to the calculation of the grand average over all participants. 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for both 
Language, Music and the Language × Music interaction (χ2(0) = .000), therefore 
degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity 
(ε = .91). Also in RT analysis I ran paired-samples t-tests in order to explore the 
Language × Group interaction. 
 
4.3.5  Results 
 
A mixed-design ANOVA (2×2×2) was carried out on accuracy for each condition, 
with Language (some felicitous, and some infelicitous, hereafter indicated 
respectively as SF and SI) and Music (without music and with music in tune in the 
background, hereafter respectively indicated as NO, and MI) as within-subject 
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factors, and Group (musicians and non-musicians) as a between-subjects factor. 
Hereafter, I am going to refer to the experimental conditions as SFNO for some 
felicitous without musical background, SFMI for some felicitous with music in tune, 
SINO for some infelicitous without music and SIMI for some infelicitous with music 
in tune in the background. I also refer to Groups as M for musicians and NM for 
non-musicians. 
 Groups are not significantly different (F(1,40)= 2.491, p = .122), with a 
medium effect size (partial η² = .059). I found a main effect of Language (F(1,40) = 
48.098, p < .001). The strength of this result, as indexed by partial η², was large 
(partial η² = .55) indicating that the two linguistic conditions are processed 
differently. Post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni correction indicated that the 
mean error rate for the SF condition (see Tables 1 and 2) was significantly lower (p < 
.001) than the score for the SI condition. This result reveals overall the increased 
difficulty in the infelicitous condition, in which the scalar implicature has to be 
computed, with a higher number of errors compared to the felicitous condition for 
both groups.  
 
Table 1, Descriptive plot for Language SF Vs. SI 
Language Mean SD 
SF .016 .007 
SI .295 .039 
 
Table 2, Post hoc with Bonferroni correction for Language (SF - SI) 
Language Language SD Sig.a 
SF SI .040 .000 
SI SF .040 .000 
 
 The effect of Music was not significant (F(1,40)= 3.533, p = .067), with a 
medium effect size (partial η² = .081), even though there was a significant Language 
× Music interaction (F(1,40)= 6.427, p = .015), with a large effect size (partial η² = 
.138), indicating that the presence of music differently affected the two linguistic 
conditions (see Graph 1).  
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1. This graph shows the increased error rate for the linguistic conditions with and without musical 
background. 
 
 
 In order to understand the interaction between Language and Music, I ran 
two paired-samples t-tests. Both groups (M and NM) were considered together, given 
the absence of a significant effect for Group. SFNO and SFMI did not statistically 
differ (t(41)= 1.704, p = .096), indicating that the presence of music does not affect 
performance in felicitous contexts. A significant difference was instead observed in 
the scores for SINO and SIMI (t(41)= -2.304 , p = .026), suggesting that in the 
pragmatically infelicitous contexts the presence of music in the background affects 
the performance of both groups (see Tables 3 and 4 below). In other words, it is only 
in the infelicitous condition that it is possible to observe a decreasing accuracy   
when music is played in the background. 
 
Table 3, Descriptive plot of the t-tests SFNO Vs. SFMI and SINO Vs. SIMI, Exp. 1 
  Mean N SD 
ACC SFNO .029 42 .0835 Pair 1 
ACC SFMI .05 42 .0309 
ACC SINO .252 42 .2761 Pair 2 
ACC SIMI .343 42 .2940 
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Table 4, Paired-samples t-tests SFNO Vs. SFMI and SINO Vs. SIMI, for accuracy in 
Experiment 1  
 Mean SD T df Sig. 
Pair 1 ACC SFNO - 
ACC SFMI 
.024 .0906 1.704 41 .096 
Pair 2 ACC SINO - 
ACC SIMI 
-.0910 .2545 -2.304 41 .026 
 
 Summarizing, for both groups the infelicitous condition was more difficult to 
process, as testified by significantly lower accuracy. Moreover, the Language × Music 
interaction revealed that in the infelicitous sentences the accuracy significantly 
decreased in presence of music. 
 The remaining interactions were not significant: Neither Language × Group 
was significant (F(1,40)= 1.465, p = .233, partial η² = .035), nor Music × Group 
(F(1,40)= 1.918, p = .174, partial η² = .046). Also Language × Music × Group was 
not significant (F(1,40)= .904, p = .347, partial η² = .022). All these results indicate 
that both groups behave the same in the Language, Music and in Language × Music 
conditions. 
 To analyse reaction times, I ran the same statistical model. In this analysis 
Language was not significant (F(1,33)= 3.302, p = .078, partial η² = .091), and so 
were Music (F(1,33)= 1.147, p = .292, partial η² = .034), and Group (F(1,33)= 1.253, 
p = .271, partial η² = .037). 
 Conversely, the Language × Group interaction was significant (F(1, 33)= 
4.415, p = .043) with a medium effect size (partial η² = .118) indicating that groups 
react differently to the linguistic conditions and that the linguistic conditions are in 
fact different from each other. To better comprehend this interaction, a paired-
sample t-test has been conducted for each group separately comparing SF to SI 
considering the mean of SFNO and SFMI in the SF condition and the mean of 
SINO and SIMI in the SI condition. 
 In the group of M the mean score of the SF condition does not significantly 
differ from the mean score of the SI condition (t(19)= -1.262, p = .222). However, in 
the group of NM a significant difference is observed between the SF condition and 
the SI condition (t(21)= -2.506, p = .020). In other words, the presence of longer 
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reaction times in the infelicitous condition found for NM reveals, with respect to this 
group, an increased difficulty in the computation of scalar implicatures. 
 All other analysis were not significant. The mixed-design ANOVA did not 
show a significant effect of Music × Group (F(1,33)= .190, p = .666, partial η² = 
.006), of Language × Music (F(1,33)= .085, p = .772, partial η² = .003), and of 
Language × Music × Group, (F(1,33)= .528, p = .473, partial η² = .016).  
 All in all, these results show that, concerning accuracy, the pragmatically 
infelicitous sentences are more difficult to be processed than the felicitous ones, for 
both groups. The Language × Music interaction shows that music interferes with 
language processing. Both groups are, in fact, significantly less accurate when there is 
a musical background than in the condition without any musical stimuli. However, 
this effect is significant only in the infelicitous conditions, while no significant 
differences are found in the felicitous conditions. 
 As for the reaction time analysis, in the paired-sample t-test following the 
Language × Group interaction, the group of NM shows that the pragmatically 
infelicitous condition is more difficult to process than the pragmatically felicitous. 
This confirms the results obtained from the accuracy analysis, at least for what 
concerns the non-musicians. 
 
4.3.6  Discussion 
 
 From a linguistic perspective, Experiment 1 confirms the Relevance Theory’s 
predictions. The responses to pragmatically infelicitous sentences are significantly 
less accurate than the responses to the pragmatically felicitous sentences. Moreover, 
concerning RTs, the group of NM confirmed that the pragmatically infelicitous 
condition is the most difficult condition to be processed. This is showed by the 
increased RTs exhibited by this group with respect to the pragmatically felicitous 
condition. 
 At the level of Language and Music interaction, the predictions I wanted to 
test were (i) that there was a language/music interference and (ii) that this 
interference was modulated by linguistic complexity. Specifically, I expected to find 
an effect of music only in the most difficult condition, corresponding to the 
sentences featuring infelicitous some (as it occurred in the works of Fedorenko et al. 
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2009, Slevc et al. 2009 and Hoch et al. 2011 for the most difficult linguistic conditions 
related to syntax). This is exactly what I found: according to the results presented 
above, music significantly affects meaning computation only in the infelicitous 
contexts (i.e. in the most difficult contexts). Moreover, I also found group 
differences: although all subjects were less accurate in pragmatically infelicitous 
sentences, non-musicians were also slower in reacting to these kind of sentences in 
comparison to musicians (see section 2.7 for group differences). 
 However, there is an important limitation in the value of these results. They 
abstract away from the reasons why music should affect meaning computation in 
linguistic processing. In Experiment 1, I tested whether meaning computation 
interferes with Music at a general level, but I would like to deepen the analysis by 
testing whether music interferes with meaning computation in a different way  when 
it is in tune, when it is presented in the form of an out-of-key chord or when it is 
presented in the form of an augmented chord concomitant to the scalar item. In 
other words, the question is now: is it possible to single out the aspects (i.e. 
properties) of musical processing that trigger the interference with meaning 
computation? Moreover, there is also an independent methodological limitation in 
the experimental design that I should try to circumvent. The statement evaluation 
task of Experiment 1, based as it is on world knowledge, independently requires 
longer times for processing, since meaning computation is also based on the subject’s 
ability to perform information retrieval from an encyclopaedic data base, a 
cognitively costly independent process. Clearly, I should strive towards experimental 
conditions that guarantee that the cognitive/linguistic processing that possibly 
interferes with musical processing is strictly limited to the process of computing a 
pragmatic reading with respect to the process of computing a logical reading. A 
sentence/picture evaluation task is arguably the best way to get rid of this sort of 
experimental artefacts. This is thus exactly what I tried to do in Experiment 2. 
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4.4  Experiment 2 – Sentence Picture Verification Task 
 
 In the Sentence Picture Verification Task, I manipulated linguistic difficulty 
through the computation of scalar implicature (felicitous vs. infelicitous sentences) 
and musical complexity (without musical stimuli (NO), with music in tune in the 
background (MI), with music with the out-of-key chord (MS), with music with the 
augmented chord (Aug)).  
 In particular, participants were presented with a picture on a screen and then, 
below the picture, a written sentence appeared one word (or chunk of words, phrase, 
relative clause) at a time. Concomitantly to the sentence presentation, a chord played 
by a synthesized piano was presented. The time of presentation was fixed in order to 
have a clear musical sequence. As in Experiment 1, participants, divided in two 
groups, musicians and non-musicians, were asked to answer whether they considered 
true or false the sentence that referred to the picture on the screen. I measured 
accuracy and RT. The task included eight experimental conditions: pragmatically 
felicitous and infelicitous sentences varying the musical background: NO, MI, MS 
and Aug. Additionally I added eight different types of filler: sentences with the 
universal quantifier in true and false context without musical background, MI, MS 
and Aug. 
  
 4.4.1  Preliminary study 
 
 Prior to the actual conduction of the experiment, I wanted to be sure that 
both groups of participants were sensitive to the out-of-key chord. Therefore, I 
tested 15 M (mean of musical practice= 9.2) and 16 NM (who never had private 
music lessons, or studied music as autodidacts), different from those who took part 
in the experimental session. Participants were tested on an individual basis and 
listened to every musical stimulus belonging to the in-tune and of the out-of-key sets 
of stimuli. They were asked to judge how harmonious they found the musical stimuli 
on the basis on a Likert’s scale from 1 (absolutely not harmonious) to 7 (highly 
harmonious).  
 Age range for both groups was 20-32, with M (M= 25.8 years, SD= 5.6) and 
NM (M= 23.7, SD= 4.75). A one-way ANOVA with Group (M and NM) as an 
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independent variable confirmed that there were no significant age differences 
between the groups, F(1, 30)= 2.432, p = .13. Moreover, a paired-sample t-test 
conducted on each group separately and comparing music in tune and out of key 
revealed a significant difference between the MI and MS condition for both groups. 
As for M, t(14)= 7.703, p <.001, and for NM, t(15)= 6.869, p < .001. Thus, I can 
conclude that both groups perceive in the same way the absence/presence of the 
out-of-key chord. 
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2. Histogram showing the mean for MI (columns on the left) and for MS (columns on the right) in 
both groups. M: dark blue; NM: light blue. 
 
 
4.4.2  Design and materials 
 
 Experiment 2 has a 2×2×4 within-subjects and within-items design, 
manipulating linguistic (felicitous vs. infelicitous sentences) and musical complexity 
(NO, MI, MS and Aug).  
 Linguistic stimuli are 32 pragmatically felicitous sentences and 32 
pragmatically infelicitous sentences both with the scalar quantifier some. Fillers are 32 
true sentences and 32 false sentences both with the universal quantifier all. Each of 
these conditions and fillers has 8 items without musical background, 8 items with 
music in tune in the background, 8 items with the out-of-key chord concomitant to 
the scalar item, and 8 items with the augmented chord concomitant to the scalar 
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item. Every linguistic stimulus is presented together with a picture, which the 
sentence refers to. An example of the pair containing a linguistic felicitous sentence 
and its concomitant picture is given in (9), an example of an infelicitous sentence and 
its picture is given in (10), examples of true and false sentences with their relative 
pictures, respectively in (11) and (12). All linguistic stimuli with their relative 
numbered pictures can be found in Appendix B.   
 
9. La vecchietta – in blu – ha – alcuni – dei – gatti – che vedi 
 The old lady – in blue – has – some – of the cats – that you see 
 
    
 
10. Il – bambino – ha – alcune – delle mele – raccolte – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – some – of the harvested – apples – that you see   
 
    
 
11. Il – bambino – ha – tutti – i – palloni – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – all – the – balls – that you see 
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12. Il – bambino – ha – tutti – i – fiori – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – all – the – flowers – that you see 
 
    
 
As one can see, at the end of every sentence, I inserted the relative clause “che vedi” 
(“that you see”) for two reasons. The first reason has to do with the music stimuli 
and the need to create a cadence with a tonic chord in closure, since I have, in this 
experiment as well as in the preceding one, a presentation that is one-word-(or chunk 
of words)-one chord. The other reason relates to the need of disambiguating the 
sentence, in order to refer only to the picture and not to anything else.  
 Musical stimuli included 72 items, all in the tonality of C major. All musical 
stimuli were mainly between the second and the fifth register (octave) of the piano. 
Pitches ranged from B1 to B5 and they were played at 80bpm, considered, from a 
work of Akiva-Kabiri, Vecchi, Granot, Basso and Schön (2009) a rate of presentation 
in between slow and fast. All sequences were played by the piano in the midi version 
of Finale notepad2008 and, in order to ensure no familiarity with the music, they 
have been specifically composed with this program for this experiment. The 
melodies were 8 s in length. Musical sequences were in a tempo of ¾ and were 
composed of three bars, each of them included three crotchet chords, except for the 
last bar which had a chord with a duration of ¾. The total amount of chords in each 
musical sequence was of 7. The target chord, which could be in tune, out-of-key, or 
augmented of 10dB, fell always in the fourth position of the musical sequence. It was 
always concomitant to the target quantifier, either some or all. This position is relevant 
because it occurs after the establishment of the tonality and it is on the strongest beat 
of the second bar. 
 Out-of-key chords were determined by the circle of fifths and I always 
considered the C# major chord as the out-of-key chord for this experiment. This is 
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five steps backwards from the C chord that it is consider acoustically very far from 
C#, even if they are adjacent in frequency.  
 
   
33. Circle of fifths. Elements three places or more away from the original key are considered out-of-
key. 
 
 
As noted by Patel (2008: 246) “this contrast between the physical and psychological 
proximity of pitches is likely to be part of what animates tonal music”.  
 For the loudness manipulation I augmented of 10dB the tonic chord 
concomitant to the scalar item (that is always in the fourth position) as did 
Fedorenko et al. (2009). Decibel in augmented chords were increased through Cubase 
5 (DAW software) by Steinberg.    
 Below, I provide an example of in tune musical background (14) and of 
musical background with the out-of-key chord (15). All musical stimuli are provided 
in Appendix B.  
 
14.  
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15.  
 
 
All musical stimuli were composed with Finale notepad2008, then exported from 
midi to wav version with Cubase5 (DAW software) by Steinberg. Items containing 
both visual (sentence and picture) and musical information were created in a video 
format through Windows Live Movie Maker.  
 
4.4.3  Pilot Test 
 
 Before conducting the actual experiment, I tested some participants (others 
from those involved in the actual experiment) on the full set of materials. This pilot 
study revealed a methodological limitation of the originally proposed experimental 
design. Participants were instructed to answer as fast and as accurate as possible but 
only at the end of the presentation of the stimuli. Since, however, the time of 
presentation was relatively long, participants had enough time to process the 
sentence prior to its end, thus the test, as it was presented, gave no reliable results. I 
have found this problem both with respect to reaction times accuracy. Given this 
problem and given that the sentences had basically the same structure, to the effect 
that it was unnecessary to read the whole sentence before giving a correct answer, I 
decided to ask the participants to answer as soon as they felt they were in the 
condition to do so.    
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4.4.4  Procedure 
 
 Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. Experiment 2 
immediately followed Experiment 1, even if all participants were allowed to have a 
break between the experiments if they wanted to. They were then presented with 
instructions, here reported (Italian and English versions). 
 
In questo test, della durata di 20 minuti, leggerai delle frasi che saranno sempre 
accompagnate da un’immagine. La verità o la falsità della frase sarà sempre associata 
a quel che vedi. Per rispondere dovrai premere i tasti b o n. Il tasto n corrisponde a 
falso, il tasto b a vero. Ti chiedo di usare la sola mano destra per rispondere. 
Al termine di ogni tua risposta, comparirà la scritta “premere la barra spaziatrice”. Se 
sei stanco, puoi fare una pausa, se invece premi la barra proseguirai con il test.  
Ti avviso: vedrai che riuscirai ad anticipare la risposta senza attendere di leggere tutta 
la frase. Ti chiedo quindi di non aspettare di leggere tutto, ma di rispondere non 
appena avrai capito.  
Anche in questo test, la risposta va data il più velocemente ed accuratamente 
possibile. 
 
(In this test, that lasts 20 minutes, you will read some sentences that are always 
associated with a picture. The truth or the falsity of the sentence is always linked to 
the picture you see. In order to answer, you will have to press b or n. Button n is for 
false, button b for true. I ask you to use only the right hand to answer. 
After giving your answer, there will appear the sentence “Press the space bar”. If you 
are tired, you can have a pause, otherwise press the space bar and the test will 
continue. 
I warn you: you will be able to anticipate the answer of the statement before reading 
the whole sentence. I ask you not to wait to read all the sentence, but to answer as 
soon as you understand. 
Also in this test, answers must be given as fast and as accurate as possible). 
 
 Stimuli were firstly presented in the form of the picture related to the 
sentence. This picture appeared alone for the first 2 seconds, then the picture 
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remained on the screen and linguistic stimuli started to be visually displayed. The 
sentence was presented below the picture simultaneously to the musical sequence in 
a speed of 80bpm. As previously noted, linguistic material was not always one-word-
one-chord, but it could also be presented in a chunk-of-words-one-chord fashion (a 
phrase, a relative clause, or other). After the appearance of a (chunk of) word(s), 
these remained on the screen, in order not to overload memory capacity. As a 
sentence was completely displayed on the screen, it remained there until participant’s 
response, though participants were asked to perform as rapidly and accurately as 
possible. Music material was listened to through headphones. Dependent variables 
were RTs and accuracy. After the participant gave her answer, the target disappeared 
from the screen and the sentence “Press the space bar” appeared instead, so that 
participants could pause if they wanted to at the end of every item. Items were 
randomized. The programme used for the Experiment was E-prime 2.0 and through 
this I recorded RTs and error rate. E-prime, headphones and the quiet room were 
kindly provided by prof.ssa Silvia Savazzi and the Department of Neurosciences, 
Biomedicine and Movement Sciences of the University of Verona. 
 
4.4.5  Research questions and predictions 
 
 In Experiment 2 I tested the computation of scalar implicatures on a 
different task, that is a sentence picture verification task. As in Experiment 1, I 
wanted to verify whether infelicitous sentences were processed differently from 
felicitous ones, predicting that the computation of scalar implicatures is costlier in 
the pragmatically infelicitous condition (the linguistically/cognitively complex 
condition) than in the pragmatically felicitous condition. 
 I also tested whether musicians and non-musicians have a different 
performance on this task. As in Experiment 1, this is an implicit task, thus I do not 
expect substantial differences between the groups. 
 The last research question I am interested in is related to the interference 
between linguistic and musical processing. In Experiment 2, with respect to 
Experiment 1, I added two more musical conditions, the condition with the out-of-
key target chord, and the condition with the augmented target chord. The loudness 
manipulation has been inserted because, as in Fedorenko et al. (2009: 3), “in order to 
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argue that linguistic and musical integrations rely on the same/shared pool of 
resources, it would be important to rule out an explanation whereby the musical 
effect is driven by shifts of attention due to any non-specific acoustically unexpected 
event. To evaluate this possibility, I added a condition in which the melodies had a 
perceptually salient increase in loudness instead of an out-of-key (chord) at the 
critical position”. 
 Here is my experimental hypothesis. Essentially, I predict that, according to 
the SSIRH, there should be no interference between the most difficult linguistic 
condition (i.e. the pragmatically infelicitous condition) and the musical stimuli with 
the out-of key chord. The reason is that implicature computation is not a sort of 
syntactic processing, but involves non-syntactic linguistic abilities and more general 
cognitive resources (cf. Relevance Theory). Moreover, I expect that there should be 
no difference, in computing the implicature in the pragmatically infelicitous 
sentences, between the two different musical conditions, that is, the condition with 
the musical background in tune and the condition with the dissonant target chord. 
The reason is that modulating the degree of musical difficulty (from in-tune chord to 
dissonant chord) should not interfere with the linguistic/cognitive resources 
necessary to process implicatures. In fact, according to the most direct interpretation 
of the SSIRH, complex linguistic processing should be increasingly affected by 
progressively augmenting the degree of musical difficulty only in the case where the 
difficulty linked to musical and linguistic processing is essentially of a syntactic 
nature. This condition is not satisfied by the kind of linguistic/cognitive computation 
triggered in Experiment 2, since the resources activated in the computation of some in 
infelicitous sentences are clearly non-syntactic in nature. Conversely, if the 
relationship between linguistic and musical processing could be extended to neural 
networks beyond those activated, in language, by exclusively syntactic processing, 
contrary to what is hypothesized by the SSIRH, I would expect that the pragmatically 
infelicitous condition presented simultaneously with the musical condition involving 
a dissonant target chord should result the most difficult condition, thus revealing a 
degree of interference between language and music that is not limited to syntactic 
processing. In other words, modulating the degree of difficulty in musical processing 
should affect the form of complex non-syntactic processing corresponding to the 
meaning of infelicitous some. 
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4.4.6  Data analytic plan 
 
 Reaction time and accuracy analysis were conducted through a mixed-design 
ANOVA (2×2×4), with Language (“Some Felicitous” and “Some Infelicitous”) and 
Music (NO, MI, MS and Aug) as within-subjects factors and Group (M, NM) as 
between-subjects factor. In accuracy analysis, Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated for both Language (χ2(0) = .000, p = 
n.a.), and Music (χ2(5) = .671, p = .009), therefore degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .36). In the 
Language × Music interaction the assumption of sphericity is respected (χ2(5) = .863, 
p = .337), thus no further correction was needed. When analysing accuracy, two 
paired samples t-tests have been conducted for the interaction Language × Music and 
for the interaction Language × Group.  
 As for the reaction time analysis, 8.75% of total answers has been discarded 
because they were errors. As in Experiment 1, when underinformative sentences 
were interpreted pragmatically they were judged “false”, thus, “true” answers in this 
condition were considered as errors. Another 2.75% of answers was discarded 
because they were given before 120msec, because they reflect anticipatory responses 
prior to proper stimulus processing, and after 4000ms, because answers after this 
time reflect distraction. For the remaining trials, I checked for outliers considering 
the RTs outside of the interval defined by the intra-subject average ±2.5 standard 
deviation, in order to minimize the impact of outliers on mean RT. Only another 
0.04% of trials was discarded. I then calculated the average for each participant in 
each of the different conditions prior to the calculation of the grand average over all 
participants. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been 
violated for both Language (χ2(0) = .000), therefore degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .91); Music and the 
Language × Group interaction, on the contrary, assume the sphericity test (Music: 
χ2(5) = .811, p = .201; and the Language × Group interaction χ2(5) = .806, p = .186). 
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4.4.7  Results 
 
 To analyse both accuracy and reaction time in Experiment 2, I ran a mixed 
design ANOVA (2×2×4), with Language (“Some Felicitous”, SF and “Some 
Infelicitous”, SI) and Music (without music, NO; with music in tune in the 
background, MI; with dissonant target chord, MS; and with augmented target chord, 
Aug) as within-subjects factors and Group (Musicians, non-Musicians) as between-
subjects factor. Hereafter, I will refer to the experimental conditions as SFNO for 
some felicitous without musical background, SFMI for some felicitous with music in 
tune, SFMS for some felicitous with dissonant target chord and SFA for some 
felicitous with augmented target chord, SINO for some infelicitous without music, 
SIMI for some infelicitous with music in tune in the background, SIMS for some 
infelicitous with dissonant target chord and SIA for some infelicitous with 
augmented target chord. I will also continue to refer to Groups as M for musicians 
and NM for non-musicians. 
 As for accuracy, a significant effect of Language was observed (F(1,40)= 
6.183, p = .017) with a medium effect size (partial η² = .134). Post hoc comparisons 
with Bonferroni correction indicated that the mean error rate for SF (see Tables 5 
and 6) was lower (p = .017) than the mean error rate for SI condition. This result 
suggests that SF is significantly more accurate than SI, thus indicating that the 
infelicitous condition is more difficult to process, confirming the results found in 
Experiment 1. 
 
Table 5, Descriptive plot of Post hoc analysis for Language 
Language Mean SD 
SF .040 .007 
SI .132 .036 
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Table 6, Post hoc with Bonferroni correction for Language in accuracy 
Language Language SD Sig. 
FEL INF .037 .017 
INF FEL .037 .017 
  
 A main effect of Music is also observed (F(2.43,97.1)= 5.63, p = .003), with a 
medium effect size (partial η² = .123). Bonferroni post hoc testing revealed that the 
condition NO (see Tables 7 and 8) was easier than the condition MI (p < .001); and 
that the condition Aug was easier than the condition MI (p = .034).  
 
Table 7, Descriptive plot of Post hoc analysis for Music 
Music Mean SD 
NO .065 .019 
MI .113 .019 
MS .087 .019 
Aug .079 .021 
 
 
Table 8, Post hoc with Bonferroni correction for Music in accuracy 
Music Music SD Sig. 
MI .010 .000 
MS .012 .461 
NO 
A .009 .747 
NO .010 .000 
MS .015 .548 
MI 
A .012 .034 
NO .012 .461 
MI .015 .548 
MS 
A .013 1.000 
NO .009 .747 
MI .012 .034 
A 
MS .013 1.000 
 
 Other post hoc analyses did not reveal any statistical differences, as for the 
comparisons between the condition NO and the condition MS (p = .461), the 
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condition NO and the condition Aug, (p= .747), suggesting that having no music, 
music with a dissonant chord or music with augmented target chord do not affect 
differently accuracy in the whole task. No significant differences have been found 
also between the condition MI and MS (p= .548), and the condition MS and Aug (p= 
1.000). Thus, MI (M= .113) is the most difficult condition; it does not statistically 
differ from MS (M= .087) but it differs from Aug (M= .079) and from NO (M= 
.065). Conversely, MS do not statistically differ from MI or Aug. 
 Taken together, these results suggest that the presence of music, if it is in 
tune, makes the task harder, and this happens with respect to the conditions without 
musical background or with the augmented target chord. It is interesting to notice 
that no differences have been found between having no music and having a 
dissonant or an augmented target chord. Moreover, the difference between music in 
tune and music with dissonant target chord, as well as the difference between the 
condition with dissonant or the augmented target chord, is not significant. As a 
general conclusion, the ordering of the musical conditions is the following: NO  is 
the easiest, followed by Aug and by MS, whereas the most difficult condition is MI 
(see Table 7). 
 Group is not significant (F(1,40)= 3.678, p =.062), with a medium effect size 
(partial η² = .084).  
 
Table 9, Descriptive plot for Group accuracy 
Group Mean SD 
M .051 .026 
NM .121 .025 
 
Table 10, Pair comparison between Groups in accuracy 
Group Group SD Sig 
M NM .036 .062 
NM M .036 .062 
  
 The Language × Music interaction was significant (F(3,120)= 9.654, p < 
.001). The strength of this result, as indexed by the partial η², is large (.194). This 
indicates that the linguistic conditions are differently affected by the musical 
conditions.  
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4. Graph showing the interaction Language × Music. 
 
In order to find out where Language significantly interacts with Music, I ran a series 
of paired samples t-tests for both groups together comparing SF and SI with all 
musical pairs: NO vs. MI; NO vs. MS; NO vs. Aug; MI vs. MS; MI vs. Aug; MS vs. 
Aug (see Tables 11 and 12).  
 In the infelicitous conditions, a significant difference is observed for SINO 
and SIMI (t(41)= -6.331, p < .001), SINO and SIMS (t(41)= -2.194, p = .034), SIMI 
and SIMS (t(41)= 2.541, p = .015); and SIMI and SIA, (t(41)= 4.961, p < .001). 
However, no differences are found for SINO and SIA (t(41)= -.813, p = .421) and 
for SIMS compared to SIA (t(41)= 1.636, p = .109). 
 Conversely, as for the interaction Language × Music in the felicitous 
contexts, no significant differences were observed. SFNO and SFMI were not 
statistically different (t(41)= .829, p = .412); this is true also for SFNO and SFMS 
(t(41)= .198, p = .844); for SFNO and SFA (t(41)= -1, p = .323); for SFMI and SFMS 
(t(41)= -.404, p = .688); for SFMI and SFA (t(41)= -1.598, p = .118); and for SFMS 
and SFA (t(41)= -1.030, p = .309). Thus, in the felicitous conditions music does not 
interfere with language processing. 
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Table 11, Descriptive plot for paired samples t-tests (SF-SI in all musical conditions) in accuracy 
  Mean N SD 
ACC SFNO .04 42 .058 Pair 1 
ACC SFMI .03 42 .067 
ACC SFNO .04 42 .058 Pair 2 
ACC SFMS .04 42 .069 
ACC SFNO .04 42 .058 Pair 3 
ACC SFA .05 42 .092 
ACC SFMI .03 42 .067 Pair 4 
ACC SFMS .04 42 .069 
ACC SFMI .03 42 .067 Pair 5 
ACC SFA .05 42 .092 
ACC SFMS .04 42 .069 Pair 6 
ACC SFA .05 42 .092 
ACC SINO .10 42 .265 Pair 7  
ACC SIMI .20 42 .249 
ACC SINO .10 42 .265 Pair 8  
ACC SIMS .13988 42 .253335 
ACC SINO .10 42 .265 Pair 9  
ACC SIA .11 42 .251 
ACC SIMI .20 42 .249 Pair 10 
ACC SIMS .13988 42 .253335 
ACC SIMI .20 42 .249 Pair 11 
ACC SIA .11 42 .251 
ACC SIMS .13988 42 .253335 Pair 12 
ACC SIA .11 42 .251 
 
 
Table 12, Paired-samples t-tests for SF-SI in all musical conditions in accuracy 
  Mean SD t df Sig. 
Pair 1 ACC SFNO - ACC SFMI .009 .070 .829 41 .412 
Pair 2 ACC SFNO - ACC SFMS .003 .098 .198 41 .844 
Pair 3 ACC SFNO - ACC SFA -.015 .096 -1.000 41 .323 
Pair 4 ACC SFMI - ACC SFMS -.006 .095 -.404 41 .688 
 102 
Pair 5 ACC SFMI - ACC SFA -.024 .097 -1.598 41 .118 
Pair 6 ACC SFMS - ACC SFA -.018 .112 -1.030 41 .309 
Pair 7 ACC SINO - ACC SIMI -.104 .107 -6.331 41 .000 
Pair 8  ACC SINO - ACC SIMS -.044643 .131888 -2.194 41 .034 
Pair 9  ACC SINO - ACC SIA -.012 .095 -.813 41 .421 
Pair 10 ACC SIMI - ACC SIMS .059524 .151813 2.541 41 .015 
Pair 11 ACC SIMI - ACC SIA .092 .121 4.961 41 .000 
Pair 12 ACC SIMS - ACC SIA .032738 .129668 1.636 41 .109 
 
 What emerges from these results is that music affects the linguistic 
computation only in the infelicitous contexts. More particularly, the number of errors 
is significantly higher in the condition MI with respect to what is found in all other 
musical conditions (NO, MS and Aug). Another significant difference is observed in 
the comparison between the condition NO, being easier than the condition MS.  
 The interaction Language × Group was significant (F(1,40)= 4.097, p = .050), 
with a medium effect size as indexed by partial η² = .093. To analyse this interaction, 
I ran a paired-sample t-test on each group separately comparing SF to SI. In order to 
consider only the linguistic conditions, I obtained the score for the SF condition 
from the means of SFNO, SFMI, SFMS and SFA, and for the SI condition, the 
means of SINO, SIMI, SIMS and SIA. What emerges is that musicians do not 
statistically differ in the two linguistic conditions, (see Tables 13 and 14), t(19)= -
1.192, p = .248), while non-musicians show a significant difference between the SF 
condition and the SI condition (see Tables 15 and 16), t(21)= -2.410, p = .025. What 
emerges is thus that non-musicians have a considerably worse performance in the 
pragmatically infelicitous condition, as found in Experiment 1. This difference was 
instead not found for musicians.  
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Table 13, Descriptive plot for Language × Group (Musicians) in accuracy 
  Mean N SD 
ACC FEL .04 20 .049 Pair 1 
ACC INF .0593750 20 .05815488 
 
 
Table 14, Paired-samples t-test Language × Group (Musicians) in accuracy 
  Mean SD t df sig. 
Pair 1 ACC FEL - 
ACC INF 
-.01718750 .06450326 -1.192 19 .248 
 
 
Table 15, Descriptive plot for Language × Group (Non-musicians) in accuracy 
  Mean N SD 
ACC FEL .04 22 .038 Pair 1 
ACC INF .2045455 22 .31864892 
 
 
Table 16, Paired-samples t-test Language × Group (Non-musicians) in accuracy 
    Mean SD t df sig. 
Pair 1 ACC FEL -         
ACC INF 
-.16761364 .32626606 -2.410 21 .025 
 
 As for the other interactions, neither Music × Group is statistically significant 
(F(2.43,97.1)= 1.328, p = .271, partial η² = .032), nor Language × Music × Group, 
(F(3,120)= .640, p = .591, partial   η² = .016). 
 Taken together, all these results indicate that subjects are more accurate in the 
felicitous condition than in the infelicitous one; this result is particularly strong for 
non-musicians, who showed a highly significant difference between the two linguistic 
conditions. As for Music, a significant effect has been observed for both groups, with 
the conditions with music in tune in the background featuring a higher error rate 
than the conditions without music or with augmented dissonant chord.  As for the 
interaction between Language and Music, significant differences were found only in 
the infelicitous contexts; the musical condition with music in tune in the background 
is always the least accurate condition compared to all other musical conditions in the 
infelicitous context; another significant difference in the infelicitous context is that 
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the condition with music with dissonant target chord turns out to be less accurate 
than the condition without any musical stimuli. 
 The analysis of reaction time of Experiment 2 has been run through a mixed 
design ANOVA with repeated measures. No main effects have been found for 
Group (F(1,36)= .420, p= .521, partial η² = .012) Language (F(1,36)= .387, p= .538, 
partial η² = .011) or Music (F(3,108)= 1.076, p= .358, partial η² = .029). Also, the 
interactions were not significant, considering Language × Music (F(3,108)= 1.058, 
p= .370, partial η² = .029); of Language × Group (F(1,36)= .527, p= .473, partial η² 
= .014);  Music × Group interaction (F(3,108)= .906, p= .441, partial η² = .025);  
Language × Music × Group interaction (F(3,108)= 1.178, p= .322, partial η² = .032). 
Owing to the lack of significant main effects or interactions, no further post hoc tests 
were performed. 
 Summarizing, in Experiment 2 all significant data come from the accuracy 
analysis. As previously observed, the infelicitous condition is significantly less 
accurate than the felicitous condition, even though the significant Language × Group 
interaction reveals that musicians display a similar behavior in both conditions, while 
non-musicians show a higher error rate in the infelicitous condition. Regarding the 
musical stimuli, the presence of music in tune causes a significant increase in error 
rate compared to the conditions without musical background and with augmented 
target chord. Interestingly, the Language × Music interaction shows that in the 
infelicitous condition, the condition with music in tune in the background is the most 
difficult compared to all other musical conditions. I conclude thus that, regarding 
accuracy, an interaction between Language and Music is observed, with the 
conditions that involve music in tune featuring a significantly lower accuracy rate in 
comparison to all other musical conditions, starting from the absence of music, 
which emerges as the most accurate condition, followed by the loudness manipulation 
condition up to the condition with the out-of-key chord. 
 
4.4.8  Discussion 
 
 The most interesting results emerging from Experiment 2 concern 
comprehension accuracy. I will therefore concentrate on these data.  
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  Based on the literature review in chapter 3 on Experimental Pragmatics, and 
on the discussion of the results obtained in Experiment 1, I can conclude that 
accuracy analysis essentially confirms the predictions of the Relevance Theory 
approach. Pragmatically infelicitous sentences are generally more difficult to compute 
than the pragmatically felicitous sentences, although this difference is more marked 
for non-musicians.  
 Music has also a significant effect, since it is the case that participants have a 
different performance according to the musical background. More particularly, the 
ordering of complexity of the musical conditions is NO, Aug, MS and MI, with MI 
yielding the higher error rate. This is also observed in the interaction between 
Language and Music. Here, the only linguistic condition that is affected by music is 
the infelicitous some condition, whereas music does not affect the linguistic 
computation in the felicitous some condition. In this case as well, the ordering of the 
musical conditions is NO, Aug, MS and MI. I interpret these results as providing 
further support to the SSIRH, because whereas musical grammar interferes with 
linguistic processing, it does so only at a general cognitive level. The additive factors 
logic adopted by Patel (2003, 2008), Fedorenko et al. (2009) and Slevc et al. (2009) 
dictates in fact that the out-of-key condition should be the one that mostly interferes 
with the computation of pragmatically infelicitous sentences. This is essentially due 
to the hypothesis that increasing the degree of difficulty at the level of musical 
processing should make linguistic processing harder. However, in my study, it is the 
simultaneous presence of music (no matter if in tune or with the dissonant target 
chord) with language that interferes with the linguistic processing, with no further 
effects linked to the modulation of the musical conditions. These results can thus be 
interpreted as suggesting that musical processing and pragmatic processing only 
interfere in the sense of the additional cognitive cost triggered by the presence of a 
double cognitive task, whereas it is not the case that these two tasks involve the same 
neural network. I will discuss this more in detail in the general discussion section.  
 As for the differences between musicians and non-musicians, I found a 
marginal significant effect of language. While the group of musicians did not display 
a significantly different performance between the felicitous and the infelicitous 
condition, the group of non-musicians performed differently depending on whether 
they had to face the felicitous or the infelicitous some condition. Interestingly, the 
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literature that explored the differences between musicians and non-musicians tested 
the behaviour of these two groups only on musical tasks and with respect to pitch 
processing in language, with an advantage for musicians with respect to non-
musicians (see section 2.7). It can be the case that the results I obtained are an 
experimental artefact (i.e. maybe related to individual variables that I did not take 
into consideration),  but it  may also be the case that musical benefits have an impact  
that is not limited to pitch processing in language, but extends to other aspects of 
linguistic and cognitive processing, possibly in terms of executive function 
enhancement. 
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5.  General Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 The effects of the computation of Scalar Implicatures based on the semantic 
and pragmatic readings of the quantifier some have been widely documented in 
psycholinguistics (see chapter 3). The present thesis intended to investigate these 
effects while assessing whether concomitant musical processing interferes with the 
cognitively demanding process of implicature computation, as analysed in Relevance 
Theory. In fact, this thesis provides further support to Relevance Theory by 
demonstrating, in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, that pragmatically felicitous 
sentences are easier to process than pragmatically infelicitous sentences. In both 
experiments, as I saw above, felicitous sentences give rise to a significantly higher 
accuracy rate than the pragmatically infelicitous sentences, although in Experiment 2 
this effect was more marked for non-musicians.  
 The critical point of this work was to test the predictions of the SSIRH in a 
linguistic context involving a pragmatic computation. As already reported in chapter 
2, Patel’s hypothesis (2003, 2008, 2012) has been assessed in relation to both syntactic 
and to semantic processing in experimental contexts where musical processing was 
also involved. Works on the processing interference between linguistic syntax and 
musical syntax found a significant overlap resulting from the modulation of the 
difficulty of the musical task: making musical processing more difficult results in an 
increasing difficulty at the level of the syntactic computation in language, providing 
substantial evidence for the hypothesis that these two kinds of processing revolve 
around the same neural resources. On the other hand, tests on the interaction 
between semantic aspects of language and harmonic processing delivered divergent 
results. In fact, Fedorenko et al. (2009), Slevc et al. (2009), Hoch et al. (2011) did 
found an overlap in the syntactic processing in language and music, but no overlap in 
the simultaneous processing of linguistic semantics and music (for semantic 
processing see also Bonnel et al., 2001, and Besson et al., 1998). However, the work of 
Poulin-Charronat et al. (2005) did actually found an interaction between semantic and 
harmonic relatedness. Given these conflicting results, and their conceptual import to 
the SSIRH, a natural question that arises is whether the kind of pragmatic processing 
typical to (scalar) implicature computation significantly interferes with musical 
processing. Though implicature computations certainly make reference to linguistic 
knowledge, the kind of processual resources that it involves are of a more general 
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cognitive nature, and they are likely to be external to the processes of online 
integration of specifically syntactic representation that are shared by language and 
music according to the SSIRH. It follows that the main focus of this work is on 
testing the predictions of the SSIRH with respect to the specific sort of meaning 
represented by a specific class of pragmatic computations. What I found is arguably 
quite interesting from the perspective of the SSIRH. First of all, according to our 
results, music interferes with linguistic processing, but it does so only in the most 
difficult linguistic condition, i.e. the condition in which calculating the pragmatics 
meaning of some gives rise to a contextually infelicitous result. Importantly, this effect 
was found using two distinct tasks, a statement evaluation task (Experiment 1) and a 
sentence-picture verification task (Experiment 2). In fact, in both experiments 
felicitous sentences did not show any significant difference with respect to the 
presence/absence of music. Conversely, the pragmatically infelicitous condition was 
in both cases clearly affected by the presence of music, giving rise to different 
behavioral results depending on how the presence of music is modulated in the 
experiment. More precisely, in the absence of musical background both groups 
(musicians and non-musicians) perform better, while their performance starts to 
decrease in the presence of music in the loudness manipulation condition. 
Interestingly, the musical conditions that mostly influence the subjects’ accuracy rate, 
progressively leading to a worse performance, are the conditions with the out-of-key 
chord and with the in-tune musical background. What this suggests is that the 
interference between language and music is only found in the linguistic condition 
where the cognitive load is higher, according to the Relevance Theory analysis of 
implicature computation. In a sense, when music is present, the subject is evidently 
confronted with the task of processing two distinct classes of stimuli, and this is 
arguably a more difficult task than processing only one class of stimuli. This is exactly 
what my results reveal: the condition without music is simpler than the conditions 
involving the concomitant processing of musical stimuli. Not surprisingly, the 
cognitive cost of this double processing task only emerges when the linguistic load is 
independently heavy, i.e. in the infelicitous some condition. At the same time, these 
results raise the question how the interference between language and music is exactly 
modulated. 
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  In fact, what I found in Experiment 1 is a general interference between 
language and music, which I wanted to better investigate by adding two more musical 
conditions (Experiment 2), corresponding to the loudness manipulation and the 
condition with the out-of-key chord. Quite significantly from the perspective of the 
SSIRH, what I found here is that the conditions with music in tune in the 
background and with the out-of-key chord do not significantly differ. On the 
contrary, this condition manifests a higher error rates if compared to the loudness 
manipulation condition and to the condition without musical background. The 
additive factors logic on which Patel (2003, 2008), Fedorenko et al. (2009) and Slevc 
et al. (2009) crucially rely explicitly predicts that increasing the difficulty of the 
musical condition should make linguistic processing significantly harder. This is 
because according to the SSIRH, music and language do not presuppose the same 
kind of knowledge and the same sort of cognitive representations: rather, language 
and music make use of the same neural resources in the process of online access and 
integration of these representations. Increasing the cost of musical processing should 
then immediately result in higher processing difficulties in the analysis of the 
linguistic stimuli. Crucially, this is not what I found. Given my results, modulating 
the degree of musical difficulty does not make the difficult linguistic condition 
harder. On the contrary, there is no significant difference among the conditions with 
music in the background, and the condition with the music in-tune (the simpler 
musical condition) affects in fact the pragmatic computation more than the condition 
with the music out-of-tune. What this suggests is that the music interferes with the 
pragmatic computation only at a general cognitive level. Pragmatic processing and 
musical processing rely on two distinct sets of neural resources and only interferes in 
the sense in which a subject who faces a double cognitive task is more burdened, in 
terms of processing resources, than a subject facing only one cognitive task. What I 
do not find is the effect that was typically predicted by the SSIRH: increasing the 
difficulty at the level of musical processing (the effect linked to the presence of the 
out-of-tune chord) should immediately results in higher error rates and/or higher 
reaction times at the level of the pragmatic computation. My results suggest that this 
is not what happens. In fact, I found that the acoustic loudness condition is the in-
between condition: it affects the pragmatic computation more than the condition 
without music in the background but less than the two conditions with music in the 
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background. A possibility is that the subjects discarded the music in the loudness 
condition as a sort of background noise, concentrating then more easily on the task 
of processing the linguistic stimuli.  Of course, further studies are needed to confirm 
the correctness of this insight. Similarly, the interpretation I have proposed of my 
results is crucially based on the addictive factors logic adopted by Patel (2003, 2008), 
Fedorenko et al. (2009) and Slevc et al. (2009). All in all, however, I think that my 
results provide a non-trivial confirmation of the SSIRH: whereas syntactic processing 
is actually the same in language and music, in the sense that accessing and integrating 
the relevant representations makes use of the very same neural resources, musical 
processing and pragmatic processing make arguably use of distinct neural networks, 
and an interference between them manifests itself only at a more general cognitive 
level, in the sense that double processing tasks are more costly than a single 
processing task.    
 The last point to be discussed concerns the difference between musicians and 
non-musicians. The literature explored in section 2.7 reports the benefits of musical 
training that are related to basic auditory properties and to the morphological brain 
differences between musicians and non-musicians, among others. However, we 
know that not all the studies that explored the skills of musicians compared to those 
of non-musicians through the interference paradigm show a significant difference. 
Loui and Wessel (2007) reported, in fact, that the behaviour of the two groups differs 
in relation to the task, depending on whether it is explicit or implicit. In my study, 
both in Experiment 1 and in Experiment 2, the musical task is implicit, thus I did not 
expect any difference between the groups, based on previous results discussed in the 
literature. My predictions have been essentially confirmed. However, I found that 
there is a marginal effect for group in the linguistic condition (in Experiment 1 for 
RTs and in Experiment 2 for accuracy). The group of musicians did not show any 
difference in the computation of scalar implicatures in both Experiment 1 (as for 
RTs) and Experiment 2 (for accuracy), while the group of non-musicians showed 
slower response times in Experiment 1 in the pragmatically infelicitous condition 
compared to the pragmatically felicitous condition, and a higher error rate in 
Experiment 2 in the pragmatically infelicitous condition compared to the 
pragmatically felicitous condition. As argued above, it is possible that this is an 
experimental artefact related to individual variables that I did not consider or to the 
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relatively small sample of subjects; notice moreover that the difference between 
musicians and non-musicians was only marginally significant. Alternatively, it may be 
that the cognitive benefits of musical training extend to pragmatic processing of 
linguistic stimuli, probably via executive function enhancement. I leave this to future 
studies. 
 In summary, the contributions of the present thesis are the following. First of 
all, my results confirm the predictions of the Relevance Theory approach concerning 
the cognitive cost of implicature computation: the infelicitous some condition 
emerged as significantly more difficult than the felicitous some condition. Second, 
concerning the interaction between music and language, I obtained an interesting set 
of results, whose interpretation suggests that syntactic processing in music and the 
kind of pragmatic meaning linked to (scalar) implicature computation interfere only 
at a general level, supporting the view that musical processing revolves around a 
distinct neural network with respect to pragmatic processing in language. This 
provides further support for the SSIRH, not only regarding the hypothesis that the 
neural overlap between language and music is limited to syntax, but also with respect 
to the hypothesis that this overlap is limited to online integration of the processed 
stimuli and does not extend to knowledge representation. In fact, what I found is 
only relevant for processing: the additive factors logic dictates that increasing the 
difficulty of the musical stimuli should increase the interference with the linguistic 
computation. Whereas this is exactly what happens when the cognitive cost of 
linguistic processing is essentially discharged into syntax, my results reveal that this is 
not the case when the cognitive cost of linguistic processing is discharged into the 
essentially non-syntactic mechanisms involved in implicature computation.  Last but 
not least, this work demonstrates that it can be of interest testing musicians and non-
musicians on purely linguistic tasks not related to pitch processing.  
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Appendix A: STIMULI EXPERIMENT 1 – Statement Evaluation Task 
 
 
Linguistic stimuli 
 
Felicitous sentences with the quantifier “some” 
 
1. La signora Elena Zacchi dice che alcuni quadrupedi sono dei cavalli. 
 Ms. Elena Zacchi says that some quadrupeds are horses. 
2. La signora Laura Rado dice che alcune uova sono di quaglia. 
 Ms. Laura Rado says that some eggs are from quail. 
3. Il signor Carlo Bacci dice che alcuni cani sono dei dalmata. 
 Mr. Carlo Bacci says that some dogs are Dalmatian. 
4. La signora Emily Menti dice che alcune armi sono da taglio. 
 Ms. Emily Menti says that some weapons are melee weapons. 
5. Il signor Mirko Felzi dice che alcuni pesci sono dei salmoni. 
 Mr. Mirko Felzi says that some fishes are salmons. 
6. Il signor Loris Machi dice che alcune pietre sono di zaffiro. 
 Mr. Loris Machi says that some stones are (made) of sapphire.  
7. Il signor Paolo Maddi dice che alcune piante sono delle querce. 
 Mr. Paolo Maddi says that some trees are oaks. 
8. Il signor Piero Babbo dice che alcuni uccelli sono dei passeri. 
 Mr. Piero Babbo says that some birds are sparrows. 
9. Il signor Denis Ruffi dice che alcune scarpe sono da ginnastica. 
 Mr. Denis Ruffi says that some shoes are sneakers.   
10. Il signor Bruno Fabri dice che alcuni denti sono dei molari. 
 Mr. Bruno Fabri says that some teeth are molars. 
 
Infelicitous sentences with the quantifier “some” 
 
11. La signora Giada Vinco dice che alcuni incisivi sono dei denti. 
 Ms. Giada Vinco says that some incisors are teeth. 
12. La signora Agata Tacci dice che alcune mele sono dei frutti. 
 Ms. Agata Tacci says that some apples are fruits. 
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13. Il signor Luigi Tagli dice che alcuni squali sono dei pesci. 
 Mr. Luigi Tagli says that some sharks are fishes. 
14. Il signor Ivano Taibi dice che alcune formiche sono degli insetti. 
 Mr. Ivano Taibi says that some ants are insects. 
15. Il signor Lucio Penna dice che alcuni gatti sono dei felini. 
 Mr. Lucio Penna says that some cats are felines.  
16. Il signor Abele Verdi dice che alcune meduse sono dei molluschi. 
 Mr. Abele Verdi says that some jellyfishes are molluscs.  
17. La signora Ivana Rossi dice che alcuni canguri sono dei marsupiali. 
 Ms. Ivana Rossi says that some kangaroos are marsupials. 
18. La signora Lucia Bianchi dice che alcune rane sono dei rettili. 
 Ms. Lucia Bianchi says that some frogs are reptiles.  
19. Il signor Diego Vella dice che alcuni orsi sono dei mammiferi. 
 Mr. Diego Vella says that some bears are mammals. 
20. La signora Sofia Palma dice che alcune margherite sono dei fiori. 
 Ms. Sofia Palma says that some daisies are flowers. 
 
Fillers: 
 
Fillers with the quantifier “all” in true context. 
 
21. La signora Noemi Pasci dice che tutti i molluschi sono invertebrati. 
 Ms. Noemi Pasci says that all the molluscs are invertebrates. 
22. La signora Giulia Russo dice che tutte le lucertole sono rettili. 
 Ms. Giulia Russo says that all the lizards are reptiles.  
23. La signora Greta Rosso dice che tutti i topi sono roditori. 
 Ms. Greta Rosso says that all the mice are rodents. 
24. La signora Adele Bianco dice che tutte le rondini sono uccelli. 
 Ms. Adele Bianco says that all the swallows are birds. 
25. La signora Alice Ferri dice che tutti i leoni sono carnivori. 
 Ms. Alice Ferri says that all the lions are carnivorous. 
26. La signora Sonia Magni dice che tutte le mucche sono femmine. 
 Ms. Sonia Magni says that all the cows are females.  
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27. La signora Anita Fanci dice che tutti i ciclamini sono fiori. 
 Ms. Anita Fanci says that all the cyclamens are flowers. 
28. La signora Erika Greco dice che tutte le coccinelle sono insetti. 
 Ms. Erika Greco says that all the ladybugs are insects.  
29. Il signor Adamo Gallo dice che tutti i maiali sono onnivori. 
 Mr. Adamo Gallo says that all the pigs are omnivorous.  
30. Il signor Adone Conti dice che tutte le gazzelle sono mammiferi. 
 Mr. Adone Conti says that all the gazelles are mammals. 
 
Fillers with the quantifier “all” in false context. 
 
31. Il signor Alfio Costa dice che tutti gli alberi sono betulle. 
 Mr. Alfio Costa says that all the trees are birches. 
32. La signora Dania Bianchi dice che tutte le piante sono sempreverdi. 
 Ms. Dania Bianchi says that all the trees are evergreen.  
33. Il signor Efrem Rizzo dice che tutti i fiori sono rossi. 
 Mr. Efrem Rizzo says that all the flowers are red. 
34. Il signor Ennio Ruggi dice che tutte le gravidanze sono gemellari. 
 Mr. Ennio Ruggi says that all the pregnancies are twin.  
35. Il signor Fabio Rossi dice che tutti i cavalli sono bianchi. 
 Mr. Fabio Rossi says that all the horses are white. 
36. Il signor Guido Galli dice tutte le erbe sono officinali. 
 Mr. Guido Galli says that all the grasses are medicinal herbs. 
37. La signora Ambra Longo dice che tutti i vertebrati sono ghepardi. 
 Ms. Ambra Longo says that all the vertebrates are cheetahs. 
38. La signora Amina Serra dice che tutte le piante sono velenose. 
 Ms. Amina Serra says that all the plants are poisonous. 
39. Il signor Italo Villa dice che tutti i crostacei sono granchi. 
 Mr. Italo Villa says that all the crustaceans are crabs. 
40. Il signor Leone Russi dice che tutte le rose sono bianche. 
 Mr. Leone Russi says that all the roses are white. 
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Fillers without quantifier in true context. 
 
41. Il signor Muzio Pasco dice che la luna è un satellite. 
 Mr. Muzio Pasco says that the moon is a satellite.  
42. Il signor Nereo Gatti dice che il dado ha sei facce. 
 Mr. Nereo Gatti says that the dice has six faces. 
43. Il signor Omero Sanna dice che il sole sorge ad est. 
 Mr. Omero Sanna says that the sun rises on the east. 
44. Il signor Orfeo Grasso dice che l’invidia è un peccato capitale. 
 Mr. Orfeo Grasso says that envy is a capital sin.  
45. Il signor Oscar Monti dice che il liquore è un alcolico. 
 Mr. Oscar Monti says that the liqueur is an alcoholic drink. 
46. Il signor Rocco Testa dice che Roma è la città eterna. 
 Mr. Rocco Testa says that Rome is the eternal city.  
47. Il signor Tobia Piras dice che gli attori recitano nei film. 
 Mr. Tobia Piras says that all the actors perform on movies.  
48. Il signor Vasco Adami dice che Luca è nome di persona. 
 Mr. Vasco Adami says that Luca is name of person.  
49. La signora Clara Pavan dice che le pesche crescono sugli alberi. 
 Ms. Clara Pavan says that all the peaches grow on trees.  
50. La signora Dafne Furla dice che il salame è un insaccato. 
 Ms. Dafne Furla says that the salami is a sausage. 
51. La signora Delia Basso dice che il cibo indiano è speziato. 
 Ms. Delia Basso says that Indian food is spicy.  
52. La signora Doris Fabri dice che la barba è tipicamente maschile. 
 Ms. Doris Fabri says that the beard is typically masculine.  
53. Il signor Elvio Costa dice che Londra è una grande metropoli. 
 Mr. Elvio Costa says that London is a big metropolis. 
54. La signora Flora Baggi dice che le patate sono dei tuberi. 
 Ms. Flora Baggi says that the potatoes are tubers.  
55. Il signor Ezio Frigo dice che Mozart è un compositore famoso. 
 Mr. Ezio Frigo says that Mozart is a famous composer.  
56. La signora Gemma Rigon dice che un secolo dura cento anni. 
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 Ms. Gemma Rigon says that a century lasts hundred years.  
57. Il signor Enzo Pozza dice che Venezia è capoluogo del Veneto. 
 Mr. Enzo Pozza says that Venice is the county seat in Veneto. 
58. La signora Gioia Bizzo dice che gli elefanti hanno la proboscide. 
 Ms. Gioia Bizzo says that elephants have trunks. 
59. La signora Irene Scarpa dice che le biciclette hanno le ruote. 
 Ms. Irene Scarpa says that bicycles have wheels.  
60. La signora Jenny Penzo dice che lo spumante è un vino. 
 Ms. Jenny Penzo says that sparkling wine is a wine.  
 
Fillers without quantifier in false context. 
 
61. La signora Irina Tozzo dice che il sole è un pianeta. 
 Ms. Irina Tozzo says that the sun is a planet. 
62. La signora Luana Bosco dice che il cane è un roditore. 
 Ms. Luana Bosco says that the dog is a rodent.  
63. La signora Nadia Niero dice che la Cina è un continente. 
 Ms. Nadia Niero says that China is a continent.  
64. La signora Tecla Carra dice che il sangue è color verde. 
 Ms. Tecla Carra says that blood is green.  
65. La signora Vanda Zanon dice che i segni zodiacali sono venti. 
 Ms. Vanda Zanon says that the zodiac signs are twenty. 
66. La signora Monia Zanin dice che i sassi sono pietre morbide. 
 Ms. Monia Zanin says that rocks are soft stones.  
67. La signora Zaira Basso dice che i messicani parlano il francese. 
 Ms. Zaira Basso says that the Mexicans speak French.  
68. La signora Luisa Ferri dice che il cinque segue il tre. 
 Ms. Luisa Ferri says that five follows the three.  
69. Il signor Gianni Grandi dice che la settimana ha dieci giorni. 
 Mr. Gianni Grandi says that the week has ten days. 
70. Il signor Mario Tonon dice che Berlino è una città italiana. 
 Mr. Mario Tonon says that Berlin is an Italian city.  
71. La signora Maria Nanni dice che il cucito è uno sport. 
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 Ms. Maria Nanni says that needlework is a sport.  
72. La signora Lucia Sarti dice che il criceto è un bovino. 
 Ms. Lucia Sarti says that the hamster is a bovine. 
73. La signora Marta Naldi dice che il Tamigi è un lago. 
 Ms. Marta Naldi says that the Tamigi is a lake.  
74. Il signor Marco Burti dice che la lava vulcanica è fredda. 
 Mr. Marco Burti says that the volcanic lave is cold.  
75. La signora Tosca Moser dice che il tofu è un salume. 
 Ms. Tosca Moser says that tofu is a salami.  
76. La signora Gianna Cocco dice che Atene è in Nuova Zelanda. 
 Ms. Gianna Cocco says that Athens is in New Zealand.  
77. Il signor Berto Pozzi dice che i Re Magi erano cinque. 
 Mr. Berto Pozzi says that the Biblical Magi were five.  
78. La signora Daria Salvi dice che Manzoni scrisse la Divina Commedia. 
 Ms. Daria Salvi says that Manzoni wrote the Divine Comedy.  
79. Il signor Diego Berti dice che i serpenti hanno le zampe.  
 Mr. Diego Berti says that snakes have legs.  
 
 
Musical Stimuli 
 
Numbers are related to the linguistic sentences above. 
 
1. 
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APPENDIX B: STIMULI EXPERIMENT 2 – Sentence Picture Verification 
Task 
 
Linguistic stimuli 
 
We remind that linguistic stimuli in Experiment 2 were presented word by word 
concomitant to the musical chord or a chunk of words concomitantly to the musical 
chord. The linguistic subdivisions here are indicated by an hyphen. 
 
Felicitous sentences with the quantifier “some” 
 
1. La vecchietta – in blu – ha – alcuni – dei – gatti – che vedi 
 The old lady – in blue – has – some – of the cats – that you see 
2. Il – cesto – contiene – alcuni – dei – gattini – che vedi 
 The – basket – contains – some – of the – cats – that you see 
3. La ragazza – castana – ha – alcune – delle – sciarpe – che vedi 
 The girl – with brown hair – has – some – of the – scarves – that you see 
4. La bambina – bionda – ha – alcuni – dei – fiori – che vedi 
 The little girl – with blond hair – has – some – of the – flowers – that you see 
5. Il bambino – castano – ha – alcune – delle – palle – che vedi 
 The little boy – with brown hair – has – some – of the – balls – that you see 
6. Il gatto – di profilo – ha – alcune – delle – zucche – che vedi 
 The cat – in profile – has – some – of the – pumpkins – that you see 
7. La – bambina – ha – alcune – delle – decorazioni – che vedi  
 The – little girl – has – some – of the – decorations – that you see 
8. Il bambino – castano – ha – alcuni – dei – cani – che vedi 
 The little boy – with brown hair – has – some – of the – dogs – that you see 
9. La bambina – in rosa – gioca con – alcune – delle – macchinine – che vedi 
 The little girl – in pink – plays with – some – of the – small cars – that you 
 see 
10. Il – coniglio – porta – alcune – delle – carote – che vedi 
 The – bunny – carries – some – of the – carrots – that you see 
11. La – bambina – ha – alcuni – degli – orsetti – che vedi 
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 The – little girl – has – some – of the – teddy bears – that you see 
12. Il – pinguino – ha – alcune – delle – palle – che vedi 
 The – penguin – has – some – of the – balls – that you see 
13. Il – cagnolino – ha – alcuni – degli – ossi – che vedi 
 The – little dog – has – some – of the – bones – that you see 
14. Il – gatto – nero – ha – alcuni – dei – pesci – che vedi 
 The – black – cat – has – some – of the – fishes – that you see 
15. La – bambina – ha – alcune – delle – bambole – che vedi 
 The – little girl – has – some – of the – dolls – that you see 
16. Il – nonno – ha – alcuni – dei – libri – che vedi 
 The – old man – has – some – of the – books – that you see 
17. La – vecchietta – ha – alcune – delle – lettere – che vedi 
 The – old lady – has – some – of the – letters – that you see 
18. Il – cagnolino – ha – alcuni – dei – polli arrosto – che vedi 
 The – little dog – has – some – of the – roasted chicken – that you see  
19. La – scimmia – ha – alcune – delle – ghiande – che vedi 
 The – monkey – has – some – of the – acorns – that you see 
20. La – bambina – ha – alcuni – dei – pesci – che vedi 
 The – little girl – has – some – of the – fishes – that you see 
21. Il – pinguino – ha – alcune – delle – palle – che vedi 
 The – penguin – has – some – of the – balls – that you see 
22. Il coniglio – in rosso – ha – alcune – delle – lattughe – che vedi 
 The bunny – in red – has – some – of the – lettuces – that you see 
23. La – scimmia – ha – alcune – delle – banane – che vedi 
 The – monkey – has – some – of the – bananas – that you see 
24. Dietro – al nonno – ci sono – alcune – delle – sveglie – che vedi 
 Behind – grandfather – there are – some – of the – alarm clocks – that you 
 see 
25. Babbo – Natale – ha – alcuni – dei – doni – che vedi 
 Santa – Claus – has – some – of the – gifts – that you see 
26. Il – ragazzo – ha – alcuni – dei – quaderni – che vedi 
 The – boy – has – some – of the – copybooks – that you see 
27. Il – cagnolino – ha – alcuni – degli – ossi – che vedi 
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 The – little dog – has – some – of the – bones – that you see 
28. Il – bambino – ha – alcuni – dei – secchielli – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – some – of the – small buckets – that you see 
29. Il – ragazzo – ha – alcuni – dei – vasi – che vedi 
 The – boy – has – some – of the – vases – that you see 
30. L’orso – bruno – ha – alcuni – dei – vasetti – che vedi 
 The brown – bear – has – some – of the – small jars – that you see 
31. La bambina – in rosa – ha – alcune – delle – stelle – che vedi 
 The little girl – in pink – has – some – of the – stars – that you see 
32. Il bambino – in verde – ha – alcuni – dei – secchi – che vedi 
 The little boy – in green – has – some – of the – baskets – that you see  
 
Infelicitous sentences with the quantifier “some” 
 
33. Il – bambino – ha – alcune – delle mele – raccolte – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – some – of the harvested – apples – that you see   
34. La – bambina – ha – alcune – delle – stelle – che vedi 
 The – little girl – has – some – of the – stars – that you see 
35. La – nonna – ha – alcuni – dei – gattini – che vedi 
 The – old lady – has – some – of the – kittens – that you see 
36. La ragazza – in blu – ha – alcune – delle – sciarpe – che vedi 
 The girl – in blu – has – some – of the – scarves – that you see 
37. Il – cagnolino – ha – alcuni – degli – ossi – che vedi 
 The – little dog – has – some – of the – bones – that you see 
38. L’orso – grigio – ha – alcuni – dei – calamari – che vedi 
 The gray – bear – has – some – of the – calamari – that you see 
39. Il – bambino – ha – alcune – delle – palette – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – some – of the – small shovels – that you see 
40. Il – bambino – ha – alcune – delle – sveglie – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – some – of the – alarm clocks – that you see 
41. La – ragazza – porta – alcuni – dei – libri – che vedi 
 The – girl – carries – some – of the – books – that you see 
42. La – scimmia – ha – alcune – delle – ghiande – che vedi 
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 The – monkey – has – some – of the – acorns – that you see 
43. Lo gnomo – in blu – ha – alcuni – dei – funghi – che vedi 
 The gnome – in blue – has – some – of the – mushrooms – that you see  
44. Il cane – sta – cacciando – alcuni – dei – topini – che vedi 
 The dog – is – hunting – some – of the – mice – that you see 
45. Il – bambino – ha – alcuni – dei – regali – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – some – of the – presents – that you see 
46. Il – pappagallo – ha – alcune – delle – banane – che vedi 
 The – parrot – has – some – of the – bananas – that you see 
47. Il – bambino – ha – alcuni – dei – pasticcini – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – some – of the – pastries – that you see 
48. La ragazza – in rosa – ha – alcune – delle – sciarpe – che vedi 
 The girl – in pink – has – some – of the – scarves – that you see 
49. L’orso – grigio – ha – alcuni – dei – vasetti – che vedi 
 The gray – bear – has – some – of the – small jars – that you see 
50. Il – signore – ha – alcuni – dei – cani – che vedi 
 The – man – has – some – of the – dogs – that you see 
51. L’elfo – natalizio – ha – alcuni – degli – orsacchiotti – che vedi 
 The Christmas – elf – has – some – of the – teddy bears – that you see 
52. La – ragazza – ha – alcuni – dei – gatti – che vedi 
 The – girl – has – some – of the – cats – that you see 
53. Il – ragazzo – ha – alcuni – dei – pappagalli – che vedi 
 The – boy – has – some – of the – parrots – that you see 
54. Il – pinguino – ha – alcuni – dei – berretti – che vedi 
 The – penguin – has – some – of the – caps – that you see 
55. Il – coniglio – ha – alcune – delle – carote – che vedi 
 The – bunny – has – some – of the – carrots – that you see 
56. Il – cuoco – ha – alcuni – dei – cucchiai – che vedi 
 The – chef – has – some – of the – spoons – that you see 
57. Il – ragazzo – ha – alcuni – dei – frutti – che vedi 
 The – boy – has – some – of the – fruits – that you see 
58. Il – topo – ha – alcuni – dei – formaggini – che vedi 
 The – mouse – has – some – of the – cheeses – that you see 
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59. Lo – scoiattolo – ha – alcune – delle – mele – che vedi 
 The squirrel – has – some – of the – apples – that you see 
60. La – ragazza – ha – alcuni – degli – zaini – che vedi 
 The – girl – has – some – of the – rucksacks – that you see 
61. Il – bambino – ha – alcune – delle – caramelle – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – some – of the – candies – that you see 
62. Il – fruttivendolo – ha – alcune – delle – lattughe – che vedi 
 The – greengrocer – has – some – of the – lattuces – that you see 
63. L’orso bruno – ha – preso – alcuni – dei – vasetti – che vedi 
 The brown bear – has – brought – some – of the – little jars – that you see 
64. Il – ragazzo – ha – alcuni – dei – birilli – che vedi 
 The – boy – has – some – of the – bowling pins – that you see 
 
Fillers: 
 
Fillers with the quantifier “all” in true context. 
 
65. Il – bambino – ha – tutti – i – palloni – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – all – the – balls – that you see 
66. La – bambina – ha – tutte – le – matite – che vedi 
 The – little girl – has – all – the – pencils – that you see 
67. Il – delfino – ha – tutti – i – birilli – che vedi 
 The – dolphin – has – all – the – bowling pins – that you see 
68. Il – pinguino – ha – tutti – i – calamari – che vedi 
 The – penguin – has – all – the – calamari – that you see 
69. Il – bambino – ha – tutti – i – disegni – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – all – the – drawings – that you see 
70. La – ragazza – ha – tutti – i – pasticcini – che vedi 
 The – girl – has – all – the – pastries – that you see 
71. Il – cane – ha – tutti – i – polli arrosto – che vedi 
 The – dog – has – all – the – roasted chicken – that you see 
72. Il – cane grande – ha – tutti – gli – ossi – che vedi 
 The – big dog – has – all – the – bones – that you see 
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73. La – ragazza – ha – tutti – i – cani – che vedi 
 The – girl – has – all – the – dogs – that you see 
74. La – vecchietta – ha – tutti – i – pasticcini – che vedi 
 The – old lady – has – all – the – pastries – that you see 
75. Il – gatto grigio – ha – tutte – le – palline – che vedi 
 The – gray cat – has – all – the – little balls – that you see 
76. La – bambina – ha – tutte – le – bambole – che vedi 
 The – little girl – has – all – the – dolls – that you see 
77. L’orso – bruno – ha – tutti – i – birilli – che vedi 
 The brown – bear – has – all – the – bowling pins – that you see 
78. Il – bambino – ha – tutte – le – bambole – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – all – the – dolls – that you see 
79. Il – bambino – ha – tutti – i – pasticcini – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – all – the – pastries – that you see 
80. La – tartaruga – ha – tutte – le – carote – che vedi 
 The – tortoise – has – all – the – carrots – that you see 
81. Nel – recinto – ci sono – tutti – i – bambini – che vedi 
 In the paddock – there are – all – the – children – that you see 
82. Il – cane – ha – tutte – le – ciotole – che vedi 
 The  dog – has – all – the – bowls – that you see 
83. Il – cane – ha – tutti – i – formaggini – che vedi 
 The – dog – has – all – the – cheeses – that you see 
84. Il – pinguino – ha – tutti – i – pesci – che vedi 
 The – penguin – has – all – the – fishes – that you see 
85. Il – gatto – ha – tutti – i – pesci – che vedi 
 The – cat – has – all – the – fishes – that you see 
86. Lo – scoiattolo – ha – tutte – le – ghiande – che vedi 
 The – squirrel – has – all – the – acorns – that you see 
87. La – tartaruga – ha – tutte – le – lattughe – che vedi 
 The – tortoise – has – all – the – lettuces – that you see 
88. La – ragazza – ha – tutti – i – cani – che vedi 
 The – girl – has – all – the – dogs – that you see 
89. La – foca – ha – tutte – le – palle – che vedi 
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 The – seal – has – all – the – balls – that you see 
90. L’elefante – grigio – ha – tutte – le – banane – che vedi 
 The gray – elephant – has – all – the – bananas – that you see 
91. Il – pescatore – ha – tutti – i – pesci – che vedi 
 The – fisher – has – all – the – fishes – that you see 
92. Il – bambino – ha – tutte – le – matite – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – all – the – pencils – that you see 
93. La – ragazza – ha – tutte – le – forbici – che vedi 
 The – girl – has – all – the – scissors – that you see 
94. Il – macellaio – ha – tutti – i – coltelli – che vedi 
 The – butcher – has – all – the knives – that you see 
95. Babbo Natale – ha – tutte – le – bambole – che vedi 
 Santa Claus – has – all – the – dolls – that you see 
96. La – vecchietta – ha – tutti – i – fiori – che vedi 
 The – old lady – has – all – the flowers – that you see 
 
Fillers with the quantifier “all” in false context. 
 
97. Il – bambino – ha – tutti – i – fiori – che vedi 
 The – little boy – has – all – the – flowers – that you see 
98. La – bambina – ha – tutti – i – cucchiai – che vedi 
 The – little girl – has – all – the – spoons – that you see 
99. La – vecchietta – ha – tutte – le – caramelle – che vedi 
 The – old lady – has – all – the – candies – that you see 
100. Il – bambino – ha – tutte – le – bambole – che vedi 
  The – little boy – has – all – the – dolls – that you see 
101. Il – postino – ha – tutte – le – lattughe – che vedi 
  The – postman – has – all – the – lettuces – that you see 
102. Il – gatto – ha – tutti – i – formaggini – che vedi 
  The – cat – has – all – the – cheeses – that you see 
103. La ragazza – castana – ha – tutti – i – gatti – che vedi 
  The girl – with brown hair – has – all – the – cats – that you see 
104. La – strega – ha – tutti – i – gattini – che vedi 
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  The – witch – has – all – the – kittens – that you see 
105. La – nonna – ha – tutte – le – carote – che vedi 
  The – old lady – has – all – the carrots – that you see 
106. Il – gatto grigio – ha – tutte – le – ciotole – che vedi 
  The – gray cat – has – all – the – bowls – that you see 
107. Il – bambino – ha – tutte – le – mele – che vedi 
  The – little boy – has – all – the – apples – that you see 
108. Il – bambino – ha – tutte – le – palle – che vedi 
  The – little boy – has – all – the – balls – that you see 
109. La – vecchietta – ha – tutte – le – patate – che vedi 
  The – old lady – has – all – the – potatoes – that you see 
110. L’orso – bruno – ha – tutto – il – miele – che vedi 
  The brown – bear – has – all – the honey – that you see 
111. Babbo – Natale – ha – tutte – le – decorazioni – che vedi 
  Santa Claus – has – all – the – decorations – that you see 
112. La – bambina – ha – raccolto – tutti – i – fiori – che vedi 
  The – little girl – has – harvested – all – the – flowers – that you see 
113. La bambina – ha – mangiato – tutte – le – caramelle – che vedi 
  The little girl – has – eaten – all – the – candies – that you see 
114. Nel salvadanaio – si – trovano – tutte – le – monete – che vedi 
  In the moneybox – there – are – all – the – coins – that you see 
115. Sopra – al camino – ci sono – tutte – le – sveglie – che vedi 
  On – the fireplace – there are – all – the – alarm clocks – that you see 
116. Sopra – alla poltrona – ci sono – tutti – i – libri – che vedi 
  On – the armchair – there are – all – the – books – that you see 
117. Sopra – al letto – ci sono – tutte – le – bambole – che vedi 
  On – the bed – there are – all – the – dolls – that you see 
118. Nella – buca – ci sono – tutti – gli – ossi – che vedi 
  In the – hole – there are – all – the – bones – that you see 
119. Sul – letto – ci sono – tutte – le – stelline – che vedi 
  On – the bed – there are – all – the – stars – that you see 
120. Nel – fiume – ci sono – tutte – le – pietre – che vedi 
  On – the river – there are – all – the – stones – that you see 
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121. L’uccello – ha – preso – tutti – i – vermi – che vedi 
  The bird – has – caught – all – the – worms – that you see 
122. La ragazza – castana – ha – tutti – gli – uccelli – che vedi 
  The girl – with brawn hair – has – all – the birds – that you see 
123. La – nonnina – ha – tutte – le – pagnotte – che vedi 
  The – old lady – has – all – the – loaves – that you see 
124. Il – ragazzo – ha – tutti – i – cani – che vedi 
  The – boy – has – all – the – dogs – that you see 
125. Il cagnolino – sta – rincorrendo – tutti – i – gattini – che vedi 
  The little dog – is – chasing – all – the – kittens – that you see 
126. Il gatto – è seduto – sopra a – tutti – i – libri – che vedi 
  The cat – is sitting – on – all – the – books – that you see 
127. Il gattino – sta – cacciando – tutti – gli – uccelli – che vedi 
  The kitten – is – chasing – all – the – birds – that you see 
128. L’uccello verde – ha – preso – tutto – il – pane – che vedi 
  The green bird – has – caught – all – the bread – that you see 
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Musical stimuli 
 
Numbers are related to the sentences above. 
 
Musical sentences in tune 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
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4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 139 
 
8 
 
 
33 
 
 
34 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
 140 
 
36 
 
 
37 
 
 
38 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 141 
 
40 
 
 
65 
 
 
66 
 
 
67 
 
 
 
 
 
 142 
 
68 
 
 
69 
 
 
70 
 
 
71 
 
 
 
 
 
 143 
 
 
72 
 
 
97 
 
 
98 
 
 
99 
 
 
 
 
 144 
 
 
100 
 
 
101 
 
 
102 
 
 
103 
 
 
 
 
 
 145 
 
 
104 
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Musical sentences (in tune) with the augmented chord. 
 
All these musical stimuli are in tune. Here, it is not stressed the augmented chord, 
however, it was always concomitant to the quantifier (either some or all), that is the 
first quarter in the second bar.  
Numbers are related to the linguistic sentences above. 
 
25 
 
 
26 
 
 
27 
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28 
 
 
29 
 
 
30 
 
 
31 
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32 
 
 
57 
 
 
58 
 
 
59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 149 
60 
 
 
61 
 
 
62 
 
 
63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 150 
64 
 
 
89 
 
 
90 
 
 
91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 151 
92 
 
 
93 
 
 
94 
 
 
95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 152 
96 
 
 
121 
 
 
122 
 
 
123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 153 
124 
 
 
125 
 
 
126 
 
 
127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 154 
128 
 
 
 155 
Musical sentences with dissonant target chord. 
 
Numbers are related to the linguistic sentences above. 
 
9 
 
 
10 
 
 
11 
 
 
12 
 
 
 156 
13 
 
 
14 
 
 
15 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 157 
41 
 
 
42 
 
 
43 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 158 
45 
 
 
46 
 
 
47 
 
 
48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 159 
73 
 
 
74 
 
 
75 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 160 
77 
 
 
78 
 
 
79 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 161 
105 
 
 
106 
 
 
107 
 
 
108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 162 
109 
 
 
110 
 
 
111 
 
 
112 
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Pictures in the “Some Felicitous” conditions. 
 
Numbers are related to the sentences above. 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
 
8 
 
 
9 
 
 
10 
 
 
11 
 
 
12 
 
 
13 
 
 
14 
 
 
15 
 
 
16 
 
 
17 
 
 
18 
 
 
19 
 
 164 
 
20 
 
 
21 
 
 
22 
 
 
23 
 
 
24 
 
 
25 
 
26 
 
 
27 
 
 
28 
 
 
29 
 
 
30 
 
 
31 
 
32 
 
 
33 
 
 
34 
 
 
35 
 
 
36 
 165 
Pictures in the “Some Infelicitous” conditions. 
 
 
37 
 
38 
 
 
39 
 
 
40 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
43 
 
 
44 
 
 
45 
 
 
46 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
48 
 
 
49 
 
 
50 
 
 
51 
 
 166 
 
52 
 
 
53 
 
 
54 
 
 
55 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
 
57 
 
 
58 
 
 
59 
 
 
60 
 
 
 
61 
 
 
 
62 
 
 
63 
 
 
64 
 
 
65 
 
 
 
66 
 
 
 167 
 
67 
 
 
 
 
68 
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Pictures in the fillers with “All” in True contexts  
 
 
 
69 
 
 
 
70 
 
 
 
71
 
72 
 
 
73 
 
 
74 
 
 
75 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
78 
 
 
79 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
81 
 
 
82 
 
 
83 
 
 169 
 
84 
 
 
85 
 
 
86 
 
 
87 
 
 
88 
 
 
89 
 
 
90 
 
 
91 
 
 
92 
 
 
93 
 
 
94 
 
 
95 
 
 
96 
 
 
97 
 
 
98 
 
 
99 
 
 
100 
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Pictures in the fillers with “All” in False contexts  
 
 
 
 
101 
 
 
 
102 
 
 
 
103 
 
 
 
104 
 
 
 
105 
 
 
 
106 
 
 
 
107 
 
 
 
108 
 
 
 
109 
 
 
 
110 
 
 
 
111 
 
 
 
112 
 
 
 
113 
 
 
 
114 
 
 
 
115 
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116 
 
 
117 
 
 
118 
 
 
119 
 
 
120 
 
 
121 
 
 
122 
 
 
123 
 
 
124 
 
 
125 
 
 
126 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
 
128 
 
 
129 
 
 
130 
 
 
131 
 
 
132 
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APPENDIX C: Statistic Tables – Experiment 1 
 
 
Table 1, Descriptive plot for accuracy in Experiment 1 
  group Mean SD N 
M .02 .0616 20 
NM .036 .1002 22 
ACC 
SFNO 
Total .029 .0835 42 
M .0 .0 20 
NM .009 .0426 22 
ACC SFMI 
Total .005 .0309 42 
M .170 .2364 20 
NM .327 .2931 22 
ACC SINO 
Total .252 .2761 42 
M .310 .3275 20 
NM .373 .2640 22 
ACC SIMI 
Total .343 .2940 42 
 
 
 
Table 2, mixed-design ANOVA (2×2×2) for Accuracy, Experiment 1 
  df F Sig. 
Effect 
size 
1 48.098 .000 .546 Language 
40       
Language × Group 1 1.465 .233 .035 
 40    
1 3.533 .067 .081 Music 
40       
1 1.918 .174 .046 Music × Group 
40       
1 6.427 .015 .138 Language × Music 
40       
1 .904 .347 .022 Language × Music × 
Group 40       
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Table 3, Descriptive plot for Reaction Times in Experiment 1 
  Group Mean SD N 
M 1527.09 638.07 16 
NM 1532.20 473.70 19 
RT 
SFNO 
Totale 1529.86 546.28 35 
M 1507.63 582.99 16 
NM 1662.07 621.23 19 
RT SFMI 
Totale 1591.47 600.29 35 
M 1447.60 466.18 16 
NM 1788.02 574.41 19 
RT SINO 
Totale 1632.40 547.87 35 
M 1553.96 688.81 16 
NM 1864.18 839.80 19 
RT SIMI 
Totale 1722.36 779.29 35 
 
 
 
Table 4, mixed-design ANOVA (2×2×2) for Reaction Time, Experiment 1 
  df F Sig. Effect size 
1 3.302 .078 .091 Language 
33       
1 4.415 .043 .118 Language × Group 
33       
1 1.147 .292 .034 Music 
33       
1 .190 .666 .006 Music × Group 
33       
1 .085 .772 .003 Language × Music 
33       
1 .528 .473 .016 Language × Music × 
Group 33       
 
 
 
Table 5, Descriptive plot of the t-test between SF Vs. SI, Musicians 
  Mean N SD 
RT SF 1558,038750 20 599,0953147 Pair 1 
RT SI 1668,795830 20 739,8207757 
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Table 6, Paired-samples t-test for Musicians, RT in Experiment 1 
  Mean SD t df Sig.  
Pair 1 RT FEL 
–  
RT INF 
-110.7570800 392.4067880 -1.262 19 .222 
 
 
 
Table 7, Descriptive plot of the t-test between SF Vs. SI, Non-musicians 
  Mean N SD 
RT FEL 1525,676518 22 516,0397985 Pair 1 
RT INF 1733,720073 22 641,7589728 
 
 
 
Table 8, Paired-samples t-test for Non-musicians, RT in Experiment 1 
 Mean SD t df Sig. 
Pair 1 RT FEL - 
RT INF 
-208.0435545 389.3266592 -2.506 21 .020 
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APPENDIX D: Statistic Tables – Experiment 2 
 
 
Table 9, Descriptive plot of the t-test MI vs MS divided per groups. M= group1; NM= group 2, Preliminary 
test 
Group     Mean N SD 
1 Pair 1 MI 5.33125 15 0.7762159 
    MS 3.6375 15 1.2596059 
2 Pair 2 MI 4.779297 16 0.7132004 
    MS 2.972656 16 0.7679175 
 
 
 
Table 10, Paired-sample t-test MI vs. MS for group 1 (musicians) and group 2 (non-musicians), Preliminary test 
Group   Mean SD t df Sig. 
1 MI - MS 1.6937500 .8515840 7.703 14 .000 
2 MI - MS 1.8066406 1.0519834 6.869 15 .000 
 
 
 
Table 11, Descriptive plot for Accuracy, Experiment 2 
  Group Mean SD N 
Mus .04 .059 20 
Nonmus .04 .060 22 
ACC 
SFNO 
Tot .04 .058 42 
Mus .03 .069 20 
Nonmus .03 .066 22 
ACC SFMI 
Tot .03 .067 42 
Mus .04 .084 20 
Nonmus .03 .054 22 
ACC SFMS 
Tot .04 .069 42 
Mus .06 .086 20 
Nonmus .05 .100 22 
ACC SFA 
Tot .05 .092 42 
Mus .02 .061 20 
Nonmus .16 .350 22 
ACC SINO 
Tot .10 .265 42 
Mus .11 .084 20 
Nonmus .28 .314 22 
ACC SIMI 
Tot .20 .249 42 
Mus .08750 .115423 20 ACC SIMS 
Nonmus .18750 .329027 22 
 176 
Tot .13988 .253335 42 
Mus .03 .065 20 
Nonmus .18 .327 22 
ACC SIA 
Tot .11 .251 42 
 
 
 
Table 12, mixed-design ANOVA (2×2×4) for accuracy, Experiment 2 
  df F Sig. Effect size 
1 6.183 .017 .134 
Language 
40       
1 4.097 .050 .093 Language × Group 
40       
2 5.630 .003 .123 
Music 
97       
2 1.328 .271 .032 
Music × Group 
97       
3 9.654 .000 .194 Language × Music 
120       
3 .640 .591 .016 Language × Music × Group 
120       
 
 
 
Table 13, Descriptive plot for Reaction Time, Experiment 2 
  Group Mean SD N 
M 1471.911 513.794 20 
NM 1396.515 501.376 18 
RT 
SFNO 
Totale 1436.197 502.507 38 
M 1385.671 450.433 20 
NM 1353.239 488.692 18 
RT SFMI 
Totale 1370.308 462.800 38 
M 1394.950 494.521 20 
NM 1290.400 538.470 18 
RT SFMS 
Totale 1345.426 511.468 38 
M 1426.168 502.620 20 
NM 1342.646 486.458 18 
RT SFA 
Totale 1386.605 490.143 38 
M 1463.443 506.263 20 
NM 1308.035 459.386 18 
RT SINO 
Totale 1389.829 484.521 38 
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M 1455.867 472.955 20 
NM 1318.079 558.437 18 
RT SIMI 
Totale 1390.599 512.845 38 
M 1470.805 473.808 20 
NM 1271.768 468.656 18 
RT SIMS 
Totale 1376.524 475.751 38 
M 1440.259 458.407 20 
NM 1473.267 584.373 18 
RT SIA 
Totale 1455.894 514.868 38 
 
 
 
Table 14, mixed-design ANOVA for Reaction Time data, Experiment 2 
  df F Sig. Effect size 
1 .387 .538 .011 Language 
36       
1 .527 .473 .014 Language × Group 
36       
3 1.076 .362 .029 Music 
108       
3 .906 .441 .025 Music × Group 
108       
3 1.058 .370 .029 Language × Music 
108       
3 1.178 .322 .032 Language × Music × Group 
108       
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